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Digital imaging has experienced tremendous growth in recent decades, and
digital images have been used in a growing number of applications. With such
increasing popularity of imaging devices and the availability of low-cost image
editing software, the integrity of image content can no longer be taken for granted.
A number of forensic and provenance questions often arise, including how an image
was generated; from where an image was from; what has been done on the image
since its creation, by whom, when and how. This thesis presents two different sets
of techniques to address the problem via intrinsic and extrinsic fingerprints.
The first part of this thesis introduces a new methodology based on intrin-
sic fingerprints for forensic analysis of digital images. The proposed method is
motivated by the observation that many processing operations, both inside and
outside acquisition devices, leave distinct intrinsic traces on the final output data.
We present methods to identify these intrinsic fingerprints via component forensic
analysis, and demonstrate that these traces can serve as useful features for such
forensic applications as to build a robust device identifier and to identify potential
technology infringement or licensing.
Building upon component forensics, we develop a general authentication and
provenance framework to reconstruct the processing history of digital images. We
model post-device processing as a manipulation filter and estimate its coefficients
using a linear time invariant approximation. Absence of in-device fingerprints,
presence of new post-device fingerprints, or any inconsistencies in the estimated
fingerprints across different regions of the test image all suggest that the image is
not a direct device output and has possibly undergone some kind of processing,
such as content tampering or steganographic embedding, after device capture.
While component forensics is widely applicable in a number of scenarios, it
has performance limitations. To understand the fundamental limits of component
forensics, we develop a new theoretical framework based on estimation and pattern
classification theories, and define formal notions of forensic identifiability and clas-
sifiability of components. We show that the proposed framework provides a solid
foundation to study information forensics and helps design optimal input patterns
to improve parameter estimation accuracy via semi non-intrusive forensics.
The final part of the thesis investigates a complementing extrinsic approach
via image hashing that can be used for content-based image authentication and
other media security applications. We show that the proposed hashing algorithm is
robust to common signal processing operations and present a systematic evaluation
of the security of image hash against estimation and forgery attacks.
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Visual sensor technologies have experienced tremendous growth in recent decades.
The resolution and quality of electronic imaging has been steadily improving, and
digital cameras are becoming ubiquitous. Shipment of digital cameras alone has
grown from $46.4 million in 2003 to $62 million in 2004, and this forms an approx-
imately $15 billion market worldwide [5]. Digital images taken by various imaging
devices have been used in a growing number of applications, from military and
reconnaissance to medical diagnosis and consumer photography. Consequently, a
series of new forensic issues arise amidst such rapid advancement and widespread
adoption of imaging technologies. For example, one can readily ask what kinds of
hardware and software components as well as their parameters have been employed
inside the devices? Given a digital image, which imaging sensor or which brand of
sensors was used to acquire the image? What kinds of legitimate processing and
undesired alteration have been applied to an image since it leaves the device? How
would you authenticate such device captured images?
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Some of these forensic questions are related to identifying the source of the
digital image, and determining possible tampering or presence of hidden data.
Evidence obtained from such forensic analysis would provide useful forensic in-
formation to law enforcement and intelligence agencies as to if the given image
was actually captured with a camera (or generated by other means) and to estab-
lish the authenticity of the digital image. In this thesis, we present two different
approaches to address this problem based on intrinsic and extrinsic fingerprints.
Intrinsic fingerprints are internal traces left behind on the final digital image
by the image capturing device. Each digital device can be broken into a number
of its internal components, each performing a particular role. When the device
is used to take a picture, the information of the real-world scene passes through
the digital device and through each of its internal components before the final
image is formed. Each of these components in the digital device modifies the
input scene via a particular algorithm and leaves some intrinsic fingerprint traces
on the final output. In this thesis, we develop a new forensic methodology called
component forensics, which aims at identifying the intrinsic fingerprints left behind
by each component inside a visual device by inferring what algorithms/processing
are employed and estimating their parameter settings. Building upon component
forensics, we extend these ideas to address a number of larger forensic issues in
discovering technology infringement, protecting intellectual property rights, and
identifying acquisition devices.
For centuries, intellectual property protection has played a crucial role in fos-
tering innovation, as it has been known for “adding the fuel of interest to the fire
of genius” since the time of Abraham Lincoln. Fierce competition in the elec-
tronic imaging industry has led to an increasing number of infringement cases filed
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in U.S. courts. The remunerations awarded to successful prosecution have also
grown tremendously, sometimes in billions of dollars. For example, the Ampex
Corporation has more than 600 patents related to digital cameras; and based on
one of the patents it has received more than $275-million compensation from law-
suits and settlements involving patent infringement cases with many digital camera
vendors [4].
According to the U.S. patent law [1], infringement of a patent consists of the
unauthorized making, using, offering for sale or selling any patented invention
during the term of its validity. Patent infringement is considered one of the most
difficult to detect, and even harder to prove in the court of law. The burden of
proof often lies on patent holders, who are expected to provide solid evidence to
substantiate their accusations. A common way to perform infringement analysis is
to examine the design and implementation of a product and to look for similarities
with what have been claimed in existing patents, through some type of reverse
engineering. However, this approach could be very cumbersome and ineffective.
For example, it may involve going over VHDL design codes of an IC chip in charge
of core information processing tasks, which is a daunting task even to the most
experienced expert in the field. Such analysis is often limited to the implementation
of an idea rather than the idea itself, and thus could potentially lead to misleading
conclusions [93,144]. Component forensics is an important methodology to detect
patent infringement and protect intellectual property rights, by obtaining evidence
about the algorithms employed in various components of the digital device.
Component forensics also serves as a foundation to establish the trustworthi-
ness of imaging devices [131]. With the fast development of tools to manipulate
multimedia data, the integrity of both content and acquisition device has become
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particularly important when images are used as critical evidence in journalism, re-
connaissance, and law enforcement applications. For example, information about
hardware/software modules and their parameters in a camera can help in building
camera identification systems. Such systems would provide useful acquisition foren-
sic information to law enforcement and intelligence agencies about which camera
or which brand of camera is used to acquire an image. Additionally, component
forensics helps establish a solid model on the characteristics of images obtained di-
rectly from a camera. This in turn will facilitate tampering forensics to determine
if there has been any additional editing and processing applied to an image after
it has been captured by the camera.
We can classify component forensics into three main categories based on the
nature of the available evidence:
1. Intrusive Forensics: A forensic analyst has access to the device in question
and can disassemble it to carefully examine every part, including analyzing
any available intermediate signals and states to identify the algorithms em-
ployed in its processing blocks.
2. Semi Non-Intrusive Forensics: An analyst has access to the device as
a black box. He/she can design appropriate inputs to be fed into the de-
vice so as to collect forensic evidence about the processing techniques and
parameters of the individual components inside.
3. Non-Intrusive Forensics: An analyst does not have access to the device in
question. He/she is provided with some sample data produced by the device,
and studies them to gather forensic evidence.
The proposed research focuses on completely non-intrusive and semi non-intrusive
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component forensics of visual sensors, while the suggested technologies can be ex-
tended to other types of acquisition models. As a new addition to the emerging
field of digital forensic engineering, we propose a novel framework for analyzing
technologies employed inside digital cameras solely on output images/videos, and
develop a set of forensic signal processing algorithms to identify the parameters of
such important camera components as color filter array, color interpolation, and
white balancing. In the first part of this thesis, we show that successful develop-
ment of the proposed intrinsic fingerprint methodologies offer a powerful framework
and solutions to a large number of critical forensic issues.
The final part of this thesis addresses the problem of multimedia forensics via
extrinsic fingerprinting. Extrinsic fingerprints are external signals that are added
to the image by the device after the image has been captured. These external
signals can then be used to establish the authenticity of digital data and determine
possible tampering. Compared with non-intrusive forensic analysis via intrinsic
fingerprints, the use of extrinsic fingerprints necessitates the presence of the device
at hand as the fingerprint needs to be added at the time of image acquisition.
While this requirement imposes some additional constraints on their applicability,
extrinsic fingerprinting techniques help build a content-based image authentication
scheme that is collision-resistant, robust to common signal processing operations,
and secure against estimation and forgery attacks, as will be shown in the thesis.
1.2 Thesis Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce a system
model for digital imaging devices and identify the main components that go into
the making of the digital device and formulate the problem.
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Chapter 3 considers the problem of non-intrusive component forensics and pro-
poses a set of forensic signal processing techniques to identify the algorithms and
parameters employed in individual processing modules in digital devices. We show
through detailed simulations that the proposed algorithms are robust to various
kinds of postprocessing that may occur in the camera and demonstrate that the
estimated intrinsic fingerprint traces can be employed to provide forensic evidence
for patent infringement cases, intellectual property rights management, and tech-
nology evolution studies for digital media.
In Chapter 4, we propose a set of forensic signal processing techniques to verify
whether a given digital image is an direct device output or not. We introduce a
new formulation to study the problem of image authenticity based on the observa-
tion that each in-device and post-device processing operation leave some distinct
intrinsic fingerprint traces on the final image. We model post-device processing as
a linear shift-invariant system and estimate its coefficients using blind deconvolu-
tion. The absence of in-device fingerprints from a test image indicates that the test
image is not a direct output of a digital device and is possibly generated by other
image production processes. Any change or inconsistencies among the estimated
in-device fingerprints, or the presence of new types of fingerprints suggest that
the image has undergone some kind of processing after the initial capture, such as
tampering or steganographic embedding.
Complementing the methods in Chapter 3 and 4 that identify the algorithms
and parameters of various parts of the information processing chain, Chapter 5
presents the theoretical aspect of multimedia forensics to help understand its lim-
itations. Using ideas from estimation and pattern classification theories, we de-
fine formal notions of identifiability of components in the information processing
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chain. We show that the parameters of certain device components can be accu-
rately identified only in controlled settings through semi non-intrusive forensics,
while the parameters of some others can be computed directly from the available
sample data via complete non-intrusive analysis.
We extend the theoretical framework to quantify and improve the accuracies
and confidence in component parameter identification for several forensic applica-
tions. In Chapter 6, we specifically consider applications of the theoretical analysis
to semi non-intrusive forensics. We assume the availability of the digital device;
and introduce a forensic methodology to estimate the component parameters more
accurately by devising good testing conditions and designing optimal input pat-
terns. We experimentally verify that by careful choice of input and test conditions,
semi non-intrusive forensics can provide much lower errors and higher accuracies
in parameter estimation compared to completely non-intrusive forensics by better
capturing the intrinsic fingerprint traces.
Chapter 7 explores using extrinsic fingerprints in image authentication and
other media security applications. In this chapter, we develop a new algorithm for
generating an image hash based on Fourier transform features and controlled ran-
domization. We formulate the robustness of image hashing as a hypothesis testing
problem and evaluate the performance under various image processing operations.
We then introduce a general framework to study and evaluate the security of image
hashing systems by quantifying its uncertainty in terms of differential entropy. We
show that the proposed hash function can provide excellent tradeoffs between secu-




System Model and Problem
Formulation
In this chapter, we introduce the system model for digital imaging devices and
formulate the problem of multimedia forensics. For our work, we use visual sensors
and images captured by devices employing these sensors for illustration, while the
suggested techniques can be appropriately modified and extended to other types
of acquisition models, and sensing technologies.1
2.1 Image Acquisition Model in Digital Cameras
Figure 2.1 shows the image capture model in digital cameras. As illustrated in
the figure, light from a scene passes through a lens and optical filters, and is
finally recorded by an array of sensors. Few consumer-level color cameras directly
acquire full-resolution information for all three primary colors (usually red, green,
1In our ongoing work, we have extended the proposed forensic techniques for images produced





















Figure 2.1: Image acquisition model in digital cameras.
and blue).2 This is not only because of the high cost in producing a full-resolution
sensor for each of the three colors, but also due to the substantial difficulty involved
in perfectly matching the corresponding pixels and aligning the three color planes
together. For these reasons, most digital cameras use a color filter array (CFA) to
sample real-world scenes.
A color filter array consists of an array of color sensors, each of which captures
the corresponding color of the real-world scene at an appropriate pixel location.
Some examples of CFA patterns are shown in Figure 2.2. The Bayer pattern,
shown in left corner of Figure 2.2, is one of the most popular CFA patterns. It
uses a square lattice for the red and blue components of light and a diagonal
lattice for the green color. The sensors are aligned on a square grid with the green
color repeated twice compared to the corresponding red and blue sensors. The
higher rate of sampling for the green color component enables to better capture
the luminance component of light and thus provides better picture quality [6].
After CFA sampling, the remaining pixels are interpolated using the sampled data.
Color interpolation (also known as demosaicking) is an important step to produce
an output image with full resolution for all three color components [7, 112].
2New digital cameras employing Foveon X3 sensor, such as Sigma SD9 and Polaroid x530,









Figure 2.2: Sample color filter arrays.
To facilitate discussions, let S be the real-world scene to be captured by the
camera and let p be the CFA pattern matrix. S(x, y, c) can be represented as a
3-D array of pixel values of size H ×W ×C, where H and W represent the height
and the width of the image, respectively, and C = 3 denotes the number of color
components (red, green, and blue). The CFA sampling converts the real-world
scene S into a three dimensional matrix Sp of the form






S(x, y, c) if p(x, y) = c,
0 otherwise.
(2.1)
After the data obtained from the CFA is recorded, the intermediate pixel values
corresponding to the points where Sp(x, y, c) = 0 in (2.1) are interpolated using
its neighboring pixel values to obtain S
(I)
p .
The performance of color interpolation directly affects the quality of the image
captured by a camera [6,7,68]. There have been several commonly used algorithms
for color interpolation. These algorithms can be broadly classified into two cat-
egories, namely, non-adaptive and adaptive algorithms. Non-adaptive algorithms
apply the same type for interpolation for all pixels in a group. Some typical exam-
ples of non-adaptive algorithms include the nearest neighbor, bilinear, bicubic, and
smooth hue interpolations [7]. Traditionally, the bilinear and bicubic interpolation
algorithms are popular due to their simplicity and ease in hardware implementa-
tion. However, these methods are known to have significant blurring along edge
regions due to averaging across edges. More computationally intensive adaptive
10
algorithms employing edge directed interpolation, such as the gradient based [92]
and the adaptive color plane interpolation [56], have been proposed to reduce the
blurring artifacts.
After interpolation, the three images corresponding to the red, green and the
blue components go though a post-processing stage. In this stage, depending on
the camera make and model, the images may undergo different processing opera-
tions [6, 7] which might include white balancing, color correction, gamma correc-
tion, lens vignetting correction, lens distortion removal, denoising, etc. Finally,
the image may be JPEG compressed to reduce storage space to produce the out-
put image Sd. For our work, we model all such post-interpolation processing as a
combined post-processing block as shown in Figure 2.1.
2.2 Problem Formulation
In this thesis, we consider two approaches to multimedia forensics based on intrinsic
and extrinsic fingerprints. These approaches are summarized in Figure 2.3 and
Figure 2.4, respectively.
2.2.1 Forensic Analysis via Intrinsic Fingerprints
The system model for component forensics based on intrinsic fingerprint analysis is
shown in Figure 2.3. As discussed in Chapter 1, the problem of component forensics
deals with a methodology and systematic procedure to find the algorithms and
parameters employed in various components in the device. Component forensics
works by estimating the intrinsic fingerprint traces that are left behind in a digital














Figure 2.3: System model for intrinsic fingerprinting.
chain, and uses such traces for estimating component parameters. We classify the
intrinsic fingerprint traces into two categories, namely, in-camera and post-camera
fingerprints. Using a detailed imaging model, as described in Section 2.1, and its
component analysis, we estimate the intrinsic fingerprints of the various in-camera
processing operations. Specifically, we focus on such important camera components
as color filter array and color interpolation and present methods to identify them
based on the traces left behind on the final camera output (corresponding to the
point A in Figure 2.3). The details of this work are presented in Chapter 3.
After the image has been produced by the camera, additional processing op-
erations may be done using softwares such as Adobe Photoshop, Google Picasa,
GIMP, etc. to further improve the picture quality and/or tamper with the image.
In our system model, we represent such post-camera processing as an additional
manipulation block as shown in Figure 2.3. Given the test image St, we assume
that it is a manipulated camera output corresponding to the point B in Figure 2.3,
and is obtained by processing the actual camera output Sd (point A in the figure)
using the manipulation block. We introduce a two-step approach to detect post-
camera manipulations. In the first step, we characterize the properties of a direct
camera output using a camera model, and estimate its component parameters and

















Figure 2.4: System model for extrinsic fingerprinting.
on Sd as a combination of linear and non-linear operations in the second step,
and approximate them with a linear shift-invariant filter. The coefficients of this
manipulation filter, estimated using blind deconvolution, serve as our post-camera
fingerprints. In Chapter 4, we describe the estimation algorithm in detail.
2.2.2 Forensic Analysis via Extrinsic Fingerprints
As discussed in Chapter 1, extrinsic fingerprints are external signals added to the
image by the camera after capture. They can be employed to establish the au-
thenticity of images and determine possible tampering of hidden data. Figure 2.4
shows the system model for extrinsic fingerprinting. After the image has been
captured by the camera, the camera inserts an extrinsic fingerprint, either in the
form of a watermark embedded with the image or in the form of a hash appended
along with the image. The image is then transmitted over the manipulation chan-
nel along with the extrinsic fingerprint. At the receiver end, the authenticator
computes the extrinsic fingerprint of the manipulated image and compared them
with the ones transmitted along with the data for verifying its authenticity. A
high similarity among the estimated fingerprints from the manipulated image and
the transmitted fingerprints suggests that the image has not undergone any ma-
nipulation after capture. On the other hand, a low similarity implies that image
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has been manipulated via tampering or steganographic embedding operations. In
this way, extrinsic fingerprints can help establish the authenticity of multimedia






In this chapter, we consider the problem of non-intrusive forensic analysis of digital
cameras. We use sample images obtained from a digital camera under diverse and
uncontrolled scene settings to determine the algorithms (and their parameters)
employed in internal processing blocks. In particular, given an camera output im-
age Sd (refer Figure 2.1), we focus on finding the color filter array pattern and
the color interpolation algorithms, and show that the forensic analysis results of
these components can be used as a first step in reverse engineering the making
of a digital camera. The features and acquisition models that we develop in this
chapter can be used to construct an efficient camera identifier that determines the
brand/type of camera used to take the image. Further, our forensic algorithms
can quantitatively help ascertain the similarities and differences among the cor-
responding camera components of different cameras. For devices from different
vendors, the digital forensic knowledge obtained from such analysis can provide
clues and evidence on technology infringement or licensing, which we shall refer to
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as infringement/licensing forensics and will assist the enforcement of intellectual
rights protection and foster technology innovation. For devices of the same brand
but of different models released at different years and/or at various price tiers, our
analysis forms a basis of evolutionary forensics, as it can provide clues on technol-
ogy evolution. In the subsequent sections, we describe our proposed methodology
and algorithms, and demonstrate their effectiveness with detailed simulation re-
sults and case studies. Later in Chapter 4, we show that the component forensic
techniques can be employed to build a ground truth camera model to facilitate
tampering forensics.
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing prior work in non-
intrusive forensic analysis in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we present methods to
identify the CFA pattern and the color interpolation algorithm. We then illustrate
proofs of concept with synthetic data in Section 3.3.1 and present results with a
real data set of 19 cameras in Section 3.3.2. The estimated model parameters are
used to construct a camera identifier and to study the similarities and differences
among the cameras in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 generalizes the proposed methods
to extend to other devices. The chapter is summarized in Section 3.6.
3.1 Related Work on Non-Intrusive Forensics
In literature, methods have been proposed to help identify the brand and model of
the device just based on output data [10,14,15,21,26,69,70,70,75,83,112,136,136].
Choi et al. propose to employ the radial component of the lens distortion for cam-
era identification [26] based on their hypothesis that the radial component varies
among different camera models. The authors show through their simulation results
that they can achieve a classification accuracy close to 91% over three different
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camera models using this approach. In [70], Kharrazi et al. proposed a set of
34−features for camera identification aiming to model the image-capture process
in digital cameras. The set of features include: average pixel value, RGB pairs cor-
relation, neighbor distribution center of mass, RGB energy ratio, wavelet domain
statistics [36], and image quality metrics [10]. The authors employ SVM for classifi-
cation and report accuracies close to 88% when tested with pictures captured under
controlled input conditions from five camera models of three different brands. The
same set of features were also tested for camera identification in [136] where they
report accuracies close to 95% over four different camera models from two different
models again under controlled input conditions, and for cell phone camera identi-
fication in [21] with an accuracy close to 62.3% over 9 cell phone camera brands.
These work do not target at explicitly estimating the various components of the
information processing chain and only try to extract representative features for
camera identification. Further, it is not clear as to which of these features enables
identification, which might become very important in forensic investigations.
Chen and Hsu proposed a camera identification method based on camera gain
histograms and features obtained from modelling camera noise to obtain an ac-
curacy close to 85% over two camera models [25]. In [112], the authors employ
Expectation/Maximization (EM) algorithms to estimate the color interpolation
coefficients for forensic analysis. The authors first assume that the image pixels
belong to one of the two hypothesis: (a) the pixel is linearly correlated to its
neighbors and is obtained by a linear interpolation algorithm, and (b) the pixel is
not correlated to its neighbors. Based on this assumption, the authors propose a
two-step EM algorithm to estimate the CFA coefficients [112]. In the expectation
step, the probability of each sample belonging to the two models is estimated, and
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the specific form of the correlations is found in the Maximization step. The EM
algorithm generates two outputs: a two-dimensional probability map indicating
the likelihood of the pixel belonging to the two models and the weighting coeffi-
cients. Using these two outputs from the EM algorithm, Bayram et al. developed
a camera identification method employing the weighting coefficients and the peak
location and magnitudes of the frequency spectrum of the probability map as fea-
tures [15]. Images captured from two cameras under controlled input conditions
along with randomly acquired images from the Internet for the third camera were
used for in the experiments, and the authors report accuracies close to 84% on
three brands [15] when 20% of the 140 images were used in training and the re-
maining 80% employed in testing. Further improvements to this algorithm were
made in [14] by separately considering smooth and non-smooth regions in the im-
age to obtain accuracies close to 96% for three camera brands. Quadriatic pixel
correlation model was used in [83] where the color interpolation coefficients were
approximated by a linear model to give a classification accuracy close to 80%. Com-
pared with these work on camera identification [14,15,70,83,136], the component
forensics methodology described in this dissertation provides better discriminat-
ing power by doing a joint estimation of the CFA pattern and the interpolation
algorithm.
Geradts et al. examine the effects of CCD pixels and used them to match
images to the source camera [50]. Building upon these techniques Lukas et al. in-
troduced a method for camera identification by estimating the pixel non-uniformity
noise, which is a dominant component of the photo-response non-uniformity noise,
inherent to an image sensor to distinguish between two cameras of the same brand,
model, and set [85]. In the training phase of the algorithm, a wavelet based de-
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noising algorithm is employed to obtain an estimate of the pixel non-uniformity
noise and the random component of this noise is eliminated by averaging the es-
timates from a number of images. In the testing phase, to determine whether a
given image is captured by a digital camera or not, the noise pattern from the
image is obtained and correlated with the average noise pattern (also called the
‘reference pattern’) of the given digital camera. A correlation value greater than
the pre-chosen threshold suggests that the given image is from the digital camera.
The authors show that such an approach can identify the digital camera source
with 100% accuracy when tested with high quality images. While useful in some
forensic tasks when a suspicious camera is available for testing, this approach does
not provide information about the internal components and cannot be used for
identifying common features tied to the same camera models and brands.
Compared to these alternative approaches, the component forensic techniques
introduced in our work are less dependent on input scenes and are robust against
various common in-camera processing, and provide a high classification accuracy
over a much larger database, as will be seen in as will be seen in Section 3.3.2.
3.2 Parameter Estimation of Camera Components
In this section, we develop a robust and non-intrusive algorithm to jointly estimate
the CFA pattern and the interpolation coefficients by using only the output images
from cameras. The proposed algorithm is schematically illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Our algorithm estimates the color interpolation coefficients in each local region
through texture classification and linear approximation, and finds the CFA pattern
that minimizes the interpolation errors [125, 128].
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Figure 3.1: Algorithm to estimate color filter array and color interpolation coeffi-
cients.
practice in digital camera design. We observe that most commercial cameras use
a RGB type of CFA with a fixed periodicity of 2 × 2 that can be represented as
C1 C2 . . .




where Ci ∈ {R, G, B} is the color of the corresponding sensor at a particular
pixel location. In typical digital cameras, each of the three types of color sensors
(R, G, and B) appears at least once in a 2 × 2 cell, resulting in a total of 36
possible patterns in the search space, denoted by P. For every CFA pattern p in
the search space P, we estimate the interpolation coefficients in different types of
texture regions of the image by fitting linear filtering models. These coefficients
are then used to re-estimate the output image Ŝ
(p)
d , and find the interpolation error
(Ŝ
(p)
d − Sd). We now present the details of the proposed algorithm.
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3.2.1 Texture Classification and Linear Approximation
We approximate the color interpolation to be linear in chosen regions of the im-
age [123]. We divide the image into three kinds of regions based on the gradient
features in a local neighborhood. Defining Ix,y = Sd(x, y, p(x, y)), the horizontal
and vertical gradients at the location (x, y) can be found from the second order
gradient values using
Hx,y = |Ix,y−2 + Ix,y+2 − 2Ix,y|, (3.1)
Vx,y = |Ix−2,y + Ix+2,y − 2Ix,y|. (3.2)
The image pixel at location (x, y) is classified into one of the three categories:
• Region ℜ1 contains those parts of the image with a significant horizontal
gradient for which (Hx,y −Vx,y) > T , where T is a suitably chosen threshold;
• Region ℜ2 contains those parts of the image with a significant vertical gra-
dient and is defined by the set of points for which (Vx,y − Hx,y) > T ; and
• Region ℜ3 consists of the remaining parts of the image which are mostly
smooth.
Using the final camera output Sd and the assumed sample pattern p, we identify
the set of locations in each color of Sd that are acquired directly from the sensor
array. We approximate the remaining pixels to be interpolated with a set of linear
equations in terms of the colors of the pixels captured directly. In this process,
we obtain nine sets of linear equations corresponding to the three types of regions
ℜm(m = 1, 2, 3) and three color channels (R, G, B) of the image.
Let the set of Ne equations with Nu unknowns for a particular region and color
channel be represented as Ax = b, where A of dimension Ne×Nu and b of dimen-
sion Ne×1 specify the values of the pixels captured directly and those interpolated,
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respectively, and x of dimension Nu × 1 stands for the interpolation coefficients to
be estimated. To cope with possible noisy pixel values in A and b due to other
in-camera operations following interpolation (such as JPEG compression), we em-
ploy singular value decomposition [137] to estimate the interpolation coefficients.
Let A0 and b0 represent the ideal values of A and b in the absence of noise, and
the errors in A and b be denoted by E and r, respectively, so that
A = A0 − E, b = b0 − r,




subject to the constraint that A0x − b0 = 0. Equivalently this can be written as






































where vNu+1 represents the (Nu +1)
th right singular vector of the combined matrix
[A b].
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3.2.2 Finding the Interpolation Error and the CFA Sam-
pling Pattern
Once we find the interpolation coefficients in each region, we use them to re-
interpolate the sampled CFA output in the corresponding regions ℜm, to obtain
an estimate of the final output image Ŝ
(p)
d . Here, the superscript p denotes that
the output estimate is based on the choice of the CFA pattern p. The pixel-wise
difference between the estimated final output and the actual camera output image
is e(p) = Ŝ
(p)
d − Sd. The interpolation error matrix e(p) of dimension H ×W ×C is
obtained for all candidate search patterns p ∈ P. Denoting the interpolation error
in the red color component as e(p)(., ., 1) and so on, the final error is computed by
a weighted sum of the errors of the three color channels:
ε(p) = wR ||e(p)(., ., 1)||2F + wG ||e(p)(., ., 2)||2F + wB ||e(p)(., ., 3)||2F (3.6)
The CFA pattern p̂ = arg minp∈P ε(p) that gives the lowest overall absolute value
of the weighted error is chosen as the estimated pattern. The constants wR, wG,
and wB denote the corresponding weights used for the three color components (red,
green, and blue), and their values are based on the relative significance of the mag-
nitude of errors in the three colors. In our experiments, we choose wR = wB = 1
and wG = 2 to give more importance to the error in the green channel as it provides
more information about the luminance values of the pixel [6]. The interpolation
coefficients corresponding to the estimated CFA pattern p̂ for all three types of
regions and the three color channels are also obtained in this process. These co-
efficients can then be directly used to obtain the parameters of the components
in the imaging model, as will be shown later in Section 3.3.2. They can also be
processed to obtain further forensic evidence, as will be demonstrated by several
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case studies in Section 3.4.
3.2.3 Reducing the Search Space for CFA Patterns
The search space for the CFA patterns can be reduced using a hierarchial approach.
As an example, we synthetically generate a 512 × 512 image, sample it on the
Bayer pattern, and interpolate using the bicubic method. In Figure 3.2, we show
the detection statistics ds(p) given by
ds(p) =
ε(p)
H × W × (wR + wG + wB)
, (3.7)
and sorted in ascending order for the 36 different CFA patterns. In this case, the
Bayer pattern gave the lowest interpolation error and was correctly identified. A
closer look at the results in Figure 3.2 reveals that the detection statistics form
three separate clusters, with some values close to 0, some around 0.3 − 0.4, and
others close to 0.7. A similar trend is also observed for real camera data and other
synthetically generated images sampled on different CFA patterns and interpolated
with the six representative interpolation techniques reviewed in Appendix I of
this chapter. This observation forms the basis for the heuristic discussed in this
subsection to reduce the search space of the CFA patterns.
Figure 3.3 shows sample patterns from these three clusters. Cluster 1 includes
all 2× 2 patterns that have the same color along diagonal directions (either along
the main diagonal or off-diagonal), chosen among the three colors (red, green, or
blue). The remaining two spots can be filled in two different ways, giving a total
of 12 such patterns in the first cluster. Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 consists of patterns
that have the same color along the horizontally (or vertically) adjacent blocks of
the 2 × 2 grid. Cluster 2 has either red or blue color repeated to produce a total
of 16 possible patterns. The remaining eight patterns with green appearing twice
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form Cluster 3. In this example, the Bayer pattern is the actual color filter array
and the patterns from first cluster give lower errors compared to the other clusters.
The patterns from Cluster 3 gives the highest error values because the error in the
green color channel is penalized more with the weight assignment wG = 2 and
wR = wB = 1 in (3.6).
The observation of clustering of patterns into three groups helps us develop
a heuristic to reduce the search space of CFA patterns. We first divide the 36
patterns into three groups and choose one representative pattern from each of the
three classes. The interpolation error is then estimated for these representative
patterns to find the cluster that the actual CFA pattern is most likely to belong.
Finally, a full search is performed on the chosen cluster to find the pattern with
the lowest interpolation error. The number of searches required to find the optimal
solution can be reduced to around 10. If additional information about the patterns
are available, it may be used to further reduce the search space. For instance, a
forensic analyst may choose to test only on those CFA patterns that have two green
color components if he/she has such prior knowledge about the visual sensor.
3.2.4 Evaluating Confidence in Component Parameter Es-
timation
In addition to identifying the parameters of the internal building blocks of the
camera, it is also important to know the confidence level on the estimation result.
A higher confidence value in estimation would increase the trustworthiness of the
decision made by a forensic analyst.
We propose an entropy based metric to quantify the confidence level on the
estimation result. Given a test image, we estimate its interpolation coefficients and
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Sorted CFA Pattern Index
Figure 3.2: Sorted detection statistics in terms of normalized overall error for
different candidate search patterns.
Figure 3.3: Sample CFA patterns from the three clusters.
provide it as an input to a c−class SVM classifier that is trained on the coefficients
of the c candidate interpolation methods. The probability that a given test sample
comes from the ith class, qi, is estimated from the soft decision values using the
probabilistic SVM framework [148], and the test data point is classified into class k
if qk is larger than the other probabilities. Some details of the probabilistic SVMs
are included in Appendix II of this chapter for readers’ reference. The confidence
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where Υ(y) = z is defined as the inverse binary entropy function such that




The argument to the Υ function in (3.8) measures the entropy difference between
the distribution {qi} and a discrete uniform distribution, and the final value of η
is normalized to the range of [0, 1] to represent a probability.
To verify that the proposed metric η can reflect the confidence level, we examine
two extreme cases. When q = [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0], the decision of choosing the first















] where ǫ is a small positive real number, there is an almost
equal probability that the given data sample comes from any of the c classes. In
this case, the decision is made with a very low confidence and η also approaches
zero. For other values of q between these two extreme cases, the value of η would
lie in the interval [0, 1], with a higher value indicating more confidence in the
decision.
3.3 Experimental Results
3.3.1 Simulation Results with Synthetic Data
We use synthetic data constructed from 20 representative images to study the
performance of the proposed techniques. The original images are first downsampled
to remove the effect of previously applied filtering and interpolation operations.
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They are then sampled on the three different CFA patterns as shown in Figure 2.2.
Each of the sampled images are interpolated using one of the six interpolation
methods reviewed in Appendix I of this chapter, namely, (a) Bilinear, (b) Bicubic,
(c) Smooth Hue, (d) Median Filter, (e) Gradient based, and (f) Adaptive Color
Plane. Thus, our total dataset contains 20 × 3 × 6 = 360 images, each of size
512 × 512.
Simulation Results under no Post-processing
We test the proposed CFA pattern and color interpolation identification algorithms
on this synthetic data set. In the noiseless case with no post-processing, we observe
no errors in estimating the CFA pattern. We use a 7×7 neighborhood to estimate
the interpolation coefficients for the three color components in the three types of
texture regions, and pass it to a classifier to identify the interpolation algorithm. A
support vector machine (SVM) classifier with a third-degree polynomial kernel [19]
[22] is used to identify the interpolation method. We randomly choose 8 out of
the 20 images from each of the six interpolation techniques as ground truth for
training and the remaining 12 images for testing. We repeat the experiment 500
times with a random set of images each time. The classifier is 100% accurate in
identifying the correct color interpolation algorithm without any errors.
Simulation Results with Post-processing
As mentioned earlier, post-processing such as color correction and compression
are commonly done in nearly all commercial cameras. Therefore, to derive use-
ful forensic evidence from output images, it is very important that the proposed
methods be robust to the common post-processing operations done in cameras.
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In this work, we primarily focus on JPEG compression and additive noise, and
study the performance under these distortions. Other post-processing operations
such as color correction and white-balancing are typically multiplicative, where the
final image is obtained by multiplying the color interpolated image by appropriately
chosen constants in the camera color space. In most commercial cameras, white
balancing is done in the XY Z color space [150], and the inverse transformation
may be applied before estimating the color interpolation coefficients. The multi-
plicative factors used in white balancing operations operate on each color channel
separately [39], and therefore white balancing operations do not significantly affect
our solution of the color interpolation coefficients. Gamma correction can be esti-
mated from the final output images [34] and can be undone before computing the
interpolation coefficients. For the results presented in this sub-section, we directly
obtain the coefficients from the output images and do not perform inverse gamma
correction based on the estimated values of gamma. Later in Section 3.3.2, we
show that the estimation results are robust to gamma correction distortions.
(i) Performance Results Under JPEG compression: JPEG compression
is an important post-processing operation that is commonly done in cameras. The
noise introduced by compression could potentially result in errors in estimating
the color interpolation coefficients and the CFA pattern. We test the proposed
CFA pattern identification algorithm with the synthetic data obtained under dif-
ferent JPEG quality factors {20, 30, . . . , 80, 90, 99}. We find that in all cases, the
estimator gives very good results and the correct CFA pattern is always identified.
Next, we study the accuracy in identifying the color interpolation when the
synthetically generated images are JPEG compressed. Here, we consider two pos-
sible scenarios. In the first case, a forensic analyst does not have access to the
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camera(s) and therefore does not have control over the input(s) to the device.
He/she makes a judgement based on the forensic evidence obtained from the im-
ages submitted for trial. In this scenario, the pictures obtained with different
interpolation methods would correspond to different scenes, which we shall call
as the multiple-scene case. The performance of the proposed color interpolation
identification for the multiple-scene case at different JPEG quality factors is shown
in Figure 3.4(a). Here we use a total of 12 images (two distinct images for each of
the six interpolation methods) for training, and test with the remaining 8 images
under each interpolation (8 × 6 = 48 in total). The experiment is repeated 500
times by choosing a random training set each time. We observe that the average
percentage of images for which the interpolation technique is correctly identified
is around 95–100% for moderate to high JPEG quality factors of 80–1001 and the
average performance reduces to 80–85% for quality factors from 50–80.
Alternatively, if a forensic analyst has access to the camera, he/she can perform
controlled testing by choosing the input to the cameras so as to reduce the impact
of the input’s variation on the forensic analysis. In this scenario, the analyst
may consider taking similar images with all the cameras under study, in order
to improve the estimation accuracy and increase the confidence level on his/her
final judgement. We call this situation the single-scene case. The single-scene
case corresponds to the semi non-intrusive forensic analysis discussed earlier in
Chapter 1. The performance of the proposed color interpolation technique for this
case for different JPEG quality factors is shown in Figure 3.4(b). Here we use 8
images under the six interpolation techniques for training (48 in total) and the
1Most commercial digital cameras employ JPEG compression with quality factors between 80
and 100
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72 remaining images for testing. We observe that for most JPEG quality factors,
the average percentage of images for which the color interpolation technique is
correctly identified is around 96% and thus the forensic decision can be made with
a higher confidence compared to the multiple-scene case. The accuracy can be
further improved using more images with representative characteristics for training.
This suggests that with an increasing number of well-designed image inputs to the
system, the detection performance can be enhanced.
(ii) Performance Results Under Additive Noise: Additive noise can be used
to model the sensor noise and several other kinds of random post-processing opera-
tions that may occur during the scene capture process. In order to study the noise
resilience of a forensics system, we test the proposed CFA pattern identification
algorithm with the images obtained under different noise levels with peak-signal
to noise ratios (PSNRs) of 15, 20, 30, and 40 dB, respectively. The correct CFA
pattern was identified in all but one cases, and the only error occurred at an ex-
tremely low PSNR of 15dB for an image interpolated with the adaptive color plane
method. Even in this case, the correct pattern came in the top three results.
We then study the identification performance of the color interpolation method
under additive noise. The performance for synthetic data, averaged over 500 iter-
ations, for the multiple-scene and the single-scene case are shown in Figure 3.5(a)
and Figure 3.5(b), respectively. We observe that there is around 90% accuracy for
the multiple-scene case and it increases to around 95% for the single-scene scenario.
3.3.2 Results on Camera Data
A total of 19 camera models as shown in Table 3.1 are included in our experiments.
For each of the 19 camera models, we have collected about 40 images. The images
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(a) Multiple-Scene case (b) Single-Scene case
Figure 3.4: Fraction of images for which the color interpolation technique is cor-
rectly identified under different JPEG compression quality factors. The testing
results here are with the synthetic dataset.
from different camera models are captured under uncontrolled conditions−different
sceneries, different lighting situations, and compressed under different JPEG qual-
ity factors as specified by default values in each camera. The default camera set-
tings (including image size, color correction, auto white balancing, JPEG compres-
sion, etc.) are used in image acquisition. From each of these images, we randomly
choose five non-overlapping 512 × 512 blocks per image and use it for subsequent
analysis. Thus, our database consists of a total of 3800 different 512×512 pictures
with 200 samples for each of the 19 camera models.
Note that all the cameras in our database use RGB type of CFA pattern with
red, green, and blue sensors. The search space for CFA in our experiments focusses
on such RGB type CFA, since it has been widely employed in digital camera design
and most cameras in the market currently use this pattern or its variations. There
are a few exceptions in CFA designs, for example, some models use CMYG type of
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(a) Multiple-Scene case (b) Single-Scene case
Figure 3.5: Fraction of images for which the color interpolation technique is cor-
rectly identified under different noise PSNR’s. The testing results here are with
the synthetic dataset.
CFA that captures the cyan, magenta, yellow, and green components of light [7].
We believe that the proposed algorithms may be extended to identify CMYG type
CFA patterns by incorporating an appropriate set of CMYG combinations in the
search space, and we plan to test cameras with such patterns as part of our future
work.
Among RGB type CFA patterns, several layouts of the three types of color
filters have been used in practice. The 2 × 2 square arrangement is the most
popular and most digital cameras utilize a shifted variation of the Bayer pattern
to capture the real world scene. Recently introduced super CCD cameras [3] have
sensors placed as shown in Figure 3.6. To test the performance of the proposed
algorithms to such cameras, we include images from the Fujifilm Finepix A500
(camera no. 17) that uses super CCD [3] in our database.
As an initial step, we try to estimate the CFA pattern from the output images
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Table 3.1: Camera models used in experiments.
No. Camera Model No. Camera Model
1 Canon Powershot A75 11 Olympus C3100Z/C3020Z
2 Canon Powershot S400 12 Olympus C765UZ
3 Canon Powershot S410 13 Minolta DiMage S304
4 Canon Powershot S1 IS 14 Minolta DiMage F100
5 Canon Powershot G6 15 Casio QV 2000UX
6 Canon EOS Digital Rebel 16 FujiFilm Finepix S3000
7 Nikon E4300 17 FujiFilm Finepix A500
8 Nikon E5400 18 Kodak CX6330
9 Sony Cybershot DSC P7 19 Epson PhotoPC 650
10 Sony Cybershot DSC P72
Figure 3.6: Super CCD sensor pattern.
using the algorithm described in Section 3.2. The estimation results show with
a high confidence that all the cameras except Fujifilm Finepix A500 (camera no.
17) use shifted versions of the Bayer color filter array as their CFA pattern. For
instance, the estimated 2 × 2 CFA that minimized the fitting errors on JPEG
images from Canon EOS Digital Rebel (camera no. 6) and the Fujifilm Finepix
S3000 (camera no. 16) are shown in Figure 3.7(a) and (b), respectively. The
estimation results perfectly match these cameras’ ground-truth data obtained by
reading the headers of the raw image files produced by the two cameras.
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Figure 3.7: Sample CFA patterns for (a) Canon EOS Digital Rebel and (b) Fujifilm
Finepix S3000.
When testing the images from the Fujifilm Finepix A500 (camera no. 17) with
the same 36 square patterns in the CFA pattern search space, we notice that the
best 2×2 pattern in the search space is still a shifted version of the Bayer pattern.
However, we observe that the minimum error ε, as given by (3.6), is larger than
the ones obtained from other square-CFA cameras. Therefore, the overall decision
confidence is lower for this super CCD camera compared to the other cameras in
the database. Further, we also find that the CFA pattern estimation results are not
consistent across different images taken with the same camera, i.e., different images
from Fujifilm Finepix A500 give different shifted versions of the Bayer pattern as
the estimated CFA. Such inconsistencies in the results along with lower confidence
in parameter estimation could be an indication that the camera does not employ
a square CFA pattern. One possible approach to identify super CCD is to enlarge
the CFA search space to include these patterns. We plan to further investigate
this aspect in our future work to gather forensic evidence to distinguish super CCD
cameras and square CFA cameras.
Next, we try to estimate the color interpolation coefficients in different image
regions using the algorithm presented in Section 3.2.2. In our simulations, we find
the coefficients of a 7×7 filter in each type of region and color channel, thus giving


















Figure 3.8: Interpolation coefficients for the green channel for one sample image
taken with the Canon Powershot A75 camera for (a) Region ℜ1 with significant
horizontal gradient, (b) Region ℜ2 with significant vertical gradient, (c) Smooth
region ℜ3, (d) Coefficients of bicubic interpolation.
using the Canon Powershot A75 camera for the three types of regions in the green
image are shown in Figure 3.8. For region ℜ1 that corresponds to areas having
significant horizontal gradient, we observe that the value of the coefficients in the
vertical direction (0.435 and 0.441) are significantly higher than those in the hor-
izontal directions (0.218 and 0.204). This indicates that the interpolation is done
along the edge, which in this case is oriented along the vertical direction. Similar
corresponding inferences can be made from coefficients in region ℜ2 of significant
vertical gradient. Compared to these two regions, the coefficients in region ℜ3 have
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almost equal values in all four directions, and do not have any directional prop-
erties. Moreover, careful observation of the coefficients in region ℜ3 reveals their
close resemblance to the bicubic interpolation coefficients shown in Figure 3.8(d).
This suggests that it is very likely that the Canon Powershot A75 camera uses
bicubic interpolation for smooth regions of the image. Similar results obtained for
other camera models indicate with η = 96% confidence that all cameras use the
bicubic interpolation for handling smooth regions. This is consistent with com-
mon knowledge in image processing practice that bicubic interpolation is good for
regions with slowly changing intensity values [63].
3.4 Case Studies and Applications of Non-Intrusive
Forensic Analysis
In this section, we present case studies to illustrate the applications of the proposed
non-intrusive forensic analysis methodology for camera identification (acquisition
forensics), and for providing clues to identify infringement/licensing.
3.4.1 Identifying Camera Brand from Output Images
The color interpolation coefficients estimated from the image can be used as fea-
tures to identify the camera brand utilized to capture the digital image. As shown
in Section 3.3.2, most cameras employ similar kinds of interpolation techniques for
smooth regions. Therefore, we focus on non-smooth regions and use the coefficients
obtained from the horizontal gradient regions ℜ1 and vertical gradient regions ℜ2
as features to construct a camera brand identifier.
To obtain more reliable forensic evidence from the input image for camera
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identification, we first pre-process the image by edge detection to locate five sig-
nificant 512 × 512 blocks with the highest absolute sum of gradient values. The
interpolation coefficients corresponding to the regions ℜ1 and ℜ2, from all three
color channels, estimated from these 512 × 512 blocks are used as features for
identification.
We use a classification based framework to identify camera brand. For each
camera in the database, we collect 40 different images and obtain 200 different
512×512 image blocks by locating the top five regions with higher gradient values.
These 200 image blocks collected from each of the 19 cameras are grouped so that
all images from the same brand form one class. A 9−camera brand SVM classifier
with a polynomial kernel function [22] is constructed with 50% of the images
randomly chosen from each class for training. The remaining images are used in
testing and the process is repeated 500 times by randomly choosing a training set
each time. Table 3.2 shows the average confusion matrix, where the (i, j)th element
gives the percentage of images from camera brand−i that are classified to belong to
camera brand−j. The main diagonal elements represent the classification accuracy
and achieve a high average classification rate of 90% for nine camera brands. A
closer look at the remaining 10% of misclassified images suggest that most of them
have significant amount of smooth regions; these regions have less discriminating
capability because most digital cameras employ similar kind of interpolation in the
smooth regions as demonstrated earlier.
The above results demonstrate the effectiveness of using the color interpolation
component as features to differentiate different camera brands. The robustness of
estimating these features under JPEG and additive noise has been shown earlier
in Section 3.3.1. Here we further examine the robustness against such nonlinear
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Table 3.2: Confusion matrix for identifying different camera brands (* denotes
values smaller than 4%).
Canon Nikon Sony Olympus Minolta Casio Fuji Kodak Epson
Canon 96% * * * * * * * *
Nikon * 83% 5% * * * * * *
Sony * * 90% * * * * * *
Olympus * * * 93% * * * * *
Minolta 8% * * * 81% * * * *
Casio * * * 6% * 89% * * *
Fuji * * * * 7% * 87% * *
Kodak * * * * * * * 89% *
Epson * * * * * * * * 100%
point operations as gamma correction. As a common practice in digital camera
design, most cameras perform gamma correction with a γ = 1/2.2 to match the
luminance of the digital image with that of the display monitor. In order to test
the goodness of the proposed algorithms for gamma correction, we first do inverse
gamma correction with γ = 2.2 on the original camera images.2 The interpolation
coefficients are then estimated from these gamma corrected images and used in
camera brand identification. In this case, the confusion matrices are similar to the
ones in Table 3.2, and average identification accuracy was estimated to be 89%.
This negligible difference from the non-gamma correction case of 90% suggests
that the camera identification results are invariant to gamma correction in digital
2In a general scenario, the value of γ can be estimated from the output images [34] and the
corresponding inverse could be applied before estimating the interpolation coefficients.
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cameras.
As the problem of camera brand identification only received attention recently,
there is a very limited amount of related work to compare with. Some algorithms
were developed recently in [70] [15], where the authors test their algorithms for
pictures taken under controlled conditions with the same scene captured with mul-
tiple cameras (corresponding to the single-scene case discussed earlier in Section
V-A). The best performance initially reported in [15] is 84% on three brands, and
this algorithm is sensitive to other in-camera processing such as compression owing
to the dependence on image content by the null-based spectral features employed
in [15]. Concurrent to the present work, further improvements have been made
to the algorithm in [15] by separately obtaining the coefficients from smooth and
non-smooth regions of each image, leading to an enhanced classification accuracy
of 96% for three camera brands [14]. Compared to these alternative approaches,
the interpolation coefficients derived in our work by exploring the spatial filtering
relations are less dependent on input scenes and are robust against various com-
mon in-camera processing. The formulation of minimizing noise norm via (3.5)
further helps mitigate the impact from noise, compression, and other in-camera
processing. As a result, the features obtained from the proposed component foren-
sics methodologies are able to achieve a high classification accuracy over a much
larger dataset with 19 camera models from nine different brands. Further, as will
be demonstrated later in this section, the proposed component forensic techniques
have a broader goal of identifying the algorithms and parameters employed in
various components in digital cameras, and are not restricted to camera brand
identification.
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3.4.2 Identifying Camera Model from Output Images
Our results in the previous subsection demonstrate the robustness of non-intrusively
identifying the camera brand using the color interpolation coefficients as features.
In this subsection, we extend our studies to answer further forensic questions to
find the exact camera model used to capture a given digital image, and examine
the performance in identifying the camera model.
We use 200 images from each of the 19 cameras in our experiments. Out of these
200 images, a randomly chosen 125 images are used for training and the remaining
are for testing with a 19−camera model SVM classifier. The simulation is repeated
500 times with different training sets and the average confusion matrix is shown
in Table 3.3. The (i, j)th element in the confusion matrix gives the fraction of
images from camera model−i classified as camera model−j. In order to highlight
the significant values of the table, we show only those set of values that are greater
than or equal to a chosen threshold λ = 1/Nc, where Nc is the number of cameras
(λ = 1/19 in our experiments). The average classification accuracy is 86% for 19
camera models.
The classification results reveal some similarity among different camera models
in handling interpolation, as there are some off-diagonal elements that have a non-
zero value greater than the threshold of 1/19. For example, among the Canon
Powershot S410 (camera no. 3) images, 20% were classified as belonging to Canon
Powershot S400 (camera no. 2). A similar trend is also observed for images from
other Canon models. These results indicate that the color interpolation coefficients
are quite similar among the Canon models and hence it is likely that they are using
similar kinds of interpolation methods.
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Table 3.3: Confusion matrix for identifying different camera models. The matrix
is divided based on different camera makes. The values below the threshold λ = 1
19






























3.4.3 Similarities in Camera Color Interpolation Algorithms
Motivated by the results in the previous subsection, we further analyze the similar-
ity between the camera models in this subsection, and propose metrics to quantita-
tively evaluate the closeness among interpolation coefficients from several cameras.
Studying Similarities in Cameras using Leave-One-Out
We perform additional experiments to identify the camera models with similar
color interpolation by a leave-one-out procedure. More specifically, we train the
classifier by omitting the data from one of the camera models and test it with
these coefficients, to find the nearest neighbor in the color interpolation coefficient
space. For instance, when we train the SVM using all the 200 images from 18
cameras except Canon Powershot S410 (Camera no. 3), and then test it using
the 200 images from Canon Powershot S410, we observe that 66% of the Canon
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Powershot S410 images are classified as Canon Powershot S400. Furthermore, out
of the remaining images, 28% of the pictures are classified as one of the remaining
Canon models. The reverse trend is also observed when we train with all the
images except Canon Powershot S400 (camera no. 2) and use these images for
testing. Around 45% of the Canon Powershot S400 pictures are classified as Canon
Powershot S410, 19% are categorized as Canon Powershot A75, and 15% of the
remaining guessed as some other Canon model. This result suggests that there is
a considerable amount of similarity in the kind of interpolation algorithms used by
various Canon models.
A similar trend is also observed for the two Sony cameras in our database.
We note that around 66% of the Sony Cybershot DSC P7 model are classified as
Sony Cybershot DSC P72 model when the former was not used in training. These
results indicate the similarities in the kind of interpolation algorithm among various
models of the same brand. Interestingly, we also observe similarity between Minolta
DiMage S304 and Nikon E4300. Around 53% of the Minolta DiMage S304 pictures
are designated as Nikon E4300 camera model. This suggests closeness between the
interpolation coefficients in the feature space.
Quantifying Similarity in Color Interpolation with a Divergence Score
From our preliminary analysis in Section 3.3.2, we observe that the majority of the
cameras use similar kinds of interpolation techniques in handling smooth regions.
We thus focus our attention on the type of interpolation used by a camera in the
non-smooth regions. We extend our interpolation coefficient estimation model in
Section 3.2.2 to explicitly target at non-smooth regions in the image. To do so, we
divide the image into eight types of regions depending on the relative gradient esti-
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mates in eight directions (namely north, east, west, south, north-east, north-west,
south-east, and south-west). The gradient values can be obtained following the
threshold-based variable number of gradients (VNG) algorithm [23]. For example,
the gradient in the north direction JN is obtained using
JN(x, y) = |Ix−1,y − Ix+1,y| + |Ix−2,y − Ix,y|
+ 0.5 × |Ix−1,y−1 − Ix+1,y−1| + 0.5 × |Ix−1,y+1 − Ix+1,y+1|
+ 0.5 × |Ix−2,y−1 − Ix,y−1| + 0.5 × |Ix−2,y+1 − Ix,y+1|, (3.9)
where Ix,y = Sd(x, y, p(x, y)) represents the image pixel sample. Similar expressions
for gradients in the remaining seven directions can be developed to find the local
gradient values [23]. Once these gradients are obtained, they are compared to a
threshold to divide the image into eight types of texture regions. The interpolation
coefficients are obtained in each region by solving a set of linear equations as given
by (3.5).
We use a classification based methodology to study the similarities in inter-
polation algorithms used by different cameras. To construct classifiers, we start
with 100 representative images, downsample them (by a factor of 2) and then
re-interpolate with each of the six different interpolation methods as discussed in
Section 3.3.1. With a total of 600 images synthetically generated in this way, we
run the color interpolation estimator to find the coefficients for each image. The
estimated coefficients are then used to train a 6-class SVM classifier, where each
class represents one interpolation method. After training the SVM classifier, we
use it to test the images taken by the 19 cameras. For each of the 200 images taken
by every camera in the 19-camera dataset, we estimate the CFA parameters (eight
sets of coefficients each with a dimension of 5×5), feed them as input to the above
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classifier and record the classification results.3 Probabilistic SVM framework is
used in classification and the soft decision values are recorded for each image [148]
(refer to Appendix II of this chapter for more details). If the two camera models
employ different interpolation methods (not necessarily the same as the six typical
methods in the classifier), then the classification results are likely to be quite dif-
ferent, and their differences can be quantified by an appropriate distance between
the classification results.
More specifically, for each image in the database, the interpolation coefficients
are found and fed into the N -class classifier, where N denotes the number of possi-
ble choices of the interpolation algorithms studied (N = 6 in our experiments). Let
the output of the classifier be denoted as a probability vector g = [g1, g2, . . . , gN ],
where gk gives the probability that the input image employs the interpolation
algorithm−k (1 ≤ k ≤ N). Such probability vectors are obtained for every image
in the database and the average performance is computed for each camera model.
Let the average classification results for camera model−i be represented by the
vector πi = [πi1, πi2, . . . , πiN ], where πik is the average probability for an image
from camera model−i to be classified as using the interpolation algorithm−k. The
πik’s are estimated using soft decision values obtained using the probabilistic SVM
framework. The similarities of the interpolation algorithms used by any two cam-
eras (with indices i and j) can now be measured in terms of a divergence score ϕij ,
defined as symmetric Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between the two probability
3A kernel size of 5 × 5 is chosen in this case to limit the total number of coefficients, and to
make the total number of features to be on the same order of magnitude as the previous case in
Section 3.4.2 where we used a kernel size of 7 × 7 and three gradient based regions.
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Table 3.4: Divergence scores for different camera models as indexed in Table 3.1.
The values below or equal to 0.06 are shaded, and the ∗ indicates zero similarities
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The symmetric KL distance is separately obtained in each of the eight types of
regions by training with synthetic data and testing with the camera images using
the appropriately chosen coefficients as features. The overall divergence score is
obtained by taking the mean of the individual divergence scores in eight regions
and three color components. A low value of overall divergence score indicates that
the two cameras are similar and are likely to use very similar kind of interpolation
methods.
The divergence scores of the 19 different camera models are shown in Ta-
ble 3.4. Here, the (i, j)th element in the matrix represents the average symmetric
46
KL distance between the interpolation coefficients of camera model−i and cam-
era model−j. Divergence scores below a threshold of 0.06 have been shaded. We
observe from the table that most cameras from the same brand are likely to use
similar kinds of interpolation algorithms. This is especially evident for some models
of Canon and Minolta used in our analysis.
The divergence score between the two Canon models, S400 and S410, are very
low, suggesting that both of these models are likely to use similar techniques for
color interpolation. We also observe similarities between the two Minolta models,
DiMage S301 and DiMage F100, and between the two Sony models, Cybershot DSC
P7 and P72. The metric is close to zero in all these cases, thus indicating that
cameras from the same manufacturer have similar interpolation. Interestingly, we
also observe some similarity between several cameras from different manufactures.
As shown in Table 3.4, the divergence score between Nikon model E4300 (camera
no. 7) and the Minolta DiMage S304 (camera no. 13) is low, which suggests a
resemblance in the type of interpolation used by these two cameras.
The work that we have presented so far quantifies the similarity of camera
models based on the estimated color interpolation coefficients. The parameters of
the other stages in the scene capture model, such as white balancing and JPEG
compression, may be further used to study similarities among different camera
models and brands. In such cases, the forensic information collected from various
components may also be fused together to provide quantitative evidence to identify
and analyze technology infringement/licensing of cameras.
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3.4.4 Applications to Image Acquisition Forensics
The goal of image acquisition forensics is to determine the device type and the
brand and model of the device that was used to acquire the image in question. In
the previous sections, we have shown that the color interpolation coefficients can
help identify the brand and model of the camera that was used to capture the image
if indeed the image was originally camera captured. In this subsection, we extend
the feature based classification approach to facilitate image acquisition forensics,
and show that the proposed methods combined with noise features [54,55] provide
a very high accuracy in differentiating between images from different sources such
as cell phones cameras, standalone cameras, scanners, and computer-graphics.
For our study, we use 100 images from each of the four scanner models (Ep-
son Perfection 2450 photo, AcerScan, Canon CanoScan D1250U2F, and Microtek
ScanMaker 3600), five different cell phone cameras models (Nokia 6102, Motorola
V550, Samsung c417, Sony Ericsson W810, and Audiovox CDM-8910), and five
standalone cameras models (Canon Powershot A75, FujiFilm Finepix S3000, Casio
QV-UX2000, Minolta DiMage F100, and Canon PowerShot S410). A separate set
of 100 computer graphics (CG) images were obtained from the Columbia univer-
sity dataset [101]. The sample images were taken in completely random conditions,
without any controlled experimental setup to simulate non-intrusive testing condi-
tions. In this way, the image dataset simulates real-world data in terms of lighting,
color, texture, and subject. The color interpolation coefficients and the noise fea-
tures from [55] were estimated from each of the 1500 images in our database and
employed for subsequent studies.
48
Table 3.5: Confusion matrix for device-type identification.
Device Phone camera Standalone Scanner Computer
Digital Camera Graphics
Phone camera 93% 2% 0% 5%
Standalone camera 1% 98% 1% 0%
Scanner 1% 3% 94% 2%
Computer Graphics 4% 2% 4% 90%
Identifying Image Acquisition Device
For our study, 100 images from each device type (cell phone camera, standalone
camera, and scanner) were selected with an equal number from each model, and all
CG images were used, to create four classes of 100 images each. A randomly cho-
sen set of 99 images from each class were used in training the SVM classifier, and
the remaining image was used in testing to obtain the leave-one-out performance.
The experiment was repeated 100 times with different set of training images and
the average confusion matrix is shown in Table 3.5. Here, the (i, j)th element of
the matrix corresponds to the fraction of images from source type−i classified as
belonging to source type−j. The main diagonal elements give the percentage of
correct identification. From the results in Table 3.5, we find that overall identi-
fication accuracy is 93.75%, suggesting that the proposed features are good for
identifying the source type.
Identifying Device Brand/Model
Once an image’s source device has been determined, further analysis can be per-
formed using the same set of features to identify the particular brand or model
49
of the device that was used to capture the image. In the previous subsections,
we have presented results for camera brand and model identification and in this
subsection, we focus on cell phone cameras and scanners. Finding the type of cell
phone camera from its output images poses additional challenges, compared to
standalone cameras and scanners, due to their lower image resolution, noisier im-
age sensors, and a higher rate of default JPEG compression. In our results with cell
phone cameras, we found that using interpolation coefficients alone, rather than
a combination of interpolation coefficients and noise features, produced higher ac-
curacies [94]. This result for cell phone cameras is expected because most cell
phone camera brands/models employ different algorithms for color interpolation;
and therefore, these coefficients alone provide tell-tale evidence to distinguish im-
ages from different brands/models. For our experiments with cell phone cameras,
we used a randomly chosen 90 random images for training and the remaining 10
for testing, and the corresponding results are shown in Table 3.6. We find from
the table that the average identification accuracy is close to 97.7% for five models,
and this is significantly better than state-of-the-art techniques that produce av-
erage accuracies close to 92% over four camera models from two different camera
brands [135].
We test the robustness of the proposed system for post-processing operations
such as JPEG compression. To generate data, we compress the original cell phone
camera images under different JPEG quality factors from 60% to 100%. The
color interpolation coefficients are then obtained from the compressed images and
used as features for classification. A randomly chosen 90 images were used in
training the classifier and the remaining 10 were used in testing. The experiment
was repeated 100 times and the average accuracies under different JPEG quality
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Table 3.6: Confusion matrix for cell phone camera identification.
Cell Phone Nokia Motorola Samsung Sony Audiovox
Nokia 95.8% 0.4% 0% 3.8% 0%
Motorola 2.8% 97.2% 0% 0% 0%
Samsung 1.2% 0% 97.8% 0.2% 0.8%
Sony 2.4% 0% 0% 97.6% 0%
Audiovox 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
factor are shown in Figure 3.9. The figure shows that as the JPEG quality factor
decreases, the identification accuracy decreases as expected. However, the lowest
accuracy achieved is around 91% demonstrating the superior performance of the
proposed features.
We compare the performance of the proposed features for cell phone camera
identification with the higher order statistical features introduced in [36]. In our
experiments with [36], we employ the same set of cell phone camera images (with
90 for training and 10 for testing) and examine the identification accuracies as a
function of JPEG quality factors. The performance, averaged over 100 iterations,
is shown alongside in Figure 3.9. The results suggest that the proposed features
perform at least 12% better in identifying the cell phone brand/model, establishing
the goodness of the proposed features.
For scanner identification, we found that using a combination of interpolation
coefficients and noise feature parameters from [54] gave best results. 100 images
from each of the four models of scanners were used, with 90 random images used for
training and the remaining 10 used for testing. The overall identification accuracy
for scanner brand was 96.2%. Further, the identification results were found to be
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Figure 3.9: Robustness to JPEG compression for cell phone camera identification
using (a) proposed color interpolation coefficients as features, and (b) higher order
statistics [36] as features.
robust to moderate levels of post-processing operations such as JPEG compression,
image sharpening, gamma correction, and contrast enhancement. Further details
can be found in [54, 94].
3.4.5 Detecting Cut-and-Paste Forgeries based on Incon-
sistencies in Component Parameters
Creating a tampered image by cut-and-paste forgery often involves obtaining dif-
ferent parts of the image from pictures captured using different cameras that may
employ a different set of algorithms/parameters for its internal components. In-
consistencies in the estimated sensor pattern noise obtained from different regions
of the image [86] or the inconsistencies in the estimated intrinsic fingerprint traces
left behind by camera components [123] can be used to identify such digital forg-
eries as cut-and-paste operations. Here, we illustrate with a case study. We create
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a tampered picture of size 2048 × 2036 by combining parts of two images taken
using two different cameras. In Figure 3.10(a) and (b), we show the tampered pic-
ture and its individual parts marked with different colors. The regions displayed
in white in Figure 3.10(b) are obtained from an image taken with the Canon Pow-
ershot S410 digital camera, and the black parts are cropped and pasted from a
picture shot using the Sony Cybershot DSC P72 model. The combined image was
then JPEG compressed with quality factor 80%.
To identify the intrinsic camera fingerprints in different parts of the picture,
the image is examined using a sliding window of 256× 256 with step size 64× 64,
and the color interpolation coefficients are estimated in each 256×256 block [123].
The k−means clustering algorithm [31] is then employed to cluster these features
into two classes. With a step size of 64, each individual 64×64 sub-block would be
analyzed 16 times to provide 16 different clustering results; the clustering results
are represented as binary values (0 or 1) as labels for the two classes. Figure 3.10(c)
shows the average of the clustering labels from these 16 sub-blocks. As shown in
Figure 3.10(c), our results indicate that the features are clustered distinctly in two
separate classes with the gray area in between representing the transition from one
class to the other. In this particular case, we notice that the manipulated picture
has tell-tale traces from two different cameras and is therefore tampered.
We then employ supervised training [31] using the 19-camera model classifier to
further verify our results. The detection results from the 19-camera model classifier
are shown in Fig. 3.10(d). In this figure, the regions marked black denotes those
classified as the Sony Cybershot DSC P72 model and the white areas correspond
to the parts correctly classified as the Canon Poweshot S410 model. The remaining




Figure 3.10: Applications to source authentication showing (a) Sample tampered
image; (b) Regions obtained from the two cameras; (c) Results from clustering
the color interpolation coefficients with black representing Sony Cybershot DSC
P72, white representing Canon Powershot S410 and shades of gray indicating the
likelihood that the region is from Canon Powershot S410 with a value close to white
denoting higher likelihood; (d) CFA interpolation identification results using the 19
camera-model classifier with black representing Sony Cybershot DSC P72, white
representing Canon Powershot S410, and grey indicating the regions classified as
other cameras.
54
of the remaining 17 camera models. As shown in Fig. 3.10(d), the results indicate
that the correct camera can be identified with a very high confidence in most of
the regions in the tampered picture using the data obtained from each 256 × 256
macro-block. In this particular case, we notice that the manipulated picture has
distinct traces from two different cameras and is therefore tampered. A closer
observation of the misclassified blocks (shown in grey) also indicates that most
of these regions are clustered either around the tampering boundaries from two
cameras or in very smooth areas of the image. Blocks around tampered regions
would contain traces of both the camera models and thus might lead to incorrect
classifications and misclassifications around the smooth regions of the image can
be attributed to the fact that most cameras employ similar techniques such as
bicubic interpolation around the smooth regions.
3.5 General Component Forensics Methodology
In this section, we extend the proposed non-intrusive forensic analysis to a method-
ology applicable to a broad range of devices. Let O1, O2, . . . , ONo be the sam-
ple outputs obtained from the test device that we model as a black box, and
C1, C2, . . . , CNc be the individual components of the black box. Component foren-
sics provides a set of methods to help identify the algorithm and parameters used
by each of the processing blocks Cy. A general forensic analysis framework is
composed of the following processing steps as shown in Figure 3.11.
1. Modelling of the Test Device: As the first step of forensic analysis, a model is
constructed for the object under study. This modeling helps break down the










Figure 3.11: The proposed forensic analysis methodology.
systematically study the effect of each of these blocks on the final outputs
obtained with the test object.
2. Feature Extraction: The forensic analyst identifies a set of features that has
good potential to help identify the algorithms used in yth device compo-
nent Cy. These features are based on the final output data and are chosen
to uniquely represent each of the algorithms used. For the case of digital
cameras, we have used in this chapter the estimated color interpolation co-
efficients as features for forensic analysis. Parameters of other components,
such as white balancing constants and gamma correction values, are also
possible features to incorporate.
3. Feature Analysis and Information Fusion: We analyze the features extracted
from the previous stage to obtain forensic evidence to meet specific applica-
tions’ needs. The appropriate analysis technique depends on the component
under study, the application scenario, and the type of evidence desired. The
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results obtained from each of the analysis techniques can be combined to
provide useful evidence about the inner working of the device components.
4. Testing and Validation Process: The validation stage uses test data with
known ground truth to quantify the accuracy and performance of the foren-
sic analysis system. It reflects the degree of success of each of the above
processing stages and their combinations. Representative synthetic data ob-
tained using the model of the test object can help provide ground truth to
validate the forensic analysis systems and provide confidence levels on esti-
mation. The results of this stage can also facilitate a further refinement of
the other stages in the framework.
The methods and techniques adopted in each stage may vary depending on the
device, the nature of the device components, and the application scenario. Re-
garding feature extraction, in some situations, the features by themselves (without
further processing) can be proven to be useful forensic evidence and be used to
estimate the parameters of the model. For instance, the color interpolation co-
efficients were directly estimated from the camera output, and used to study the
type of interpolation in different regions of the image in Section 3.3.2. Evidence
collected from such analysis can be used to study the similarities and differences
in the techniques employed in the device components across several models and
answer questions related to infringement/licensing and evolution of digital devices.
In some other application scenarios, the component parameters might be an inter-
mediate step and further processing would be required to answer specific forensic
questions. For example, we have used the estimated color interpolation coefficients
as features to build a robust camera identifier to determine the camera model (and




In this chapter, we consider the problem of component forensics and propose a
set of forensic signal processing techniques to identify the algorithms and parame-
ters employed in individual processing modules in digital cameras. The proposed
methodology is non-intrusive and uses only the sample data obtained from the
digital camera to find the camera’s color array pattern and the color interpolation
methods. We show through detailed simulations that the proposed algorithms are
robust to various kinds of postprocessing that may occur in the camera. These
techniques are then used to gather forensic evidence on real world datasets cap-
tured with 19 camera models of nine different brands under diverse situations. The
proposed forensic methodology is used to build a robust camera classifier to non-
intrusively find the camera brand and model employed to capture a given image
for problems involving image source authentication. Our results indicate that we
can efficiently identify the correct camera brand with an overall average accuracy
of 90% for nine brands. Our analysis also suggests that there is a considerable de-
gree of similarity within the cameras of the same brand (e.g. Canon models) and
some level of resemblance among cameras from different manufacturers. Measures
for similarity are defined and elaborate case-studies are presented to elucidate the
similarities and differences among several digital cameras. We believe that such
forensic evidence would provide a great source of information for patent infringe-
ment cases, intellectual property rights management, and technology evolution
studies for digital media.
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Appendix I: Some Popular Color Interpolation Al-
gorithms
There have been numerous algorithms employed in practice for Color Filter Array
interpolation. In this appendix, we briefly review some of the popular methods.
For a detailed survey, the readers are referred to [7]. Color interpolation methods
can be broadly classified into two main categories, namely, adaptive and non-
adaptive methods, depending on their adaptability to the image content. While
non-adaptive methods use the same pattern for all pixels in an image, adaptive
methods such as gradient based algorithms use the pixel values of the local neigh-
borhood to find the best set of coefficients to minimize the overall interpolation
error.
Bilinear and Bicubic methods are examples of non-adaptive interpolation schemes.
In these algorithms, the pixel values are interpolated according to the following
equation [112]:




hc(u, v)Sraw(x − u, y − v, c),
where Sraw are the original raw values obtained from the sensor with Sraw(., ., 1)
representing the red color and so on, Sint denotes the interpolation results, and hc
denotes the 2-D filters of dimension Ng × Ng used in interpolation. In a general
case, hc may be dependent on the color channel. Let hr, hg, and hb denote the
values taken by hc for red, green, and blue colors, respectively. For the bilinear
case, these filters are given by





























































The Smooth Hue interpolation algorithm is based on the observation that the
hue varies smoothly in natural images. In this algorithm, the green channel is first
interpolated using bilinear interpolation to yield Sint(., ., 2). The red components







Sraw(x, y − 1, 1)
Sint(x, y − 1, 2)
+
Sraw(x, y + 1, 1)
Sint(x, y + 1, 2)
)
.
The blue components can be obtained similarly by interpolating the ‘blue/green’
ratios.
In Median filter based algorithms, the three channels are first interpolated
using bilinear interpolation. Then the differences ‘red−green’, ‘red−blue’, and
‘green−blue’, are median filtered to produce Mrg, Mrb, and Mgb, respectively. At
each pixel location, the missing color values are obtained by linearly combining
the original color sensor value and the appropriate median filter result [112]. For
example, the green color component at the location of the red color filter is obtained
as
Sint(x, y, 2) = Sraw(x, y, 1) − Mrg(x, y).
All the methods described above are non-adaptive in nature and do not depend
on the characteristics of particular regions. In contrast to these techniques, the
Gradient Based algorithms [76] are more complex. Here, the horizontal gradient
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(Jh) and the vertical gradient (Jv) at the point (x, y) are first estimated using
Jh(x, y) = |Ix,y−2 + Ix,y+2 − 2Ix,y|,
Jv(x, y) = |Ix−2,y + Ix+2,y − 2Ix,y|,
where Ix,y = Sraw(x, y, p(x, y)) and p is the CFA pattern matrix (e.g. Bayer pat-
tern) with p(x, y) = 1, 2, or 3, indicating that the CFA pattern at the (x, y)th pixel
is red, green, or blue, respectively. The edge direction is then estimated from the
gradient values, and the missing pixel values in the green component of the image
are obtained in such a way that the interpolation is done along the edge and not
across the edge, using only pixel values from the green channel. The missing red
and blue components are found by interpolating the difference, ‘red−green’ and
‘blue−green’ along the edge, respectively.
The Adaptive Color Plane interpolation method [56] is an extension of the
gradient based method. Here, the horizontal and vertical gradients are estimated
using
Jh(x, y) = |Ix,y−1 − Ix,y+1| + |Ix,y−2 + Ix,y+2 − 2Ix,y|,
Jv(x, y) = |Ix−1,y − Ix+1,y| + |Ix−2,y + Ix+2,y − 2Ix,y|.
Unlike the simple gradient based method, the interpolation of one color component
here also uses the other colors, and the output is a linear combination of sampled
sensor outputs in the neighborhood across the three color channels [56].
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Appendix II: Probabilistic Support Vector Ma-
chines
We employ the probabilistic SVM framework proposed in [148] to find the likeli-
hood qi that a given data sample comes from the i
th class. Let the observation
feature vector be denoted as x and the class label as y, where 1 ≤ y ≤ c for a
c-class problem. With the assumption that the class-conditional densities Pr(x|y)
are exponentially distributed [108], the estimate µ̂ij of the pairwise class proba-
bilities µij , Pr(y = i|y = i or j,x) is found by fitting a parametric model to
the posterior probability density functions µ̂ij = 1/(1 + exp(âx + b̂)). The values
of â and b̂ are estimated by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler distance between the
parametric pdf define earlier and the one observed obtained from the training sam-
ples. We then find qi , Pr(y = i|x), the probability that the data sample comes



















qi = 1, qi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , c.
Further details of the algorithm can be found in [148], and a possible implementa-
tion is available at [22].
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Chapter 4
Digital Image Forensics via
Intrinsic Fingerprints
In Chapter 3, we showed that any change or inconsistencies in the estimated intrin-
sic fingerprints can help detect forgeries. In this chapter, we take a closer look at
approaches for tampering detection and steganalysis and introduce a new method-
ology for digital image forensics of color images aimed at identifying different types
of global tampering operations. The algorithm works in a two steps. In the first
step, using a detailed imaging model and its component analysis as presented in
Chapter 3, we estimate the intrinsic fingerprints of the various in-camera process-
ing operations. We then model any further processing applied to camera outputs
as a filtering operation, and estimate its coefficients to obtain the post-camera
fingerprints. We show that absence of estimated in-camera fingerprints suggests
that the test image is not a camera output and is possibly generated by other im-
age production processes, and any change or inconsistencies among the estimated
in-camera fingerprints, or the presence of new post-camera fingerprints indicates
that the image has undergone some kind of post-camera processing. We begin this
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chapter by reviewing related work in Section 4.1. The proposed forensic frame-
work to estimate the post-camera fingerprints is presented in Section 4.2. Detailed
simulation results and elaborate case studies are then presented in Section 4.3 and
Section 4.4, respectively, and the chapter is summarized in Section 4.5.
4.1 Related Work on Tampering Detection and
Steganalysis
In the forgery detection literature, there have been work that try to address the
problem of identifying if the given digital image has gone through any process-
ing, such as tampering or steganographic embedding, after being produced by the
camera. These work try to define the properties of a manipulated image in terms
of the distortions it goes through, and using such analysis present methods for
detecting manipulated images. For instance, some work assume that creating a
tampered image involves a series of processing operations, which might include
resampling [111], JPEG compression [33,80,84], Gamma correction [34], and chro-
matic aberration [67]. Based on this observation, they propose to identify such
manipulations by extracting certain salient features that would help distinguish
such tampering from authentic data.
When the image is upsampled, some of the pixel values are directly obtained
from the smaller version of the image, and the remaining pixels are interpolated and
thus highly correlated with its neighbors. Thus, post-processing operations such
as resampling can be identified by studying the induced correlations [111]. JPEG
compression has been considered as quantization in the discrete cosine transform
(DCT) domain and statistical analysis based on binning techniques have been
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used to estimate the quantization matrices [33, 84]. Image manipulations such as
contrast changes, Gamma correction and other image non-linearities have been
modelled and higher order statistics such as the bispectrum have been used to
identify and blindly correct them [37,110]. Inconsistencies in noise patterns [110],
JPEG compression [35], or lighting [66], and alternations in correlations induced
by color interpolation [112] caused while creating a tampered picture have been
used to identify inauthentic images.
In [35], the authors exploit the differences in JPEG quantization tables among
different cameras to introduce an image authentication scheme. Given a digital
image, the authors first estimate the quantization table from it [84,110], and then
compare the estimated tables with a database of quantization tables collect apriori
from 204 different digital cameras. A mis-match in the estimated quantization ta-
bles with the ones in the database or across different regions of the image suggests
that the image has been manipulated after being captured by a digital camera.
Johnson et al. model inconsistencies in lighting directions to determine possible
tampering [66]. A 2-D model is constructed based on an earlier work by Nillius
et al. [103] and the lighting direction is estimated non-intrusively from the image
based on this model. The authors show through simulations that the lighting di-
rection can be estimated up to an error of two degrees when tested with infinite,
local, and multiple light sources; therefore, assisting in the detection of contradict-
ing light sources.
Although these methods can be employed to identify the type, and the pa-
rameters of the post-processing operation, it would require an exhaustive search
over all the numerous kinds of post-processing operations to detect tampering.
Based on this observation, blind tampering detection methods based on sensor
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noise patterns and image features were proposed. The presence of pattern noise
in camera-captured images and its absence in tampered images have been used
to detect forgeries [86]. Ng et al. employed bicoherence features to detect the
presence of abrupt discontinuities in the image and use such analysis to detect
tampering and to distinguish between photographic and computer graphics im-
ages [102]. In [36], the authors show that wavelet features extracted from the
image can be employed for other forensic applications including distinguishing be-
tween natural and un-natural synthetic images, plan text and stego data, computer
graphics images and photographs, and differentiating between live and broadcast
images [36,87]. Avcibas et al. develop a set of content independent features based
on analysis of variance approaches and image quality metrics [10] for distinguishing
between unmanipulated images and images manipulated via brightness or contrast
enhancement [8]. These methods [8,36,53] require samples of tampered images for
classification to distinguish manipulated images from genuine ones. Further, these
methods may not be able to efficiently identify other kinds of manipulations that
are not modelled or considered directly. By defining the properties of an authentic
image via intrinsic fingerprints, our proposed methods provide better scalability
and can help identify previously unseen distortions as will be seen in Section 4.3.
In steganalysis literature, there have been work that identify the presence
of hidden information in multimedia data. These work can be broadly classi-
fied into two classes, namely embedding-specific and universal. In the class of
embedding-specific steganalysis, there have been algorithms to identify different
types of least significant bit (LSB) embedding [43, 45, 143]. Statistics based ap-
proaches for universal blind staganalysis have been introduced in [9, 88], where
features from wavelet statistics [88] or image quality measures [9] are used to build
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a classifier to distinguish stego data from cover data.
Most of these techniques mentioned above are primarily targeted at finding
the processing steps that occur after the image has been captured by the camera,
and are not for finding the algorithms and parameters used in various components
inside the digital camera. As shall be seen from our results, the proposed foren-
sic methodology based on intrinsic fingerprints provides a combined framework
for authenticating digital camera outputs and distinguishing them from scanned,
computer generated, tampered, and stego data.
4.2 Estimating Intrinsic Fingerprints of Post-Camera
Manipulations
In this section, we present methods to estimate the intrinsic fingerprints of post-
camera manipulations under the assumption that the entire image has undergone
the same manipulation. This approach can be extended over a block-by-block basis
to estimate the intrinsic fingerprints in individual blocks. Given a test image or
an image block, St, we introduce a non-intrusive forensic methodology to identify
if it has undergone any further processing after it is being captured using a digital
camera. We first assume that St is a manipulated camera output corresponding
to the point B in Figure 2.3, and is obtained by processing the actual camera
output Sd (point A in Figure 2.3) using the manipulation block. We then represent
the post-camera processing applied on Sd as a combination of linear and non-
linear operations, and approximate them with a linear shift-invariant filter. The
coefficients of this manipulation filter, estimated using blind deconvolution, serve
as our post-camera fingerprints to answer a number of forensic questions related to
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the origin and the authenticity of digital images [132]. In the following subsections,
we describe the estimation algorithm in detail.
4.2.1 Computing Inverse Manipulation Filter Coefficients
by Constrained Optimization
Let St denote the test image, and let Ste represent the estimate of the camera
output obtained by passing the given test image through the inverse manipulation
filter u, i.e.,
Ste(x, y, c) =
∑
m,n
u(m, n, c)St(x − m, y − n, c), for 1 ≤ c ≤ 3. (4.1)
Here, we assume that u(., ., .) is of dimension Nu ×Nu × 3, and operates indepen-
dently on each color component. The coefficients of the inverse manipulation filter,
u, are estimated by solving an optimization problem that minimizes the camera








Ŝte(x, y, c) −
∑
m,n
u(m, n, c)St(x − m, y − n, c)
)2
, (4.2)
where Ŝte denotes the image formed from Ste by imposing the constraints that
pixels from a camera output image should satisfy due to CFA based color interpo-
lation:











m,n αℜi(m, n, c)Ste(x − m, y − n, c)
∀{x, y} ∈ ℜi, and 1 ≤ c ≤ 3,
Ste(x, y, c) otherwise.
(4.3)
In these camera constraints, αℜi denote the estimates of the color interpolation co-
efficients, and are derived from the image Ste using the component forensics tech-
niques presented in Section 3.2 . In our work, we assume that
∑
m,n u(m, n, c) = 1
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Inverse










Figure 4.1: Recursive algorithm to estimate the coefficients of the manipulation
filter.
for c = 1, 2, 3 to ensure that the original image and its manipulated version have
similar brightness levels. Incorporating this gain constraint into the minimization





Ŝte(x, y, c) −
∑
m,n









u(m, n, c) − 1
)2
, (4.4)
where the value of η is chosen to adjust the weights of the relative individual costs.
The filter coefficients can be directly estimated in the pixel domain through
a recursive procedure illustrated in Figure 4.1. We start the iteration by setting
u(0) to be a delta function; this corresponds to direct camera outputs. In the kth
iteration, we obtain an estimate of the camera output, S
(k)
te , by passing the test
image St though the estimate of the inverse blur filter u
(k)(., ., .). We then impose
camera constraints given by (4.3) to get Ŝ
(k)
te and find the camera model fitting
error. The inverse filter coefficients are then updated [74] by
u(k+1) = u(k) + tkdk, (4.5)
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Figure 4.2: Convergence of the cost function for (a) unmanipulated image, (b)








−∇J(u(k)), if k = 0,
−∇J(u(k)) + λk−1dk−1, otherwise,
(4.6)
λk−1 =
< ∇J(u(k)) −∇J(u(k−1)),∇J(u(k)) >
||∇J(u(k−1))||2 , (4.7)
and the step sizes tk are chosen as the one that minimizes J(u
(k) + tkdk) ≤
J(u(k) + tdk) for all t. The recursive procedure is repeated for a finite number
of iterations or until convergence. In the Appendix of this chapter, we show that
the optimization problem is convex and converges to a unique solution for all im-
ages whose interpolation parameters αℜi can be estimated accurately.
We test the blind deconvolution method for a sample direct camera output
along with its filtered versions. Figure 4.2(a) and (b) shows the variation of the
modified cost function J given by (4.4) as a function of the number of iterations








Figure 4.3: Estimated inverse manipulation filter coefficients for (a) unmanipulated
image, (b) manipulated image filtered with a 5 × 5 averaging filter. The inverse
filter kernel size is set to 5 × 5.
filter, respectively. We observe that the cost function converges in 10 iterations
in both cases. The final estimated inverse filter coefficients u(., ., 2) for the green
color channel for the two cases are shown in Figure 4.3(a) and (b), respectively.
While the estimated coefficients from the unmanipulated camera output in Fig-
ure 4.3(a) are very close to an identity transform (corresponding to no post-camera
manipulations), the corresponding manipulation coefficients derived from the av-
erage filtered image, as presented in Figure 4.3(b), are similar to the 5 × 5 kernel
approximation of the inverse of the 5 × 5 averaging filter.
The performance of the blind deconvolution algorithm for tampering detection
is to a great extent tied with the choice of the kernel size. In an ideal scenario, a
finite size averaging filter in the pixel domain would require an infinite length kernel
for its inverse. Although a larger kernel gives enhanced performance improvements,
it requires more iterations for convergence. In the next subsection, we present a
solution to directly estimate the filter coefficients in frequency domain.
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4.2.2 Estimating Manipulation Filter Coefficients by Iter-
ative Constraint Enforcement
The recursive algorithm described in Figure 4.1 can be solved in the frequency
domain to directly obtain the manipulation filter coefficients by iteratively applying
known constraints to the input image [11]. A schematic diagram of the iterative
constraint enforcement algorithm is shown in Figure 4.4. The test image St is used
to initialize the iterative process. In each iteration, the estimated camera output, g,
and the estimated filter coefficients, h, are updated by repeatedly applying known
constraints on the image and the filter in the pixel domain and the Fourier domain.
In the kth iteration, the pixel domain constraints on the image gk consists of
1. Real-valued constraints that enforce the image pixel values to be real,
2. Boundedness constraints restricting the image pixel values to the range [0, 255],
and
3. Camera constraints of CFA-based color interpolation given by













m,n αℜi(m, n, c)gk(x − m, y − n, c),
∀{x, y} ∈ ℜi, and 1 ≤ c ≤ 3
gk(x, y, c) otherwise,
(4.8)
where αℜi denote the estimates of the color interpolation coefficients derived from
the image gk using the component forensics techniques presented in Section 3.2.
After the image ĝk is obtained, it is transformed by Discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) to give Ĝk. The frequency response Hk of the estimated manipulation filter
























Figure 4.4: Schematic diagram of the iterative constraint enforcement algorithm.
where β1 is an appropriately chosen constant, F(St) denotes the Fourier transform
of the test image St, and Ĝ
∗
k represents the complex conjugate of Ĝk. The value
of H0 for the first iteration is initialized as H0 = F(St)/Ĝ0. The estimated filter
response Hk is then inverse Fourier transformed to give hk. We further impose
filter constraints on hk and obtain ĥk to be the real part of hk. The value of Gk+1
for the (k + 1)st iteration is obtained as a function of its two available estimates,
(a) previous value, Gk, and (b) the estimate obtained by enforcing the Fourier
domain constraint, (FSt/Ĥk), where FSt = F(St) and Ĥk = F(ĥk). Both these
estimates have their unique properties – Gk has a non-negative inverse transform
that satisfies the image domain constrains, and (FSt/Ĥk) satisfies the Fourier
domain constraints. In our work, we average these two estimates separately in
every iteration for each spatial frequency value and color to obtain the new estimate













Gk if |FSt| < γ,







if |FSt| > |Ĥk| and |FSt| ≥ γ.
(4.10)
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Here, γ and β2 are appropriately chosen constants. The value of γ represents
the noise resilience of the system, and β2 is chosen to lie in the range [0, 1] to
indicate the relative significance of the two terms in update equation [11]. In our
experiments, we set γ = 10−5 and β1 = β2 = 0.3. Finally, Gk+1 is inverse Fourier
transformed to give gk+1, the pixel domain estimate of the camera output image,
and the system proceeds to the next iteration. This process is repeated for a finite
number of iterations and the frequency response of the estimated manipulation
filter parameters H are found, to obtain the intrinsic fingerprints of post-camera
manipulations. Deviation of the estimated manipulation filter parameters from
an identity transform indicates that the test image has been manipulated after
capture by the camera.
4.2.3 Performance Studies on Detecting Manipulations with
Synthetic Data
We use synthetic data constructed from 100 representative images to study the
performance of the blind deconvolution techniques for tampering detection [124,
132]. These 100 images are first down-scaled by a factor of 2 × 2 to remove the
effects of previously applied filtering and interpolation operations, sampled on
the Bayer filter [6, 7] array and then interpolated using six different interpolation
algorithms to reproduce the scene capture process in cameras. For our simulations,
we consider six different color interpolation methods: (a) bilinear, (b) bicubic, (c)
smooth hue, (d) median filter, (e) gradient based, and (f) adaptive color plane.
Details about these interpolation algorithms can be found in [7]. These 600 images
that satisfy the camera model form our unmanipulated set. Processed versions are
then obtained by applying average filtering to these 600 images with different filter
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Figure 4.5: Frequency response of the manipulation filter for (a) A simulated un-
manipulated camera output, and (b) Image low-pass filtered with a 5×5 averaging
filter; (c) Actual manipulation filter coefficients of the 5× 5 averaging filter shown
alongside for comparison. The magnitude of the frequency response is shown in
the log10 scale.
orders from 3 to 11.
We run the proposed blind deconvolution methods on all the images and com-
pute the coefficients of the manipulation filter in each case using iterative con-
straint enforcement algorithm. In Figure 4.5(a), we show the estimated Fourier
transform for a simulated unmanipulated camera output. We notice that it is
almost a constant flat spectrum, representing an identity transform. The corre-
sponding estimated frequency response for a 5× 5 average filtered image is shown
in Figure 4.5(b), and the actual coefficients are shown in Figure 4.5(c) for compar-
ison. The similarity among the estimated and the actual coefficients justifies the
performance of the the blind deconvolution algorithms.
A closer look at the frequency response of the manipulation filter for an un-
manipulated camera output, shown in Figure 4.5(a), suggests minor deviations
from an ideal flat spectrum. These deviations are attributed to the various post-
interpolation processing that are done inside the cameras such as compression,
denoising, and white balancing. To compensate for these minor deviations, we
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use the spectral response Href , obtained using the blind deconvolution algorithm,
from an authentic camera output as reference. Given the test input St, we find the
frequency domain coefficients of the manipulation filter Ht and compare it with
Href to measure the similarity among the coefficients. More specifically, we first
find Θt = log10(|Ht|) to obtain the logarithm of the magnitude of the frequency
response, and compute the similarity between the coefficients of the test input and




(Θt(m, n) − µt) × (Θref(m, n) − µref) , (4.11)
where µt denotes the mean of the Θt, and µref represents the mean of the Θref .
The test input is then classified as unmanipulated if the similarity to the reference
pattern is greater than a suitably chosen threshold. On the other hand, if the
input image has undergone tampering or steganographic embedding operations,
the estimated manipulation filter coefficients would include the effects of both
the post-camera manipulation operations along with post-interpolation processing
inside the camera. In this case, the manipulation filter coefficients would be less
similar to the reference pattern, and the similarity score would be lower than the
chosen threshold.
We examine the performance of the threshold based classifier in terms of the
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) [124]. For each original image, we com-
pute the frequency response of the equivalent manipulation filter and measure its
similarity with the reference filter pattern. The fraction of original images with a
similarity score lower than a threshold τ is found to give the false alarm probability
PF . Similarly, we record the fraction of manipulated images (filtered in this case)
with a similarity score less than τ to give the probability of correct decision PD.
We repeat this process for different decision thresholds τ , and arrive at the ROC as
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Receiver Operating Characteristics for Simulated Data
Figure 4.6: Receiver operating characteristics for distinguishing between simulated
camera outputs and its filtered versions.
shown in Figure 4.6. We observe from the figure that the proposed scheme attains
a PD ≈ 1 for PF = 0. This suggests that the proposed scheme can effectively
distinguish between direct camera outputs and its filtered versions.
4.3 Detecting Tampering on Camera Captured
Images
Forensic evidence obtained by analyzing the coefficients of the manipulation filter
provides clues about possible image tampering. Most often, creating a realistic
tampered image involves a series of post-camera processing operations such as fil-
tering, compression, resampling, contrast change, and others, that may be applied
globally to the entire image or locally to different regions of the image. These
processing operations leave distinct traces in the final picture and can be detected
using the threshold based classifier by comparing the estimated manipulation filter
coefficients with the reference pattern. In this section, we study the performance of
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the proposed techniques for detecting different types of global image manipulations
with real camera data. The forensic methodologies discussed in this section can be
extended to detect local tampering by applying the techniques on a block-by-block
basis.
4.3.1 Simulation Setup
A total of nine camera models as shown in Table 4.1 are used in our experi-
ments. For each of the nine camera models, we have collected about 100 im-
ages. The images from different camera models are captured under uncontrolled
conditions−different sceneries, different lighting situations, and compressed under
different JPEG quality factors as specified by default values in each camera. The
default camera settings (including image size, color correction, auto white balanc-
ing, and JPEG compression) are used in image acquisition. From each of these
images, we randomly crop a 512 × 512 portion and use it for subsequent analysis.
Thus, our camera image database consists of a total of 900 different 512 × 512
pictures. These images were then processed to generate 21 tampered versions per
image to obtain 18900 manipulated images, and the 21 manipulation settings are
listed in Table 4.2.
4.3.2 Classification Methodology and Simulation Results
We study the discriminative capabilities of our proposed schemes in terms of the
ROC of the hypothesis testing problem with the following two hypotheses:
• Υ0: image is a direct camera output,
• Υ1: image is not a direct camera output and is possibly manipulated.
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Table 4.1: Camera models used in experiments.
No. Camera Model No. Camera Model
1 Canon Powershot A75 6 Canon EOS Digital Rebel
2 Canon Powershot S410 7 Nikon E4300
3 Canon Powershot G6 8 Fujifilm Finepix S3000
4 Canon Powershot S400 9 Sony Cybershot DSC P72
5 Canon Powershot S1 IS
For each image, we compute the frequency domain coefficients of the estimated
manipulation filter and determine its similarity with the chosen reference pattern.
Images with a similarity score greater than a threshold are classified as authentic.
To choose the reference pattern, we randomly select a set of Nt training images
along with its manipulated versions in the training stage. Using each of these Nt
images, we compute the in-class and out-class similarity scores. More specifically,
given the ith image (1 ≤ i ≤ Nt), we calculate the in-class similarity scores by
comparing the manipulation filter estimated from the ith image and the estimates
obtained from the remaining (Nt − 1) images using (4.11). The out-class scores
are then found by quantifying the similarity among the manipulation filter of the
ith image and the filter coefficients derived from the remaining tampered images.
Using a threshold τ , the fraction of direct camera outputs with a similarity score
lower than τ is computed to give the false alarm probability PF = Pr(Υ1|Υ0), and
the fraction of manipulated images with a similarity score less than τ is found to
give the probability of correct decision PD = Pr(Υ1|Υ1). We repeat this process for
different decision thresholds τ to arrive at the ROC, and compute the area under
the curve. These steps are performed separately with each of the Nt images in
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Table 4.2: Tampering operations included in the experiments.
Manipulation Operation Parameters of the Operation Number of Images
Spatial Averaging Filter orders 3-11 in steps of 2 5
Median Filtering Filter orders {3, 5, 7} 3
Rotation Degrees {5, 10, 15, 20} 4
Resampling Scale factors 6
{0.5, 0.7, 0.85, 1.15, 1.3, 1.5}
Additive Noise PSNR 5dB and 10 dB 2
Histogram Equalization 1
Total 21
the training stage, and the manipulation filter coefficients that gives the maximum
area under the ROC curve is chosen as the reference pattern. After choosing the
reference pattern in the training stage, we compute the in-class and out-class sim-
ilarity scores by comparing the chosen reference pattern with the filter coefficients
obtained from the remaining camera outputs and its corresponding tampered ver-
sions, respectively, in our database in the testing stage. The corresponding ROC
curves are obtained through this process.
Testing with Images from Canon Powershot A75
We test the performance of the proposed techniques using the 100 images from
Canon Powershot A75. We choose this camera for two reasons: (a) based on our
experimental studies, we observe that a linear shift-invariant model for the color
interpolation coefficients fits well with the cameras’ interpolation in each type of
region and gives a very low fitting error; and (b) we observe that this Canon camera
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Figure 4.7: Receiver operating characteristics for tampering detection for images
from Canon Powershot A75 when 50 images are used in training and the remaining
50 images are used in testing.
uses the same JPEG quantization table for all images that it captures, invariant
of the input scene. Therefore, all images from the camera undergo the same kind
of post-processing operations after color interpolation.
For our analysis with images from Canon Powershot A75, we use a randomly
chosen set of 50 images for training, and test on the remaining 50 images along
with the corresponding 50 × 21 tampered images. Figure 4.7 shows the perfor-
mance of the threshold based detector averaged over 100 iterations. At relatively
low PF around 10%, the probability of correct detection is about 80% − 95% for
most types of manipulations tested. Here, the results are based on a two-class
classification problem, wherein the first class includes the direct camera outputs
and the second class consists of camera outputs that have undergone a specific
type of manipulation.
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Testing with Diverse Inputs from Multiple Cameras
We now examine the performance of the proposed techniques under diverse in-
put conditions. More specifically, we use all the 900 direct camera output images
for the untampered dataset. These images were captured under the default cam-
era settings and may have undergone different kinds of in-camera post-processing
operations such as JPEG compression after color interpolation.
Figure 4.8 shows the ROC curve for detecting each manipulation. Here, we use a
randomly chosen set of 200 images to train the classifier and test with the remaining
700 images; the experiments are repeated over 100 times to obtain an average
ROC curve. In this case, we observe that for PF close to 10%, the probability of
correct detection is close to 100% for such manipulations as spatial averaging and
additive noise, and around 70%−80% for median filtering, histogram equalization,
and rotation. These results are better than other work in the literature that are
applicable to blind tampering detection [36, 112].
Comparing the results in Figure 4.8 with the results with the Canon Power-
shot A75 in Figure 4.7, we notice around 5%−10% performance drop in detection
accuracy for the same false positive rate. This reduction in performance can be at-
tributed to the different types of post-processing operations performed after color
interpolation in various camera brands and models. In our future work, we plan to
estimate the parameters of such post-interpolation operations as JPEG compres-
sion [84] and white balancing, and include them into the system model to bridge
the performance gap.
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Figure 4.8: Receiver operating characteristics for tampering detection when tested
with all images in the database with 200 images are used in training.
Training and Testing using Inputs from Different Cameras
The proposed techniques are non-intrusive and do not require that the actual
camera make/model be used in the training set. To demonstrate this aspect, we
test the performance of the proposed techniques using 100 images from Canon
Powershot A75 and 100 images from Sony Cybershot DSC P72. We randomly
choose 50 out of 100 Canon Powershot A75 images and use them for training to
identify the reference pattern; the 100 images from Sony Cybershot DSC P72 are
used in testing. The performance results, averaged over 100 iterations, are shown in
Figure 4.9. The figure shows that the performance is good for most manipulations
and for PF around 10%, the probability of correct detection is close to 80%−90%.
This result is comparable to the plots in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. The drop in
performance for some manipulations such as resampling can be attributed to the
absence of the original camera make/model in training.
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Figure 4.9: Receiver operating characteristics for tampering detection when images
from Canon Powershot A75 are used in training and images from Sony Cybershot
DSC P72 are used in testing.
4.3.3 Tampering Forensics using the Estimated Manipula-
tion Filter Coefficients
The estimated filter coefficients can also be employed to quantify the likelihood
and degree of tampering, and to identify the type and parameters of the tampering
operation. In this subsection, we show that the similarity score can be used to
define a camera-model fitting score to evaluate the amount of tampering that the
test image has undergone. For our experiments, we first choose six good reference
patterns that give the highest area under the ROC curve. The camera-model
fitting score for the test image is then defined as the median of the similarity
scores obtained by comparing the estimated coefficients of the test image with the
ones obtained from each of the six reference patterns. The higher the fitting score
is, the greater the likelihood that the test image is a direct camera output without
further processing.
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We examine the variation of the camera-model fitting score as a function of the
degree of tampering for all the manipulations listed in Table 4.2. Figure 4.10(a)
and Fig 4.10(b) show the camera-model fitting score as a function of the filter
order for spatial averaging and median filtering, respectively. In both cases, we
observe that the fitting score reduces as the filter order increases and as the degree
of tampering increases. Further, the score is less than −1000 for all average filtered
images. This low value is because of the distinct nulls in the frequency spectrum
of the manipulated filter, estimated from filtered images, making it very different
from the flat reference pattern.
Figure 4.11(a) and (b) show the camera-model fitting score as a function of the
angle of rotation and the resampling rate, respectively. For manipulations such as
rotations, the average fitting scores for manipulated images are less than zero as
can be seen in Figure 4.11(a), and therefore the detection algorithm can efficiently
identify rotations by setting an appropriate threshold close to zero. For image
resampling, the results from Figure 4.11(b) indicate that the average camera-model
fitting score reduces as the resampling rate deviates from 100% and therefore these
manipulations can be detected with the threshold based classifier. Similar trend
is also observed for additive noise and the fitting score reduces as the strength of
additive noise increases.
The estimated manipulation filter coefficients can also be employed to identify
the type and parameters of post-camera processing operations. In Figure 4.12,
we show the frequency response of the estimated manipulation filter coefficients
for the different types of manipulations listed in Table 4.2. A closer look at the
manipulation filter coefficients in the frequency domain suggest noticeable differ-
ences for the different kinds of tampering operations. For such manipulations as
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Figure 4.10: Variation of the camera-model fitting score as a function of the filter
order for (a) average filtering and (b) median filtering.
average filtering, we observe distinct nulls in the frequency spectrum and the gap
between the nulls can be employed to estimate the order of the averaging filter
and its parameters. Image manipulations such as additive noise result in a white
noisy spectrum as shown in Figure 4.12(g), and the strength of the noise can be
computed from the manipulation filter coefficients. Rotation and downsampling
can be identified from the smaller values in the low-high and the high-low bands
of the frequency spectrum of the manipulation filter. In our future work, we plan
to further investigate on employing the estimated intrinsic fingerprints of post-
camera processing operations to provide forensic evidence about the nature and
parameters of the tampering that the image has undergone. Such analysis may
help re-create the original image from its corresponding tampered versions.
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Figure 4.11: Variation of the camera-model fitting score as a function of the degree
of tampering for (a) image rotations and (b) resampling.
4.3.4 Attacking the Proposed Tampering Detection Algo-
rithm
In the work presented so far, we have considered direct camera outputs as authentic
images and presented methods to distinguish them from other images that have
undergone post-camera manipulations. In this subsection, we examine the other
side of the problem from the attackers’ viewpoint. Given the knowledge of the
proposed tampering detection algorithm, the attacker could potentially come up
with better tampering operations to foil the detector. We illustrate it with a
particular attack as follows:
In Step 1 of the tampering process, the attackers estimate the color interpo-
lation coefficients using component forensics methodologies described in Section
3.2 . After estimating the color interpolation coefficients, the attacker proceeds to
Step 2 to tamper the image by applying such post-camera operations as filtering
and resampling; then in Step 3 the attacker re-enforces the camera constraints via
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Figure 4.12: Frequency response of the manipulation filter for camera outputs that
are manipulated by (a) 7× 7 averaging filter, (b) 11× 11 averaging filter, (c) 7× 7
median filter, (d) 20 degrees rotation, (e) 70% resampling, (f) 130% resampling, (g)
noise addition with PSNR 20dB, and (h) histogram equalization. The frequency
response is shown in the log scale and shifted so that the DC components are in
the center.
(4.3) using the estimated camera component parameters obtained earlier in Step 1.
Figure 4.13(a) shows the in-class and the out-class similarity scores obtained by
comparing the reference patterns with the direct camera outputs and the tampered
versions by the above three-step process, respectively, for the scenario when the
camera input is tampered by down-sampling to half its original size in Step 2, be-
fore enforcing the camera constraints in Step 3. We notice from the figure that the
in-class and the out-class distances are well separated, and an appropriate thresh-
old value τ ≈ −200 can be used to distinguish the two classes. The ROC curve
computed using the threshold based classifier is shown alongside in Figure 4.13(b).
The figure suggests that the classifier still performs well and gives a PD close to
100% even for low values of PF close to 1%. The reason behind the superior per-
formance is because the tampered images have undergone several manipulations,
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Figure 4.13: Performance results for reverse engineering attacks: down-sampling
by 50% followed by camera-constraint re-enforcement. (a) In-class and out-class
similarity scores, (b) Receiver operating characteristics for the tampering detection
problem.
each of which introduce some inherent traces in the final output image, and the
Step 3 restoration process is not able to completely disguise the attacks from the
iterative forensic analysis algorithm. Thus, the proposed techniques can efficiently
resist such attacks.
4.4 Further Discussions and Applications
The results in the previous section demonstrate that the intrinsic fingerprint traces
left behind in the final digital image by the post-camera processing operations can
provide a tell-tale mark to robustly detect global manipulations. In this section,
we show that the estimated filter coefficients can also be employed to detect other
kinds of post-camera processing operations such as steganographic embedding and
watermarking. Further, any change or inconsistencies in the estimated in-camera
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Figure 4.14: Performance results for steganalysis of (a) F5 algorithm and (b)
Steghide at different embedding rates.
fingerprints, or the presence of new post-camera fingerprints provide clues to detect
cut-paste tampering and to determine if the given image was produced using a
camera, a scanner, or a computer graphics software.
4.4.1 Applications to Universal Steganalysis
Watermarking and steganographic embedding may also be modeled as post-processing
operations applied to camera outputs, and the estimated post-camera fingerprints
can be utilized to identify them. Steganography is the art of secret communica-
tion whereby the hidden information is transmitted by embedding it on to the
host multimedia. Over the past few years, there have been a number of stegano-
graphic embedding algorithms using digital images as hosts for covert communica-
tion [44,47,60,91,142]. In the same period, several steganalysis methods have been
proposed to identify the presence of hidden data in multimedia. While embedding-
specific steganalysis [45] target specific embedding algorithms, universal steganal-
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ysis [9,88] are designed to identify more than one type of steganography. With an
increasing number of steganographic embedding algorithms, there is a strong need
for robust universal methods for blind steganalysis. As can been seen from our
results, the proposed intrinsic fingerprinting techniques facilitate blind steganalysis
by distinguishing authentic camera outputs from images with hidden content.
A common challenge of steganalysis is how to model the ground truth orig-
inal non-stego image data. In our work, we consider direct camera outputs as
non-stego data and apply the camera model to characterize its properties; image
manipulations such as watermarking and steganography are then modelled as post-
processing operations applied to camera outputs. In this subsection, we show that
these embedding algorithms leave behind statistical traces on the digital image
that can be detected by analyzing the coefficients of the manipulation filter, and
examine the performance of our proposed techniques for identifying the presence
of hidden messages in multimedia data.
We test the performance of the threshold based detector in distinguishing au-
thentic camera outputs from stego data. In our experiments, we use the same
camera data set with 100 images of size 512 × 512 from Canon Powershot A75
camera [127]. Stego images are then generated by embedding random messages of
different sizes into the cover images. Generally speaking, the maximum embedding
payload depends on the nature of the cover image and the data hiding algorithm.
For our simulations, we first find the average of the maximum embedding payload
across 100 images and then embed messages at 100%, 75%, and 50% of this value.
For our study, we consider three popular steganographic embedding methods that
employ different approaches to hide information – F5 [142], steghide [60], and
spread spectrum steganography [91].
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Performance Results for LSB Embedding
Least Significant Bit (LSB) embedding methods have been widely used for data
hiding. Many algorithms such as Jsteg, JPEG hide-and-seek [77], Outguess [113],
and F5 [142] embed a secret message into the LSB of the DCT coefficients of the
cover image. For a survey of LSB methods, see [114] and the references therein.
Most LSB embedding methods such as JPEG hide-and-seek [77] and Outguess [113]
replace the LSB of the DCT coefficients with the secret message, and statistical
steganalysis using χ2-test can be used to detect them [143]. In our work, we focus
on the embedding methods of F5 and steghide.
The F5 technique that has been shown to be resilient to such statistical attacks
based on χ2-test [142], although it was subsequently broken in [45] by histogram
analysis of DCT coefficients. The F5 embeds data through matrix encoding by
decrementing the absolute value of the DCT coefficients. In our experiments with
F5, we estimate the average maximum payload across 100 color images to be
around 12 KB. The stego images are then generated by embedding secret mes-
sages of size 12 KB, 9 KB, and 6 KB using the software [141], respectively. The
detection results are shown in Figure 4.14(a) for different embedding rates. We
notice that the proposed algorithms perform with reasonable accuracy giving an
average detection accuracy close to 62% and 50% respectively at 100% and 75%
average embedding rates for false alarm probabilities around 1%. These results
are comparable to the wavelet statistics based steganalysis technique [88], which
reports average accuracies of 62% and 52% at the embedding rates of 100% and
78%, respectively.
Steghide preserves the first-order statistics of the image and can provide high
message capacity. Steghide employs a graph-theoretic approach to embed the
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secret messages on multimedia data. The message is hidden by exchanging rather
than overwriting pixels [60]. A graph is first constructed from the cover data to
the secret message. The pixels to be modified are represented as vertices and are
connected to possible partners by edges. A combinatorial problem is then solved
to embed the secret message by exchanging samples. In our studies with steghide,
we estimate the average maximum payload across 100 color images to be around
32 KB for a 512 × 512 color image. The stego images are then generated by
embedding secret messages of size 32 KB, 24 KB, and 16 KB using the software
[59], respectively. The detection results are shown in Figure 4.14(b) for different
embedding rates. We notice that the proposed algorithms can efficiently identify
steghide at 100% and 75% embedding rates with the probability of identifying stego
data close to 100% for a false alarm probability of 1%. However, the performance
reduces significantly when the secret message length is reduced to 50% capacity
at 16 KB. These results are better than the wavelet statistics based steganalysis
technique [88], which reports average accuracies of 77% and 60% at 100% and 78%
embedding rates, respectively.
Performance Results for Spread Spectrum Embedding
Next, we study the performance of spread spectrum embedding methods. Block-
DCT based spread spectrum embedding have been widely used in literature for
data hiding, watermarking, and steganography [146] for a wide variety of applica-
tions. Detecting spread spectrum steganography has been a challenging problem
over the last decade, and statistics based schemes typically do not perform well
in distinguishing original cover data and stego pictures. To our best knowledge,
the only work that addresses spread spectrum steganalysis is by Avcibas et al. [9],
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where it was shown that image quality metrics may be used as features to identify
such embedding. In their work, the authors show that they can attain an average
probability of correct decision of 80% with 40% false alarm probability when tested
with 10 images. We test the performance of the proposed intrinsic fingerprint sys-
tem for spread spectrum embedding. In our experiments, we use the same camera
data set with 100 Canon Powershot A75 images of size 512× 512 as our authentic
set. Stego images are then generated by adding pseudo-random watermarks at
different peak signal-to-noise ratios (PSNR) of 38dB, 40dB, and 42dB. The ma-
nipulation filter coefficients are estimated for the cover and the stego data, and
classified with the threshold based classifier. Figure 4.15 shows the performance
results for different PSNRs. We note that the average identification accuracy is
close to 100% for PSNRs of 38dB and 40dB, and reduces to 91% for 42dB PSNR.
These results demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed techniques.
In addition to the three steganographic schemes mentioned above, we also
test the performance of our algorithms for such embedding techniques as stochas-
tic modulation [44] and perturbed quantization (PQ) steganography [46, 47]. In
stochastic modulation steganography [44], a weak noise signal with a noise distri-
bution chosen to mimic the noise produced by the image acquisition device is added
to the cover image to embed the message bits. In the case of digital cameras, it has
been shown that the sensor and hardware noise are best modelled to be Gaussian
distributed [44, 58] and therefore detecting stochastic modulation steganography
can be considered equivalent to detecting the presence of additive Gaussian noise
in an image captured by a digital camera. Our results suggest that such embed-
ding can be detected with a very high accuracy with a PD close to 100% for low
values of PF about 1% using the proposed forensic analysis techniques. Perturbed
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Figure 4.15: Performance results for spread spectrum embedding at different
PSNR.
quantization steganography embeds information in the DCT coefficients by quan-
tizing the values either up or down depending upon the message to embedded.
The set of changeable coefficients is first found by identifying those coefficients
whose fractional part (i.e., difference between the actual value and the quantized
value) is lower than a pre-chosen threshold [47]. For our experiments with PQ
steganography, we use the 100 Canon Powershot A75 images of size 512 × 512,
JPEG compressed in the camera with the default quality factor close to 97%, as
our authentic set. Stego images are created by randomly embedding messages into
these images and quantizing them to a quality factor of 70%. Steganalysis for this
scheme is more challenging and the proposed techniques are able to identify such
manipulations with PD close to 70-80% under a PF ≈ 25%.
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4.4.2 Distinguishing Camera Capture from Other Image
Acquisition Processes
The proposed forensics methodology can be used to authenticate the source of the
digital color image. Evidence obtained from such forensic analysis would provide
useful forensic information to law enforcement and intelligence agencies as to if
a given image was actually captured with a camera or scanner, or generated us-
ing computer graphics software. We demonstrate this application with two case
studies.
Photographs vs Scanned Images
Digital cameras and image scanners are two main categories of image acquisition
devices. While a large amount of pictures of natural scenes are taken with digital
cameras, scanners have been increasingly used for digitizing documents. Rapid
technology development and the availability of high quality scanners has in part
led to more sophisticated digital forgeries. In this case study, we are interested in
determining if a digital image is produced by a camera or a scanner. The motivation
behind employing the proposed techniques for device identification is based on the
observation that the manipulation filter coefficients for an authentic camera output
would be close to a delta function, and the corresponding coefficients for a scanned
image would represent the scan process.
For our study, we choose 25 different images from four camera models to give a
total of 100 images for the camera image data set. We then collect another set of
25 different photographic images from several cameras with diverse image content.
These photographs are printed and then scanned back using 4 different scanner
models: (a) Canon CanoScan D1250U2F, (b) Epson Perfection 2450 photo, (c) Mi-
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Figure 4.16: Receiver operating characteristics for classifying authentic camera
outputs from scanned images.
crotek ScanMaker 3600, and (d) Visioneer OneTouch 5800USB. These 25×4 = 100
images form our scanned image data set. We test our proposed methods for these
200 images. The frequency response of the manipulation filter is estimated and
compared with a reference pattern. The ROC obtained using the threshold based
classifier is shown in Figure 4.16. Here PD denotes the fraction of scanned images
that are correctly classified as scanned, and PF represents the fraction of camera
outputs mis-classified as scanned. We observe from the figure that the proba-
bility of correct decision PD is around 92% for 1% false probability rate. These
results indicate that our proposed methods can effectively distinguish between the
camera-captured and scanned images.
Photographs vs Photo Realistic Computer Graphics
With an increasing number of sophisticated processing tools, creating realistic im-
agery has become easier. Modern graphic synthesis and image rendering tools can
be used to reproduce photographs to a very high degree of precision and accuracy,
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and therefore, the problem of distinguishing camera outputs from photorealistic
computer graphics has become important. In this case study, we employ our
proposed framework to distinguish digital photographic images and photorealistic
graphics images. For our study, we use a set of 100 images from 4 camera models
to create the camera image dataset. A randomly chosen set of 100 photorealistic
computer graphics images, obtained from the Columbia dataset [101] constitute
our photorealistic computer graphics data set. We use a cropped sub-image of size
512 × 512 to estimate the coefficients of the manipulation filter. The estimated
frequency response is then compared with the reference pattern and a threshold
based classifier is used to distinguish authentic camera outputs from graphics im-
ages. The results of our analysis, in terms of the receiver operating characteristics
(ROC), are shown in Figure 4.17. Here PD denotes the fraction of graphics im-
ages that are correctly classified as photorealistic, and PF represents the fraction
of photographs classified as computer generated. A large area under the ROC
curve suggests that our proposed method can distinguish between the two classes.
These results are comparable to the geometry based features proposed in [102],
and are better than the wavelet features [36] and the cartoon features based clas-
sifiers tested in [102]. Different from the geometry based features in [102] that are
motivated by the modelling the computer graphics creation tools and the artifacts
produced therein, our method focuses on finding the algorithms and parameters of
the imaging process in digital cameras to distinguish digital photographic images
from photorealistic computer graphics.
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Figure 4.17: Receiver operating characteristics for classifying authentic camera
outputs from photorealistic computer graphics.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a set of forensic signal processing techniques to verify
whether a given digital image is an direct camera output or not. We introduce a
new formulation to study the problem of image authenticity. The proposed formu-
lation is based on the observation that each in-camera and post-camera processing
operation leave some distinct intrinsic fingerprint traces on the final image. We
characterize the properties of a direct camera output using a camera model, and
estimate its component parameters and the intrinsic fingerprints. We consider any
further post-camera processing as a manipulation filter, and find the coefficients of
its linear shift-invariant approximation using blind deconvolution. A high similar-
ity of the estimated coefficients and the reference pattern that corresponds to no
manipulations, certifies the integrity of the given image. We show through detailed
simulation results that the proposed techniques can be used to identify different
types of post-camera processing, such as filtering, resampling, rotation, etc. Evi-
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dence obtained from such forensic analysis is used to build a universal steganalyzer
to determine the presence of hidden messages in multimedia data. Our results sug-
gest that we can efficiently detect different types of embedding methods such as
least significant bit (LSB) and spread spectrum techniques with a high accuracy.
The estimated post-camera fingerprints are also employed for image acquisition
forensics to establish if a given digital image is from a digital camera, a scanner,
or a computer graphics software. Overall, our proposed techniques provides a
common framework for a broad range of forensic analysis on digital images.
Appendix: Convexity of the Optimization Prob-
lem and Uniqueness of Solution
In this appendix, we show that the optimization formulation in (4.4) is convex if
the camera’s color interpolation coefficients are known. A function J is said to be
convex if for any u1, u2 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have
J(λu1 + (1 − λ)u2) ≤ λJ(u1) + (1 − λ)J(u2).
Since J(u) in (4.4) is a sum of two quadratic functions, it is sufficient to show






















J2c (u) = (
∑
m,n
u(m, n, c) − 1)2.
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Here, Ŝt denotes the estimate of the test image St obtained by imposing the camera
constraints:







m,n αℜi(m, n, c)St(x − m, y − n, c) ∀{x, y} ∈ ℜi, and 1 ≤ c ≤ 3,
St(x, y, c) otherwise.
In the above equation, αℜi denotes the color interpolation coefficients employed in
the camera to render the test image St. In the absence of additional information,
the values of αℜi can be non-intrusively estimated from the test image as long
as St is a direct camera output or an image that has undergone minor levels of
post-interpolation processing. Now, defining









J1c (λu1 + (1 − λ)u2) =
∑
x,y










−λ(1 − λ) ×
∑
x,y
(ϕ1(x, y, c) − ϕ2(x, y, c))2
= λJ1c (u1) + (1 − λ)J1c (u2)
−λ(1 − λ) ×
∑
x,y
(ϕ1(x, y, c) − ϕ2(x, y, c))2
≤ λJ1c (u1) + (1 − λ)J1c (u2),
where the last inequality follows from 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. This shows that J1c is convex.
Similarly, we can show that the quadratic function J2c is also convex, and therefore
establish the convexity of J .
To show that the solution of the optimization problem is unique, we make use of
a theorem in optimization theory that states that solution of a convex optimization
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problem with a cost function J is unique if the cost function is unimodal [61, 74],
i.e., ∇2J(u) > 0 for all u. Defining Ψ(x, y, c) = St(x, y, c) − Ŝt(x, y, c), we can
show that
∂2J




Ψ(x − ai, y − bi, c)Ψ(x − aj, y − bj , c)
+2u(ai, bi, c)u(aj, bj , c),
= 2 < Λ(ai,bi,c), Λ(aj ,bj ,c) >,
where Λ(ai,bi,c) represents a vector of length (H×W+1) consisting of all the elements
of Ψ(x−ai, y−bi, c) for all x and y along with the element u(ai, bi, c). Arranging the
vectors Λ(ai,bi,c) column-wise, we construct the matrix Ωc = [Λ(a1,b1,c)Λ(a1,b2,c) . . .] of











In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we introduced component forensics as a new method-
ology for forensic analysis, and showed that evidence obtained from component
forensic analysis can be used in a number of applications including discovering
patent infringement, authenticating image acquisition source, detecting tampering,
and for fostering evolutionary studies. When security is compromised, intellectual
rights is violated, or authenticity is forged, component forensic methodologies can
be employed to reconstruct what have happened to the content to answer who has
done what, when, where, and how. In the previous chapters, we used the intrinsic
fingerprint traces left behind in the final digital image by the different components
of the imaging device as evidence to estimate the component parameters and to
answer the forensic questions. However, as the intrinsic fingerprint traces pass
through the different parts of the information processing chain, some of them may
be modified or destroyed and some others newly created. Therefore, the goodness
of this forensic evidence depends to a great extent on the accuracy at which they
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can be obtained and this limits their usage.
Let us consider the example of bootlegging. In recent times, an increasing num-
ber of movies have been re-shot with camcorders directly from the theater where
they are screened, and sold in the market. This kind of piracy incurs a significant
loss to the copyright industry. Complementary to watermarking and fingerprinting
technologies that help track such illegal reproduction, forensic analysis can help
to trace the origin and authenticity of digital data. The knowledge of the source
camera or camcorder (and its brand/model) that was used to capture the data
and information about the the display device (such as a flat-screen or projector)
from where the image/video was recorded can help identify both the person who
illegally captured the video and the place where the video was shot. To establish
such forensic evidence regarding the source and display characteristics in courts, a
higher confidence in the decision and a higher accuracy in parameter estimation is
strongly desired. However, such accuracies may not always be attained in practice
via multimedia forensic analysis due to its inherent fundamental limits. In the
bootlegging example, some traces of the projector employed in the theater might
be lost and new fingerprint traces about the camcorder itself might be inserted.
Hence, the data obtained from the final camcorder alone may or may not help com-
pute the parameters of the display device. This leads to further forensic questions
as to what components are identifiable and what are not.
In this chapter, we introduce a novel theoretical framework for component
forensics to quantify the accuracies at which the intrinsic fingerprints and the
component parameters can be estimated. We develop formal notions of identifia-
bility of components and investigate fundamental performance bounds. We define
a component as the basic unit of the information processing chain to facilitate
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theoretical analysis and consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, we
assume no prior knowledge about the component or the possible subset of algo-
rithms employed by the component, and develop a framework based on estimation
theory and Cramer-Rao lower bounds to quantify the accuracies in estimating the
parameters of several components in the information processing chain [126, 134].
Details of this work are presented in Section 5.1. This theoretical framework has
useful in applications where there the forensic analyst has no prior knowledge about
the forensic system.
In some forensic applications, additional side information may be available to
the forensic analyst [130,134]. For instance, in the bootlegging example, geographic
constraints can be enforced to narrow down on a possible set of theaters (and their
display parameters) from where the movie could have been illegally recorded using
a camcorder. In the presence of such additional information, the component pa-
rameters could be found with a higher accuracy from among the available sample
set of algorithms by reformulating the estimation problem as a classification prob-
lem. In Section 5.2, we consider this scenario and develop a theoretical framework
for media forensics under the assumption that the component parameters take val-
ues from a finite set of possible algorithms. We derive conditions under which a
component is forensically classifiable and present case studies to demonstrate the
applications of this framework for a wide range of forensic tasks.
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5.1 Theoretical Analysis via Estimation Frame-
work
In this section, we introduce a theoretical framework for component forensics and
examine the conditions under which the parameters of a component can be esti-
mated accurately. We quantify the accuracy of estimation in terms of bias and
variance of the estimator and derive performance bounds based on Fisher Infor-
mation. We first review Fisher information in Section 5.1.1 and then introduce the
theoretical formulation in Section 5.1.2.
5.1.1 Fisher Information and Cramer-Rao Lower Bound
Fisher information is the amount of information that an observable random variable
Z carries about an unobservable parameter θ [48]. It is mathematically given by









where f(Z|θ) denotes the probability density function (pdf) of Z conditioned on
the value of the parameter to be estimated θ, and the notation Eθ denotes that
the expectation is performed conditioned on the value of the parameter θ. The
significance of the Fisher information is given by the Cramer-Rao lower bound
(CRLB). According to the CRLB, the average estimation error given an estimator
θ̂(Z) is lower bounded by













} + b(θ̂, θ)2, (5.2)
where b(θ̂, θ) denotes the bias of the estimator and is given by
b(θ̂, θ) = Eθ(θ̂(Z)) − θ. (5.3)
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If the estimator, θ̂(Z), is unbiased, b(θ̂, θ) = 0 and (5.2) reduces to









} = I(Z, θ)−1, (5.4)
suggesting that the variance of the estimator is lower bounded by the inverse of
Fisher information.
5.1.2 Theoretical Analysis using Fisher Information: Back-
ground and Definitions
To facilitate theoretical analysis, let ℜx denote a super-set of all possible inputs
that can be given to the kth component Ck, and let ℜy contain the corresponding
outputs. Without loss of generality, let x ∈ ℜx be the input and y ∈ ℜy denote
the corresponding output. Now, we have the following definitions:
Definition 5.1 The parameter θk of a component Ck can be estimated intrusively
using an estimator θ̂k(y, x) with an average error Eθk(θ̂k(y, x) − θk)2 such that













} + b(θ̂k, θk)
2 = δk(x). (5.5)
where b(θ̂k, θk) denotes the bias term given by
b(θ̂k, θk) = Eφ(θ̂k(y, x)) − θk. (5.6)
From the CRLB, it can be shown that any other estimator T (y, x) of the parameter
θk cannot provide error values lower than δk(x), i.e.,
Eθ ((T (y, x) − θk)|x)2 ≥ δk(x). (5.7)
If the forensic analyst is not allowed to break open the device, then he/she can
either do semi non-intrusive or completely non-intrusive analysis depending on the
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availability of the device. In this case, we may extend the definition to study
multi-component devices. Let a device D with Nc components be represented as
D = {C1, C2, . . . , CNc}, and let φ = [θ1, θ2, . . . , θNc ]T denote set of the parameters
of all the Nc components in the device. We may now define the following:
Definition 5.2 The parameter set φ of the device D can be estimated semi non-
intrusively with an average error Eφ
[




φ̂(y, x) = [θ̂1(y, x), θ̂2(y, x), . . . , ˆθNc(y, x)]
T ,
of the parameter set φ, such that Eφ
[















+ bs(φ̂, φ)bs(φ̂, φ)
T . (5.8)
Here,
bs(φ̂, φ) = Eφ(φ̂(y, x)) − φ, (5.9)
represents the bias term, and Is(x, φ) denotes the Fisher information matrix for
semi non-intrusive forensics with its (i, j)th element given by









As can be seen from (5.8), the accuracy of parameter estimation depends on
the choice of the input to the system and can be improved by designing better
inputs. Motivated by this observation, we define a notion of an optimal input as
follows:
Definition 5.3 An optimal input for semi non-intrusive forensics, x̂e, is the one
that minimizes the average error in parameter estimation, i.e.,




where ||∆s(x)||d represents an appropriate matrix norm or a function of ∆s(x).
The lowest error that can achieved via semi non-intrusive analysis is then given by
||∆s||d = ||∆s(x̂)||d.
Several definitions of ||.||d are possible. Unless otherwise specified, in this work,
we define minimum of ||.||d to represent element-wise minima. More specifically,
for two matrices ∆1 and ∆2, we say ∆1 < ∆2 if all the elements of ∆1 are less than
the corresponding entries of ∆2; and based on this definition, find the optimal
input as the one that minimizes all the array elements. This definition of ||.||d
could be restrictive in certain applications as there might not be one single input
that minimizes all the entries of the matrix. Later in this section, we consider
particular examples for which this might be possible.
In the case of non-intrusive forensics, the forensic analyst does not have ac-
cess to the camera at hand and only has some sample images provided to him.
Therefore, in this case, the estimate is done without the knowledge of the input x.
Definition 5.4 A device D with parameter set φ can be estimated non-intrusively
with an average error Eφ
[
(φ̂(y) − φ)(φ̂(y) − φ)T
]
≥ ∆n using the estimator, φ̂(y) =
[θ̂1(y), θ̂2(y), . . . , ˆθNc(y)]













+ bn(φ̂, φ)bn(φ̂, φ)
T . (5.12)
Here, the bias term is given by
bn(φ̂, φ) = Eφ(φ̂(y)) − φ, (5.13)
and In(φ) denotes the Fisher information matrix for completely non-intrusive
forensics with its (i, j)th element given by










If the estimator is unbiased, the bias term corresponding to bs(φ̂, φ) in (5.9)
and bn(φ̂, φ) in (5.13) are zero and therefore the error terms ∆s(x) and ∆n depend
only on the Fisher information as
∆s(x) = Is(x, φ)−1, (5.15)
∆n = In(φ)−1. (5.16)
Here, the (i, i)th of the matrix ∆s(x) denotes the error in estimating the parameter
of the ith component, and the (i, j)th cross terms of the matrix represent the
interaction between the components i and j in the device.
For the case of digital cameras, the best estimates for most components such as
color interpolation and white balancing are typically unbiased in nature. There-
fore, in the rest of our work, we assume an unbiased estimator for which the best
achievable accuracies under semi non-intrusive and completely non-intrusive sce-
narios are given by (5.15) and (5.16), respectively.
5.1.3 Theoretical Analysis and Fundamental Limits
We may now theoretically establish the following results. All the results presented
in this section are for unbiased estimators.
Theorem 5.1 The average Fisher information obtained for component parameter
estimation via semi non-intrusive forensics is larger than the the corresponding
Fisher information for completely non-intrusive forensics. Expressed mathemati-
cally,
E(Is(x, φ)) ≥ In(φ), (5.17)
where the expectation is performed over all x in the input space ℜx.
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Proof : We show the proof for a single component system and the analysis can be
extended to devices with multiple components. For a device with one component
with parameter φ = θ, we have


















Here, the expectations are performed over all output values y given the input x
and component parameter φ in (5.18) and over all output values y given the the
component parameter φ in (5.19), respectively. Taking expectation with respect
to x on both sides of (5.18), we have












































































































= E(Is(x, φ)). (5.23)
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 5.1 suggests, as a corollary, that for an unbiased estimator, the compo-
nent parameter estimation errors obtained using non-intrusive forensics are greater
than the average error obtained via semi non-intrusive analysis, or diag{E(∆s(x))} ≤
diag{∆n}. Here, ‘≤’ of two matrices represents element-wise comparison. Semi
non-intrusive forensics provides additional control to the forensic analyst both in
terms of designing device inputs and input conditions to give better component
parameter estimation results, and this intuitively justifies the reason behind the
result that even on an average, the performance of semi non-intrusive forensics
would be better than completely non-intrusive forensics.
Corollary 5.1 The Fisher information obtained for component parameter estima-
tion via semi non-intrusive forensics is larger than the the corresponding Fisher
information for completely non-intrusive forensics. i.e., Is(φ) = Is(x̂e, φ) ≥ In(φ).
Proof : The proof of the corollary follows from Theorem 5.1 where we showed
that E(∆s(x)) ≤ ∆n, where ‘≤’ represents element-wise inequality. By definition
of optimal input for semi non-intrusive forensics, we have
∆s = min
x∈ℜx
∆s(x) ≤ E(∆s(x)) ≤ ∆n.
This suggests that ∆s ≤ ∆n which completes the proof.
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This result suggests that for an unbiased estimator, the component parameter
estimation errors obtained via semi non-intrusive analysis would be lower than that
obtained via completely non-intrusive analysis, and semi non-intrusive forensics is
therefore better. Next, we examine the conditions under which both semi non-
intrusive and completely non-intrusive analysis give the same accuracies.
Theorem 5.2 The Fisher information obtained for component parameter estima-
tion via semi non-intrusive forensics is equal to the Fisher information for com-
pletely non-intrusive forensics when the knowledge of the component parameters
do not help in the guessing the input x given the output y. In this scenario, semi
non-intrusive forensics and completely non-intrusive analysis provides the same
accuracies.
Proof : From the definition of Fisher information for semi non-intrusive forensics,
we have












































A closer look at (5.24) shows that the equality Is(x, φ) = In(φ) is attained when
∀i, ∂
∂θi
ln(f(x|y, φ)) = 0, or f(x|y, φ) is independent of the component parameters
θi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ Nc. This result also suggests that the knowledge of the component
parameters do not help in the guessing the input x given the output y; thus,
completing the proof of the theorem.
Now, let us consider an example for illustration.
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Example: Consider a device with a single component for which the input-output
relationship is given by
y = αx + n,
where x represents the input to the component, y denotes the corresponding out-
put, α is a constant, and n represents additive noise. For this example, let us
assume that n follows a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance Σn.
φ = {α, Σn} is the component parameter set.















As a first step, we compute the optimal input for semi non-intrusive foren-
sics from (5.25). We observe from the equation that optimal input maximizes
I11s (x, φ) = x
2
Σn
, which is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) with signal power equal
to x2 and noise power given by the variance of the noise signal Σn. This suggests
that the optimal input for semi non-intrusive forensics of this component would
be the input that maximizes ||x||d. Defining ||x||d to be the norm of x, we find the
optimal input as the one that maximizes the signal power, i.e., x̂e = maxx∈ℜx |x|.
Next, we derive the Fisher information for completely non-intrusive forensics
under the premise that the input to the system follows a Gaussian distribution
with mean µx and variance Σx, i.e., x ∼ N (µx, Σx). With this assumption, it
can be shown that the output y also follows a Gaussian distribution with y ∼






















Now, we use the example as an illustration to verify the above mentioned
theorems. Taking expectations on both sides of (5.25) under the assumption that














Taking the term-by-term difference of (5.26) and (5.27), we get
E(I11s (x, φ)) − I11n (φ) =
Σx ((α
















Both these terms satisfy E(Iiis (x, φ))−Iiin (φ) ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, verifying Theorem
5.1. This result suggests that on an average semi non-intrusive forensics can provide
higher estimation accuracies and lower estimation errors than completely non-
intrusive forensics. Further, it can be seen from (5.28) and (5.29) that the condition
E(Iiis (x, φ)) − Iiin (φ) = 0 is satisfied only when Σx = 0 or x is deterministic with
a value equal to µx. This confirms the result in Theorem 5.2 indicating that semi
non-intrusive forensics and completely non-intrusive forensics can provide the same
accuracies when the knowledge of the component parameters do not help in the
guessing the input x given the output y.
Theorem 5.3 For an unbiased estimator, the component parameter estimation
errors obtained via intrusive analysis is lower than or equal to the average estima-
tion errors obtained using semi non-intrusive studies.
Proof : We first consider a simple case of a device D consisting of two components
namely, C1 and C2 and prove the theorem for this case. Let x be the input to the
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device and x ∈ ℜx, and let y be the output of the device, y ∈ ℜy. For sake
of analysis, we define a variable z as the output of the first component which
is provided as an input to the second. Also, let ℜz denote the superset of all
possible intermediate outputs so that z ∈ ℜz. Let φ = [θ1 θ2]T denote the device
parameter set with θ1 and θ2 representing the parameters of the first and the second
component, respectively. The first component C1 with parameter θ1 takes an input
x and outputs a value z with probability pθ1(z|x); and the second component
takes z as the input and outputs y ∈ ℜy with probability qθ2(y|z). The overall





The (1, 1)th term of the Fisher information corresponding to semi non-intrusive





























































































dz = I11i (x). (5.31)
Therefore, we have I11s (x) ≤ I11i (x) for all x ∈ ℜx. Denoting the optimal inputs
for semi non-intrusive forensics and intrusive forensics by x̂semie and x̂
int
e , respec-
tively, we have I11s (x̂semie ) ≤ I11i (x̂semie ) ≤ I11i (x̂inte ) = maxx∈ℜx I11i (x). Similarly, it
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= E(I22i (z)|x) ≤ max
z∈ℜz
I22i (z) = I22i (x̂inte ). (5.32)
Therefore, we have specifically for x = x̂semie that I22s (x̂semie ) ≤ I22i (x̂inte ).
This result suggests that the diagonal elements of the Fisher information ma-
trix satisfy diag(Is(x̂semie )) ≤ diag(Ii(x̂inte )). Therefore, for an unbiased estima-
tor, the component parameter estimation errors obtained using semi non-intrusive
forensics are greater than the average error obtained via intrusive analysis, or
diag{E(∆i(x))} ≤ diag{∆s}. This proves the theorem.
In the case of semi non-intrusive forensics the decision has to be made based on
the overall input-output response of the entire device. Therefore the final forensic
analysis is this case is dependent upon how different components in the device
interact with each other and to what extent the intrinsic fingerprint traces of
one component are lost/modified when they pass through the other components
in the information processing chain. This reduces the overall accuracies of semi
non-intrusive forensics. On the other hand, in the case of intrusive analysis, the
117
forensic analyst can break open the device and examine each and every component
individually independent of the other components in the information processing
chain. In the following theorem, we mathematically derive the conditions under
which semi non-intrusive analysis can provide the same accuracies as intrusive
analysis.
Theorem 5.4 For an unbiased estimator, the component parameter estimation
errors obtained via intrusive analysis is equal to the average estimation errors
obtained using semi non-intrusive studies only if the mutual Fisher information
between any two components in the system is equal to zero.
Proof : To prove this theorem, we take a closer look at the estimation errors to
examine the conditions under which semi non-intrusive analysis gives the same
accuracies compared to intrusive analysis. For an unbiased estimator, the average
estimation errors obtained from intrusive analysis for a two component device with
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I22s (x, φ) −I21s (x, φ)





























where the last equation follows from the fact that I12s (x, φ) = I21s (x, φ). Moreover,
as the magnitude of I12s (x, φ) increases, the estimation error increases. Comparing
the two equations, we notice that the equality is attained only when the following
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conditions are satisfied
I11s (x, φ) = I11i (x, θ1), (5.35)
I22s (x, φ) = I22i (x, θ2), and (5.36)
I12s (x, φ) = 0. (5.37)
It is to be noted that the I12s (x, φ) term represents the interactions between the
two components and higher its absolute value, the greater the interaction. A small
absolute value of I12s (x, φ) suggests that the components are independent and its
parameters can be estimated separately. Further, from the inequalities in (5.31),
we notice that the condition I11s (x) = I
11


















= constant(say c1), (5.38)






= constant(say c2). (5.39)
Expanding on I12s (x, φ), we have












































Substituting for (5.38) and (5.39), we have
I12s (x, φ) =
∫
y∈ℜy
c1c2Pφ(y|x)dy = c1c2 (5.41)
119
Therefore, ∆i(x) = ∆s(x) would be satisfied only when c1c2 = 0 or either of c1 or
c2 is zero. This suggests that either pθ1(z|x) is independent of the parameter θ1 or
qθ2(y|z) is independent of θ2 or mathematically
∂
∂θ1
pθ1(z|x) = 0, or
∂
∂θ2
qθ2(y|z) = 0. (5.42)
The above equations will be satisfied only when Iijs (x, φ) = 0. This completes the
proof of the theorem.
This theorem leads to the following definition:
Definition 5.5 Two components of the device are said to be forensically inde-
pendent if its component parameters can be estimated separately and the errors in
estimating the parameters of one component does not affect the estimation of the
other components’ parameters.
As can be seen from the previous theorem, two components would be forensi-
cally independent if and only if Iijs (x, φ) = 0. For a device with more than two
components, this condition reduces to Iijs (x, φ) = 0 and ∀k Iiks (x, φ) = 0 or
Ikjs (x, φ) = 0.
Corollary 5.2 Intrusive analysis, semi non-intrusive forensic analysis, and com-
pletely non-intrusive forensic analysis provide the same accuracies in parameter
estimation only when all the components in the device are forensically independent
of each other. i.e., Iijs (x, φ) = 0 for all i and j such that i 6= j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Nc.
Proof : The proof of this corollary follows from the proofs of Theorem 5.2 and
Theorem 5.4.
Next, we consider an example of forensically independent components and to
illustrate how this theoretical analysis can be employed to compute optimal inputs,
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and later in Chapter 6, we employ these principles to design optimal inputs for
semi non-intrusive forensics of digital cameras to identify color interpolation and
white balancing components.





































where x = [x1 x2]
T is the input to the system, y = [y1 y2]
T denotes the output from
the system, n = [n1 n2]
T represents additive Gaussian noise with E(n21) = E(n
2
2) =
Σn and E(n1n2) = 0, and φ = [a11 a12 a21 a22]
T are the component parameters.
The goal of the forensic analyst is to compute the values of the parameter φ.
In this example of a single component system, the Fisher information matrix
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From the matrix, we observe the following:
• A higher value of x1 and x2 can provide higher accuracies in parameter
estimation. This is because a higher value would imply that the signal power
is much larger than the noise power giving a higher SNR.
• The estimation of the component parameters a11 and a12 are dependent on
each other because of the non-zero value of I12s (x, φ) for non-zero inputs.
This observation can be intuitively explained by the fact that the estimation
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of both the component parameters a11 and a12 needs to be done based on
the same equation
y1 = a11x1 + a12x2 + n1. (5.45)
Additionally, we notice that I12s (x, φ) = 0 only when x1 = 0 or x2 = 0 in
which case (5.45) reduces to either y1 = a11x1 +n1 or y1 = a12x2 +n1. Under
these conditions, the component parameters a11 and a12 can be estimated
independent of each other from one of the two reduced equations.
• The estimation of the component parameters a11 and a21 (or a22) are inde-
pendent of each other as can be seen from the Fisher information matrix
(I13s (x, φ) = I14s (x, φ) = 0). This is because a11 is solely estimated from
(5.45) and the equation y2 = a21x1 + a22x2 + n2 does not provide any infor-
mation to aid in the estimation of a11.
Based on these observations, we can conclude that there is no single optimal
input for semi non-intrusive forensics. The best strategy for the forensic analyst
would be to first give an input x with x1 = maxx∈ℜx x and x2 = 0 and observe
the output to estimate the values of the parameters a11 and a21, and then give
the input x with x1 = 0 and x2 = maxx∈ℜx x to obtain a12 and a22. In this way,
the analyst can design good inputs to improve the overall accuracy of parameter
estimation.
5.2 Theoretical Analysis via Pattern Classifica-
tion Framework
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework for media forensics for compo-
nents with a finite number of possibilities in the parameter space. The proposed
122
framework employs ideas from pattern classification theory to answer forensic ques-
tions about what components and processing operations are classifiable and what
are not. We define formal notions of identifiability of components under different
scenarios, and quantify the confidence in which the component parameters can be
computed in each case. The analysis presented in this section adds to the un-
derstanding of multimedia forensics and supplements the the theoretical analysis
based on estimation theory presented in the previous section. We that the confi-
dence in identifying the component parameters depends on the nature of available
inputs and testing conditions, and that intrusive forensics gives higher confidence
than semi non-intrusive forensics and semi non-intrusive analysis is better than
completely non-intrusive scenario.
5.2.1 Background and Definitions
As in Section 5.1, we consider a system with Nc components {C1, C2, . . . , CNc} and
let ℜx and ℜy denote the set of all possible inputs and outputs respectively. Unlike
in the previous case where we assume that the parameter of the kth component
θk can take infinite number of possibilities, in this section, we develop a new
theoretical framework under the premise that the component parameter can take a
finite number of values from the algorithm space, i.e., θk ∈ Θk = {θk1 , θk2 , . . . , θkNa},
where Nka is the total number of possible algorithms for the component Ck. Now,
we define formal notions of intrusively, semi non-intrusively, and completely non-
intrusively classifiable components.
Definition 5.6 A component Ck is said to be intrusively classifiable or i-
classifiable if for each possible algorithm θki used by the component, and for most
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inputs x ∈ ℜx,
p(θki |y, x) ≥ p(θkj |y, x) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nka } and j 6= i,
and there exists at least one input x∗ ∈ ℜx and its corresponding output y∗ for
which
p(θki |y∗, x∗) > p(θkj |y∗, x∗) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nka } and j 6= i.
Here, x and y denote the corresponding input and output of the component, re-
spectively, and are vectors of appropriate dimensions; and p denotes the probability
distribution function. The forensic analyst can then employ maximum a posteriori
estimation techniques [31] to identify the component parameters θ̂k as
θ̂k = arg max
j=1,2,...,Nka
p(θkj |y, x).
In semi non-intrusive and completely non-intrusive forensics, analysts are not
allowed to break open the device or system. In the scenario of semi non-intrusive
forensics, the analysts have access to the system as a black box, and can design
appropriate inputs to the system and collect the corresponding output data in
order to analyze the processing techniques and compute the parameters of the in-








to represent the set of algorithms (and parameters) employed by the entire sys-
tem. Assuming that the component parameters in the kth component can take Nka




a possible algorithm choices for the
system. The task for the forensic analyst is now reduced to finding which of these
Na algorithms is used by the system in question.
Definition 5.7 A system is said to be semi non-intrusively classifiable or s-
classifiable if for each possible algorithm φi used by the component, and for most
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inputs x ∈ ℜx
p(φi|y, x) ≥ p(φj |y, x) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Na} and j 6= i, (5.46)
and there exists at least one input x∗ ∈ ℜx and its corresponding output y∗ such
that
p(φi|y∗, x∗) > p(φj|y∗, x∗) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Na} and j 6= i. (5.47)
Here, x and y denote the inputs and its corresponding outputs, respectively, of the
overall system.
In addition to computing the parameters of the internal building blocks of the
components, it is also important to know the confidence level on the parameter
estimation result. A higher confidence value would increase the trustworthiness
of the decision made by the forensic analyst in applications involving infringe-
ment/licensing to determine potential technology breach [128, 130]; and also in
cases involving tampering detection.
Definition 5.8 For an s-classifiable system with parameter set φi, the confidence
score η
(semi)
i (x, y) for correct classification under the input x and its corresponding
output y is defined by the difference between the likelihood of the correct decision











= p(φi|y, x) −
1
Na − 1











As can be seen from the equation, the confidence score η
(semi)
i (x, y) is propor-
tional to the difference between the probability of correct classification and (1/Na)
that corresponds to uniform likelihood. In our work, we define the confidence score
using (5.48) motivated by Definition 5.6 and 5.7. Several other definitions for the
confidence score in classification have been proposed in literature [104,128,130,139].
Later in Section 5.2.3, we examine other definitions of confidence score.
The equation (5.48) also suggests that the confidence score is a function of the
input x and can be improved by selecting proper inputs. To illustrate this aspect
of confidence score, we consider the following example.
Example: Consider an example of a component with parameters {ξ0, ξ1} whose
input-output relationship is given by:
y(n) = ξ0x(n) + ξ1x(n − 1).
Let x(1) = [. . . , 1, 1, 1, . . .] and x(2) = [. . . , 0, 1, 2, . . .] be two possible inputs to the
system. The corresponding outputs would be y(1) = [. . . , ξ0 +ξ1, ξ0 +ξ1, ξ0 +ξ1, . . .]
and y(2) = [. . . ,−ξ1, ξ0, 2ξ0 + ξ1, . . .], respectively. We notice that y(1) is a constant
sequence with each of its elements being equal to (ξ0 + ξ1) and knowledge of the
sum would not provide any indicative of the parameters ξ0 or ξ1. Therefore, x
(1) is
not a good input for evaluating the value of the component. On the other hand,
observing the output y(2) of the system, one can formulate a system of linear
equations to compute the value of ξ0 and ξ1; thus, x
(2) is a good input to obtain
the component parameter values.
More generally, let us define q(x, y) = [p(φ1|y, x), p(φ2|y, x), . . . , p(φNa|y, x)]
to facilitate discussions. If for an input, x′, q(x′, y′) = [0, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0] with
1 at the ith location, the decision of choosing the ith class is made with a very
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high confidence and η
(semi)
i (x
′, y′) equal to 1. On the other hand, if q(x′′, y′′) =
[1−ε
Na






, . . . , 1−ε
Na
] where ε is a small positive real number, there
is an almost equal probability that the given data sample comes from any of the




′′, y′′) = ε ≈ 0. In this example, x′ and x′′ represent the best and the worst
possible inputs for identifying the component parameters. For other inputs, x, the
value of η
(semi)
i (x, y) would lie in the interval [0, 1], with a higher value indicating
more confidence in the decision made.
This example illustrates that the confidence score in parameter estimation can
be improved by choice of inputs, and generalizing on this observation, we define
an optimal input as the one that maximizes the confidence score [130].
Definition 5.9 An optimal input, x̂i, for semi non-intrusive forensic analysis
of the system that employs the algorithm φi is defined as the one that maximizes
the confidence score, i.e.,




i (x, y). (5.49)




i (x̂i, ŷi), then represents the
overall maximum confidence in semi non-intrusively classifying the parameters
of the system, where ŷi is the output of the system with input x̂i.
In the completely non-intrusive forensics scenario, the forensic analyst is pro-
vided only with some sample data produced by the device or system and does not
have access to nor other knowledge about its inputs. In this case, we can define:
Definition 5.10 A system is said to be completely non-intrusively classifiable
or n-classifiable if for each possible algorithm φi used by the component, and
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most possible outputs y ∈ ℜy,
p(φi|y) ≥ p(φj |y) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Na} and j 6= i, (5.50)
and there exists at least one input x∗ ∈ ℜx, such that the corresponding output, y∗,
satisfies
p(φi|y∗) > p(φj|y∗) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Na} and j 6= i. (5.51)
The confidence score for a system to be non-intrusively classifiable under the













We now establish the following results.
Theorem 5.5 If a system is n-classifiable, then it is s-classifiable.
Proof : If a device is n-classifiable, then for each possible algorithm φi(1 ≤ i ≤ Na)
used by the component, there exists an input x ∈ ℜx to the overall system such
that its corresponding output y satisfies






p(φj|y, x)p(x)dx for j = 1, . . . , Na, j 6= i. (5.54)
Since, all the terms on both sides of the equation are positive, there must be atleast
one x = x0 ∈ ℜx for which
p(φi|y, x0)p(x0) > p(φj |y, x0)p(x0) for j = 1, 2, . . . , N, j 6= i. (5.55)
Factoring out p(x0) completes the proof.
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Theorem 5.6 The confidence scores obtained using semi non-intrusive analysis
is greater than or equal to the ones obtained via completely non-intrusive analysis.
i.e., If a system is n-classifiable with a confidence score η
(non)
i (y) under the output
y, then it is s-classifiable with a confidence score η
(semi)
i ≥ η(non)i (y).
Proof : From the definition of the confidence score for semi non-intrusive forensics
for the input x, we have
η
(semi)









Multiplying the equations with p(x) and integrating over ℜx, we obtain:
E(η
(semi)





























Thus, we have η
(semi)
i = maxx∈ℜx η
(semi)
i (x, y) ≥ E(η(semi)i (x, y)) = η(non)i (y); this
completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 5.5 and Theorem 5.6 suggest that if a component is non-intrusively
classifiable, then its parameters can also be identified semi non-intrusively, and
the average confidence values obtained using semi non-intrusive analysis is greater
than or equal to the ones obtained via completely non-intrusive analysis under
a given output. These results pertain to the scenario where the forensic analyst
has to make a decision based on ‘one’ output or ‘one’ input-output pair. If the
forensic analyst has access to ‘multiple’ outputs or ‘multiple’ input-output pairs,
he/she can then make a combined judgement based on studying all the available
data samples. In the following, we extend the proposed theoretical framework to
address such scenarios. We begin with the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.1 The overall confidence in estimating the component parameter(s)
given Nd inputs (and corresponding outputs) is lower than the value obtained for
the best input/output pair.
Proof : Suppose {y1, y2, . . . , yNd} denote the Nd output data samples available to
the forensic analyst, and let {x1, x2, . . . , xNd} be the corresponding inputs. Then,
for a given algorithm φi, the confidence in parameter estimation is given by
η
(semi)










Expanding the equation using the independence property, we get
η
(semi)












Now, let m̂ = arg maxm=1,2,...,Nd p(φi|xm, ym) so that p(φi|xm̂, ym̂) ≥ p(φi|xm, ym)
for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nd}. Equation (5.59) can therefore be re-written in terms of
p(φi|xm̂, ym̂) to give
η
(semi)








≤ η(semi)i (xm̂, ym̂). (5.60)
Thus, we have η
(semi)
i (x1, x2, . . . , xNd, y1, . . . , yNd) ≤ maxm=1,2,...,Nd η(semi)i (xm, ym).
This completes the proof.
Lemma 5.1 suggests that the highest confidence in parameter estimation is
determined by the best input – one among the Nd inputs that gives the maxi-
mum confidence score. The remaining inputs would reduce the confidence score
and confuse the forensic analyst into possibly making a wrong decision. This re-
sult is useful to study the scenario of completely non-intrusive forensics. In this
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case, the forensic analyst does not have access to the device at hand and col-
lects the forensic evidence based on the observed output data available to him.
More specifically, if the analyst has access to Nd such outputs, the overall con-
fidence in his decision can be shown from Theorem 5.6 to be upper bounded by
η
(semi)
i (x1, x2, . . . , xNd, y1, . . . , yNd), i.e.,
η
(non)
i ≤ η(semi)i (x1, x2, . . . , xNd , y1, . . . , yNd). (5.61)
Additionally, the result from Lemma 5.1 gives
η
(semi)
i (x1, x2, . . . , xNd, y1, . . . , yNd) ≤ maxm=1,2,...,n η
(semi)
i (xm, ym) ≤ η(semi)i (x̂, ŷ) = η(semi)i .
(5.62)
where x̂ denotes the optimal input for semi non-intrusive forensics of D. Combining
(5.61) and (5.62), we obtain η
(non)
i ≤ η(semi)i . This result leads to the following
theorem:
Theorem 5.7 The confidence scores obtained using semi non-intrusive analysis
under the optimal input is greater than or equal to the ones obtained via completely
non-intrusive analysis even when completely non-intrusive forensics is performed
with infinite amount of data.
Proof : The proof follows from (5.61) and (5.62).
This result is intuitively expected from the fact that semi non-intrusive foren-
sics provides more control to the forensic analyst who can design better inputs
to improve the overall performance. Next, we examine the scenario when semi
non-intrusive forensics and completely non-intrusive forensics provides the same
confidence.
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Theorem 5.8 The confidence scores for component parameter estimation via semi
non-intrusive forensics is equal to the confidence scores for completely non-intrusive
forensics when the knowledge of the component parameters do not help in the guess-
ing the input x given the output y. In this scenario, semi non-intrusive forensics
and completely non-intrusive analysis provides the same accuracies.
Proof : From the definitions of confidence scores for semi and completely non-





p(φi|y) = p(φi|y, x), ∀i. It can be shown that this condition is equivalent to
p(x|y, φi) = p(y, x)/p(x) or p(x|y, φi) is independent of the component parame-
ters φi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ Na. This result also suggests that the knowledge of the
component parameters do not help in the guessing the input x given the output y;
thus, completing the proof of the theorem.
It is to be noted that Theorem 5.8 provides the same conditions for equality of
semi and completely non-intrusive forensics as Theorem 5.2 discussed in Section
5.1 and proved via estimation theory. While the theoretical results obtained via
estimation and pattern classification theories are based on different assumptions,
applicable for different scenarios, and are derived using different mathematical
premises, they provide the same fundamental results. This suggests that these
theories are merely two different approaches to look at the same problem.
In the remainder of this subsection, we examine the relations between semi
non-intrusive forensics and intrusive forensics.
Theorem 5.9 If a device is s-classifiable, then each of its components are i-
classifiable.
Proof : This theorem is straightforward if the device has only one component. In
this case, the definitions of s-identifiability and i-identifiability coincide.
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Now, let us consider a multi-component device. Let xk represent the individual
inputs for the kth component Ck (and outputs of the (k − 1)th component), with
x1 = x. Since the device is s-classifiable, there exists at least one input x ∈ ℜx to
the overall system such that its corresponding output y satisfies
p(φi|y, x) > p(φj|y, x) for j = 1, 2, . . . , N, j 6= i, (5.63)




, θ2i2 , . . . , θ
Nc
iNc
] and expanding p(φi|y, x), we have















p(xm+1|xm, y)p(xm|y, x). (5.64)
For (5.63) to hold for all j 6= i, each of the individual terms in the right hand side
of the (5.64) need to satisfy ∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nc}
p(θmim |xm+1, xm) > p(θmjm|xm+1, xm) for all im 6= jm and 1 ≤ im, jm ≤ Nma , (5.65)
otherwise, we can construct another hypothesis φl by replacing the component
parameter setting for some of the components. This contradicts (5.63) as there
exists atleast one j = l for which p(φi|y, x) ≤ p(φj|y, x). Equation (5.65) also shows
the existence of alteast one input input x = xj to the jth component for which the
component would be i-classifiable. This completes the proof of the theorem.
In general, the converse of Theorem 5.9 is not true. To examine the conditions
under which an i-classifiable component is s-classifiable, we introduce the notion
of an ǫ-consistent component.
Definition 5.11 A component is said to be ǫ-consistent if the following two con-
ditions are satisfied:
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1. for most outputs y1 and y2 with dY (y1, y2) ≤ ǫ, the estimates of the cor-
responding inputs x1 and x2 satisfy dX(x1, x2) ≤ ǫ, where dX and dY are
appropriately chosen distance metrics in the input and the output space, re-
spectively,
2. for most inputs x1 and x2 with dX(x1, x2) ≤ ǫ, the estimates of the corre-
sponding outputs y1 and y2 satisfy dY (y1, y2) ≤ ǫ.
We now have the following theorem that relates the confidence in intrusively clas-
sifying a component and the confidence values obtained for semi non-intrusively
classifying the same component.
Theorem 5.10 If all the components in a system are ǫ-consistent and the kth
component with parameter θki is i-classifiable with a confidence score η
k(int)
i , then

























Proof : In the ideal case, highest confidence η
k(int)
i is attained when the input
to the kth component is the optimal input denoted as x̂ki (with its corresponding
output ŷki ). However, since the (k−1) prior to Ck are ǫ-consistent, it would not be
possible to exactly attain x̂ki , but only (k−1)× (2ǫ) close to it. This would lead to
















. Since, the forensic analyst
can only observe the final output y, he/she would incur an additional error of from

















Thus, the total error incurred from first-order approximation, ignoring the higher-
order terms, would be
(




















Theorem 5.10 gives the conditions under which the knowledge about the intru-
sive forensics can be extended to semi non-intrusive forensics. The theorem also
suggests that η
k(int)
i ≥ ηk(semi)i , and therefore the confidence score for parameter
identification from semi non-intrusive forensics is lower than (or at most equal to)
the ones that can be attained from intrusive forensics. This result is expected
because intrusive forensic methodology gives more control than semi non-intrusive
forensics, as the forensic analyst can break the device or system open to examine
each of its individual components in greater detail. On the other hand, in the case
of semi non-intrusive forensic analysis, the analyst would need to come up with
good inputs to be given to the overall system and study the interactions between
various system components based on the overall input/output response. Next, we
examine the conditions when semi non-intrusive forensics and intrusive forensics
provide the same accuracies.
Corollary 5.3 The confidence scores for component parameter estimation via semi
non-intrusive forensics is equal to the confidence scores for intrusive forensics when
the knowledge of the component parameters do not help in the guessing the input
x given the output y.
Proof : From (5.66), we notice that equality among the confidence scores for semi
non-intrusive forensics and intrusive forensics is obtained only when all the com-
ponents in the system are 0−consistent. A component is said to be 0−consistent,
by definition, when its input can be uniquely determined given its output, and
viceversa. Further, for a 0−consistent component, the knowledge of the compo-
nent parameters do not help in the guessing the input x given the output y. This
completes the proof.
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Corollary 5.4 Intrusive analysis, semi non-intrusive forensic analysis, and com-
pletely non-intrusive forensic analysis provide the same confidence scores in param-
eter classification only when all the components in the device are 0−consistent.
Proof : The proof of this corollary follows from the proofs of Theorem 5.8 and
Corollary 5.3.
Comparing Corollary 5.2 and Corollary 5.4, we observe that the concept of
forensic independence is equivalent to 0−consistency. Further, it can be shown
that if all the components of the device are forensically independent of each other,
then all the components of the device are also 0−consistent, and viceversa. This
indicates the parallels between estimation and pattern classification theories.
Next, we re-consider the example discussed in Section 5.1.3 to illustrate pattern
classification framework to forensically classify component parameters.





































where x = [x1 x2]
T is the input to the system, y = [y1 y2]
T denotes the output from
the system, n = [n1 n2]
T represents additive Gaussian noise with E(n21) = E(n
2
2) =
Σn and E(n1n2) = 0, and φ = [a11 a12 a21 a22]
T are the component parameters.
The goal of the forensic analyst is to compute the values of the parameter φ.
Contrary to the example in Section 5.1.3 where we assume that φ can take
infinite possible values in the parameter space, in this example, we restrict the φ
to take one of the two values in the parameter space Φ, i.e., φ ∈ Φ = {φ1, φ2}.
The parameter sets φ1 and φ2 are assumed to be of the form φ1 = [α1 0 0 α2]
T and
φ2 = [0 β1 β2 0]
T , where the values of the parameters α1, α2, β1, and β2 are known
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apriori. For our analysis, we assume that there is no apriori knowledge about the
likelihood of choosing either φ1 or φ2 so that p(φ1) = p(φ2) = 0.5; and let φ1 be the
actual parameter set employed in the component without any loss in generality.
• s-classifiability: We first show that the component is semi non-intrusively
classifiable. A component is s-classifiable, by definition, if for most inputs x and
corresponding outputs y,
p(φ1|y, x) ≥ p(φ2|y, x). (5.68)
Imposing the assumption that noise follows a Gaussian distribution, the require-
ment for s-classifiability in inequality (5.68) reduces to
(2β1x2 − 2α1x1)y1 + (2β2x1 − 2α2x2)y2 ≤ (β21 − α21)x21 + (β22 − α22)x22. (5.69)
This inequality indicates that the component is s-classifiable under the input x =
[x1 x2]
T with the actual parameter φ1 if the output y = [y1 y2]
T lies on the correct
side of the straight line given by (5.69). Considering a specific case, if α1 = α2 =
β1 = β2 = 1, the inequality in (5.69) reduces to (y2 − y1)(x2 − x1) ≥ 0; suggesting
that for an input x2 > x1, the component is s-classifiable under the hypothesis
φ = φ1, if the corresponding output satisfies y2 > y1. Now, we quantify the
probability of y2 > y1 under the hypothesis φ = φ1. It can be shown that











where ‘erf’ is the error function. When x2 > x1, the ‘erf’ term is approximately
equal to ‘1’ giving Pr(y2 > y1|φ1, x2 > x1) ≈ 1. Thus, for most inputs satisfying
x2 > x1, the probability of deciding φ = φ1 is close to ‘1’. Similarly, we can show
that for inputs satisfying x2 < x1, Pr(y2 < y1|φ1, x2 < x1) ≈ 1; thus, establishing
the s-classifiablility of the component for all range of inputs.
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• Confidence score and optimal inputs for semi non-intrusive forensics:
The confidence score attained via semi non-intrusive forensic analysis is given by
(5.48) and can be reduced to
η(semi)(x, y) = 2p(φ1|y, x) − 1,
=
p(φ1)p(y|φ1, x) − p(φ2)p(y|φ2, x)
p(φ1)p(y|φ1, x) + p(φ2)p(y|φ2, x)
. (5.71)
As can be seen from the equation, the confidence score is a function of the input
and can be improved by appropriate choice of the input. Under the condition that
p(φ1) = p(φ2) = 0.5, we get






















1 − exp(A(x1, x2, y1, y2))
1 + exp(A(x1, x2, y1, y2))
.
where
A(x1, x2, y1, y2) =




Optimal inputs can be computed by maximizing A(x1, x2, y1, y2) with respect to
x1 and x2. For the specific case of α1 = α2 = β1 = β2 = 1, the equation reduces to
A(x1, x2, y1, y2) =
(x2 − x1)(y2 − y1)
2Σn
. (5.73)
Therefore, the best input for semi non-intrusive forensics of this component is the
one that maximizes |x2 − x1|, i.e., choose x1 = minx∈ℜx x and x2 = maxx∈ℜx x or
viceversa.
• n-classifiability: In this part, we assume that the input x follows a Gaussian
distribution with mean µx = [µ1 µ2]
T and E(x21) = E(x
2
2) = Σx with E(x1x2) = 0.
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− (y1 − α1µ1)
2
(α21Σx + Σn)




If α1 = α2 = β1 = β2 = 1, then B(y) = 0 and p(φ1|y) = p(φ2|y). The component is
not non-intrusively classifiable under this scenario as there exists no input x∗ for
which the corresponding output y∗ satisfies p(φ1|y∗) > p(φ2|y∗).
5.2.3 A Note on the Definition of Confidence Score
We define the confidence score for parameter estimation according to (5.48) as the
difference between the probability of correct classification and the average of the
corresponding likelihoods of the making a wrong decision as
η
(1)






Several other definitions for the confidence score in classification have been pro-
posed in literature and have been employed in practice to judge the confidence in
classification. In [139], Wan defined confidence score as the Kullback-Leibler dis-




i (x, y) = D(p(φi|y, x)||U), (5.77)








p(φi|y, x) log(Nap(φi|y, x)). (5.78)
139
In the Chapter 3, we developed a confidence score based on the symmetric
Kullback-Leibler divergence as [128]
η
(3)











and in [130], we defined a confidence metric as the difference between the proba-
bility of correct classification and the maximum of the corresponding likelihoods
of the making a wrong decision:
η
(4)
i (x, y) = p(φi|y, x) − max
j=1,2,...,Na,j 6=i
p(φj|y, x). (5.80)
Although the definitions of confidence score in η
(1)
i (x, y) to η
(4)
i (x, y) are differ-
ent, they provide different approaches to evaluate the goodness in decision making
and can provide different insights into the classification result. However, many of
the theorems, corollaries, and lemmas derived and proved proved in Section 5.2.2
are fundamental and hold true invariant of the choice of the confidence score metric
as shown in the following example.
Example: In this example, we show that the result in Theorem 5.7 holds true
even a different choice of confidence measure. Specifically, we consider the case
ηi(x, y) = η
(2)
i (x, y). The confidence score for semi non-intrusive forensics and
completely non-intrusive forensics for this case are given by




p(φi|y, x) log(p(φi|y, x)). (5.81)





To show that ηsemii (x, y) ≥ ηnoni (y), we start with the identity: E(p(φi|y, x)) =
p(φi|y). This identity implies that there exists at least one input x0 ∈ ℜx for
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which p(φi|y, x0) ≥ p(φi|y), and therefore for this input ηnoni (y) ≤ ηsemii (x0, y) ≤
ηsemii (x̂, ŷ) = η
semi
i . Here, x̂ is the optimal input to the component with ŷ denoting
its corresponding output.
5.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we develop two new theoretical frameworks for analyzing infor-
mation forensics to analyze component forensics depending on the nature of the
component. In the first scenario, we assume that the parameter values of a com-
ponent can take infinite number of possibilities. Under this scenario, we introduce
a framework based on estimation theory, Fisher information, and the Cramer-Rao
lower bound. We define formal notions of identifiability of components under in-
trusive, semi non-intrusive, and completely non-intrusive forensic analysis cases
and quantify the accuracies at which the component parameters can be estimated
in each case using Fisher information as a criterion.
In the second scenario, we assume that the forensic analyst has some apriori
knowledge about the component and has information about the possible superset
of parameter values employed in the component. For this scenario, we employ ideas
from pattern classification theory to answer forensic questions about what com-
ponents and processing operations are classifiable and what are not; and quantify
the confidence in which the component parameters can be classified.
Building on the proposed theoretical analysis frameworks, we establish a num-
ber of fundamental results. Our theoretical analysis suggests that intrusive foren-
sics gives superior estimation accuracies and classification confidence over semi
non-intrusive forensics, and this is better than completely non-intrusive scenario.
We demonstrate that the accuracy in estimating the component parameter and
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the confidence in classifying the component algorithms depend on the nature of
available inputs and testing conditions, and can be improved by better choice of
inputs. We then apply the theoretical framework in case studies to design optimal
inputs for semi non-intrusive forensics; and show that the confidence in parameter
identification can be improved via such an approach. The proposed theoretical
model can also be extended to study post-device processing operations such as
tampering, and to provide a theoretical foundation for media forensics to answer a




Case Studies and Applications of
Theoretical Forensics Framework
In this chapter, we present case studies and applications of the proposed theoretical
analysis frameworks presented in Chapter 5. Specifically, we focus on the problem
of semi non-intrusive forensics. We briefly describe the imaging model in digital
cameras and define the notations used in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2, we show that
the parameters of such important components as color interpolation and white
balancing can be better estimated via semi non-intrusive forensics compared to
completely non-intrusive forensics. Based on a detailed modeling of the imaging
process and knowledge of the possible algorithms employed in such components
as color interpolation and white balancing, in Section 6.3, we design a heuristic
input for semi non-intrusive forensics of digital camera components and show that
the designed pattern can provide better accuracies. The pattern is then optimized
in Section 6.4 using metrics from theoretical analysis and simulation results are
presented to demonstrate the goodness of the pattern. The chapter is summarized
in Section 6.5.
143
To our best knowledge, this is the first work to address the problem of semi
non-intrusive component forensics. Related work fall into two basic categories. In
the forensics literature, there have been work that aim to find the parameters of
post-camera processing operations [84,110] such as JPEG compression, resampling,
and brightness change; and to non-intrusively estimate the parameters of camera
components such as lens distortions, color filter array [123], and color interpolation
[112,123]. However, the accuracy of these non-intrusive techniques is limited by the
nature of the available data. A second group of prior art concerns television and
camera manufacturing technologies. Among these work, there have been studies
that focus on designing test patterns to tune the parameter settings of television
sets by analyzing its response to specific inputs [89]. However, these work are not
intended for estimating the parameters of internal device components.
6.1 Signal Processing Model of Camera Compo-
nents
In this section, we develop a signal processing model of camera components. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows the image acquisition model in digital cameras. Let x be the input
to the camera’s color interpolation module. For our work, we divide the image
into different types of regions based on the local gradient directions, and approx-
imate color interpolation in each region to be linear.1 The output y1 after color
interpolation can be written as
y1(m, n, c) =
∑
k,l
α(k, l, c)x(m − k, n − l, c) + n1(m, n, c), (6.1)
1In Chapter 3, we show that this linear approximation is good for estimating the color inter-
polation coefficients.
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for each texture region. Here, α denotes the color interpolation coefficients and the
summations over variables k and l are done in the regions where the filter α(k, l, c)
has support. The noise term n1(m, n, c) is used to simulate the model fitting error,
and in our analysis, we assume that n1 follows a Gaussian distribution.
After color interpolation, the interpolated image y1 undergoes white balancing
to give y2. White balancing and color correction are typically done in the camera as
part of the post-processing block to remove unrealistic color casts from the image.
White balancing is typically multiplicative in nature, where the output is obtained
by scaling the input by the chosen scaling factor. In manual white balancing, the
user chooses the appropriate multiplication constants for each color channel so
that a white colored object looks white after compensation. On the other hand,
auto white balancing algorithms compute the multiplication factors based on the
estimated illuminance of the scene [7] and use these estimates for scaling the input.
White balancing operations can be mathematically represented as




β(c, j)y1(m, n, j), for c = 1, 2, 3. (6.2)
where β are the white balancing coefficients.
Finally, the image may be JPEG compressed to reduce storage space. Compres-
sion can be modeled as quantization in the DCT domain, and can be represented
as additive noise in the pixel domain. Denoting this compression noise as n2, the
final image is given by
y(m, n, c) = y2(m, n, i) + n2(m, n, c). (6.3)
Combining (6.1), (6.2), and (6.3), we obtain the input-output response of the
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digital camera










β(i, j)n1(m, n, c)+n2(m, n, c).
(6.4)
The goal of the forensic analyst is now to estimate the device parameters α(., ., .)
and β(., .).
6.2 Theoretical Analysis of Digital Camera Com-
ponents
In this section, we employ the theoretical frameworks presented in Chapter 5 to
analyze the parameters of such camera components as color interpolation, white
balancing, and JPEG compression. We analyze these components from both es-
timation and pattern classification perspectives and determine the accuracies in
computing the component parameters.
6.2.1 Color Interpolation
Color interpolation is an important processing stage in digital cameras. Most cam-
eras of different brands/models employ a different algorithm for color interpolation
and therefore estimating the interpolation parameters provides very useful infor-
mation to build a robust camera identifier as shown in Chapter 3 and [128]. In
this subsection, we examine the conditions under which the color interpolation
component parameters are identifiable.
Typically, the data recorded by the CFA are interpolated using its neighbor-
ing pixel values to form the interpolated image as represented by equation (6.1).
Obtaining the component parameters α in a general case involves solving a blind
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deconvolution problem. However, additional information about the sampling pat-
tern could be used to simplify the problem as the knowledge of the CFA gives
the locations of the set of pixels that are interpolated and those that are di-
rectly obtained from the CCD sensor. With this information and with the as-









⌋]× [1, 3], (6.1) can be equivalently re-written for the
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where W and H denote the width and the height of the image. In constructing
these equations, we assume that the camera employs Bayer CFA [13] to sample
the real-world scene and similar equations can be obtained for other CFA.
In the absence of post-interpolation processing, such as white balancing and
JPEG compression, there would be no additive noise and y = y1. Further, under
these conditions, the values of the camera output image at locations corresponding
to {y1(1, 1, 1), y1(1, 3, 1), y1(1, 5, 1), . . .} are obtained directly from the ‘red’ color
component of camera input, and the values at the remaining intermediate pixel
locations corresponding to {y1(1, 2, 1), y(1, 4, 1), y1(1, 6, 1), . . .} are obtained inter-
polated. Therefore, with the knowledge of the color filter array, the output y1 = y
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This final set of equations in (6.6) are dependent only on the camera outputs and
can be solved by least squares method to estimate the component parameters.
Therefore, in the absence of noise and post-interpolation processing, the average
error in estimating the cameras’ color interpolation parameters with an input x
via semi non-intrusive forensics is equal to the average estimation error obtained
via completely non-intrusive forensics with the knowledge of just the component
output y1, i.e., ∆s(x) = ∆n.
Equation (6.6) also suggests that the component is n-classifiable, s-classifiable,
and i-classifiable in the absence of noise and post-interpolation processing. Color
interpolation component is therefore a particular example of a component for which
n-classifiability implies s-classifiability which is not true in a general case. This
property of color interpolation can be attributed to the fact that the component is
0−consistent, and the knowledge of the output y gives full information about the
input x, and p(y|φi) = p(y|φi, x), where φi are the component parameters.
In the presence of noise and post-interpolation processing, the component would
no longer be 0−consistent and semi non-intrusive analysis would provide better
accuracies than completely non-intrusive analysis. In the subsequent sections, we
design a heuristic input and optimize it to increase the estimation accuracy and
classification confidence in computing the color interpolation parameters.
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6.2.2 White Balancing
In this part, we theoretically analyze the white balancing component under the
presence and absence of additive noise. We begin with the ‘no-noise’ case.
• No Noise case: The input-output relationship for the white-balancing operation
under no noise is given by (6.2) and can be expressed in the matrix form as
y = y2 = θy1, (6.7)
where θ is the white balancing parameter, and y1 and y represent the input and
the output of the white balancing component, respectively.
In the noiseless case case, the component is i-classifiable and s-classifiable be-
cause the forensic analyst can accurately estimate θ given one instantiation of
the input and output, as θ = y × y−11 . However, the component may not be n-
classifiable in a general scenario because, in the absence of the knowledge about the
input y1, the values of y1 and θ may be appropriately swapped and the information
about the output y would not resolve the ambiguity.2
• Under Additive Noise: Most often, white balancing precedes processing such
as JPEG compression in digital cameras. Operations such compression add noise
to the final output and under this scenario, and therefore the final output can be
written as
y = θy1 + n2, (6.8)
where n2 models the additive noise.
To simplify mathematical analysis of the white balancing component, we con-
sider a specific case with y1 = y1 of unit length and E(n
2
2) = σn. Under this
2The white balancing component may be n-classifiable if there is a restriction on the parameter



















This equation suggests that the Fisher information is equal to the signal to noise
ratio (SNR); this satisfies intuition as we notice that as the SNR increases, the
Fisher information increases and the overall accuracy improves.
With the assumption that the input to the component, y1, follows a Gaus-
sian distribution with mean µy1 and variance σ
2































Comparing (6.10) and (6.12), we notice that for any input y1 that satisfies y1 ≥
σn
√
In(θ), the Fisher information for semi non-intrusive forensics would be higher
than the Fisher information for completely non-intrusive forensics. Therefore,
by choosing such an input, the overall estimation errors obtained via semi non-
intrusive forensics can be made lower compared to non-intrusive studies. Thus,
the white balancing parameters can be better estimated semi non-intrusively by
appropriate choice of inputs.
6.2.3 JPEG compression
JPEG compression can be considered as quantization in the Discrete Cosine Trans-
form (DCT) domain. The compression parameters and the quality factors can be
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reasonably estimated via statistical analysis based on binning techniques just based
on the output image [33,84]. Therefore, the component is n-classifiable for non-zero
inputs.
6.3 Semi Non-Intrusive Forensics with Heuristic
Pattern
In the previous section, we have shown that the parameters of such important
components as color interpolation and white balancing can be estimated with a
higher accuracy and confidence via semi non-intrusive forensics compared to com-
pletely non-intrusive forensics. In this section, we design a heuristic pattern for
semi non-intrusive forensics of digital cameras and show that the heuristic pattern
can provide better accuracies in parameter estimation.
6.3.1 Heuristic Pattern Design
Lets consider the imaging model discussed in Section 6.1. Concatenating all the
elements of y(m, n, c) to form y, and representing (6.4) in matrix form, we obtain
y = Aαβx + Bβn1 + n2. (6.13)
where Aαβ and Bβ denote the matrices of appropriate dimension and are formed
from the parameters α and β. The sub-scripts in these matrices are used to indi-
cate their dependence on the appropriate component parameters. The goal of the
forensic analyst in semi non-intrusive forensics is to design an input that would
help increase the confidence (or accuracy) in classifying (or estimating) the device
parameters φ = [Aαβ Bβ ].
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Suppose Na is the total number of possible algorithms employed by the com-
ponent such that φ ∈ Φ = {φ1, φ2, . . . , φNa}, the forensic analyst computes the










Assuming the noise terms n1 and n2 to be independent and Gaussian distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2n1 and σ
2
n2
, respectively, it can be shown that finding
an input that maximizes (6.14) is equivalent to computing the input that maxi-
mizes the distance, (Aαβ(i) − Aαβ(j))x, between the means of every two pairs of
distributions. In this subsection, we develop heuristics to achieve this property.
As seen from the analysis, choosing the optimal input pattern would depend
on the nature of the algorithms in the parameter space Φ. In the case of the
color interpolation component, the algorithm space Φ can be mainly classified
into two categories as adaptive and non-adaptive methods depending on the way
they handle edge regions (see Appendix I of Chapter 3 for a brief summary).
Therefore, a good input to identify the interpolation category would be a pattern
with significant edge patterns, either in the horizontal or vertical direction. A
sample is shown in Figure 6.1(a). The corresponding images interpolated with
non-adaptive and adaptive methods are shown in Figure 6.1(b) and (c) and their
magnified versions are shown in Figure 6.1(d) and (e) respectively. As can be seen
from the figures, there are significant artifacts for images interpolated using non-
adaptive methods, and no such distortions are present in the images interpolated
using gradient based adaptive techniques. This result is expected because the non-
adaptive methods to not use any kind of edge sensing algorithms to avoid averaging
across the edge. In this case, we would be able to easily distinguish between the
two kinds of interpolation methods only by visually examining the outputs under
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Figure 6.1: A possible input pattern to identify the interpolation type. The figure
shows (a) sample input pattern; (b) image obtained after non-adaptive interpo-
lation techniques; (c) image obtained after edge based adaptive methods; (d) a
magnified version of (b) showing the artifacts; (e) a magnified version of image in
(c).
this input. This illustration indicates that the choice of an optimal input would in
general depend on the type of possible interpolation algorithms that we intend to
identify (or differentiate). For instance, the sample pattern in Figure 6.1 may not
be able to distinguish between two different types of adaptive methods that use
different set of coefficients for interpolation.
Generalizing on this observation, we define a set of properties required for an
optimal input pattern based on a detailed study of the imaging process and possible
algorithms employed in each component.
• Identifying Color Interpolation Methods:
– To help distinguish between different kinds of adaptive interpolation
methods, it would be necessary to study the similarity and differences
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in the way each of the interpolation methods handle different types
of directional edges. Thus, a converging wedge pattern as shown in
Figure 6.2 would be useful.
– Chirp signals can be used to capture the variations in the frequency do-
main as they have been known to have a very good frequency response.
The basic equation for generating a chirp signal is of the form
s(m, n) = a1cos(a2m
2 + a3n
2).
where a1, a2, and a3 are suitably chosen constants. These patterns also
provide us with a simple method to construct symmetric and circular
patterns with gradually decreasing widths and thickness, and in turn
facilitating performance studies of the interpolation methods under var-
ious frequency levels.
– Some interpolation methods have different ways to handle smooth re-
gions. Generally, bilinear or bicubic interpolation methods are used in
smooth regions due to their ease in implementation and because they
do not produce pronounced visual distortions in these areas. Thus, the
ideal pattern should also have reasonable sized smooth and gradually
varying regions to help identify the type of interpolation used here.
– Naturalness: Many of the interpolation methods are designed to work
well for natural images taken using a camera with a gradually changing
smooth hue. Some of them further assume that the edges of the three
color channels are aligned, and some others suppose that the differences
between the color channels (red-green, red-blue, blue-green) are contin-
uous. Hence, it would be necessary that have a smooth hue in order to
achieve maximum accuracy in identification.
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• Identifying White Balancing methods: Most of the cameras use white-patch
algorithm or the grey-world methods for white balancing. The white patch
method is based on relative normalization of the individual color channels
based on assumption that a particular region (in the image) is white. Thus,
introducing large sections of all-black and all-white regions with constant
intensity would enable us to find if the white-patch methods were used. To
identify the grey-world algorithms, it would be necessary to see if the average
pixel value in the output image is close to the mid-grey value of 128.
• Identifying Gamma Correction: The best input pattern to find the value
of Gamma is the varying grey scale pattern. Thus, comparing the output
grey scale values with the input, one can obtain a very good and reasonable
estimate of the value of the parameter gamma.
• Identifying Lens distortions: The best pattern to help identify any kind of
lens distortions is the checkerboard pattern with long straight lines. We
would also be able to estimate the parameters of the lens distortions by
studying the transformations undergone by a straight line. The checkerboard
pattern also helps align the captured image with the original image.
Based on the requirements outlined above, a possible input pattern is con-
structed as shown in Figure 6.3 by combining different patterns each satisfying
some of the requirements listed above. As can be seen from the figure, it has
the variable frequency chirp patterns at the center, the wedge patterns have been
repeated twice to help provide more information about the variability in handling
gradients along different directions. Gradually changing smooth regions border the
chirp patterns to help identify the interpolation methods used in smooth regions.
The image has been post-processed by fine tuning the hue and the ratios red/green
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Figure 6.2: Wedge patterns for semi non-intrusive forensics.
and the blue/green components have been smoothened to introduce naturalness.
Finally, the difference images (red-green and blue-green) have also been spatially
averaged to obtain good performance.
6.3.2 Component Forensics Analysis of Color Interpolation
As shown in Section 6.2.1, in the absence of noise and post-interpolation process-
ing operations, color interpolation module is 0−consistent and completely non-
intrusive analysis would provide the same accuracies as semi non-intrusive analy-
sis and the knowledge of the input does not provide any additional information to
aid forensic analysis in this case. However, in the presence of noise, the compo-
nent would no longer be 0−consistent and semi non-intrusive analysis would pro-
vide better accuracies than completely non-intrusive analysis. In this subsection,
we examine the effectiveness of the heuristic input pattern for semi non-intrusive
forensics of color interpolation module and compare the results obtained with nat-
ural images under completely non-intrusive forensics scenario in the presence of
post-interpolation processing.
We employ the proposed heuristic pattern for semi non-intrusive forensic anal-
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Figure 6.3: Heuristically designed input pattern.
ysis. In order to simulate completely non-intrusive forensic scenario for compari-
son studies, we select 20 representative images corresponding to different natural
scenes [129, 133]. These images are first down-sampled to remove the effects of
previously applied filtering and interpolation operations, sampled on the Bayer fil-
ter array [13], and then interpolated using six different interpolation algorithms to
reproduce the scene capture process in cameras. The interpolation methods that
we consider are: (a) Linear types of interpolation, including Bilinear and Bicubic,
and (b) Non-linear interpolation methods including Smooth Hue, Median Filter
based approach, Gradient based, and Adaptive Color Plane [7]. These 120 images
obtained using these six different interpolation techniques form the non-intrusive
157
















Natural images under non−linear interpolation
Natural images under linear interpolation
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Proposed pattern under linear interpolation
Figure 6.4: Results for color interpolation showing (a) mean and (b) variance of
estimation error.
forensic dataset. We test the efficiency of semi non-intrusive forensics from both
an estimation and pattern classification perspective.
Performance Evaluation from Estimation Perspective
For each image in the dataset, we estimate the interpolation coefficients from
each type of region ℜm(m = 1, 2, 3) by solving the least squares problem [128],
re-interpolate the image using the estimated coefficients, and find the estimation
error. We compare the estimation results obtained semi non-intrusively using the
proposed heuristic pattern with the ones got by employing natural images under
non-intrusive scenarios. Figure 6.4(a) and (b) compare the results in terms of
the mean and variance of the estimation error, respectively, for the two linear
and four non-linear interpolation algorithms. As can be seen in the figure, the
proposed heuristic pattern gives an average estimation error close to 0.007 per pixel
that is much lower compared to natural images for which the values are around
0.015 − 0.03. This suggests the effectiveness of the proposed heuristic pattern for
improving the estimation of the color interpolation coefficients and demonstrates
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the performance gains of semi non-intrusive forensics over the completely non-
intrusive scenario.
Performance Evaluation from Classification Perspective
In this part, we study the performance of the heuristic pattern for classifying the
interpolation type. For our experiments, we estimate the interpolation coefficients
from each of the 120 synthetic images in the dataset and classify them with a
SVM classifier [148]. We compute the confidence value as a difference between
the probability of correct classification and the maximum of the corresponding
likelihoods of the making a wrong decision, i.e.,
ηi(x, y) = p(φi|y, x) − max
j=1,2,...,Na,j 6=i
p(φj|y, x), (6.15)
and use this as a metric to examine the classification results.
We study the robustness in parameter classification under JPEG compression.
In Table 6.1, we show the confidence scores obtained on ‘correct’ classification
under different quality levels of JPEG compression. We note that the maximum
confidence is attained under ‘no compression’ for most of interpolation algorithms,
and the confidence score reduces as the JPEG quality factor reduces. The ‘∗’
marks in the table under low JPEG quality indicate mis-classification. Upon a
closer look at these results, we find that these bilinear and smooth hue interpolated
images have been wrongly classified as bicubic. This result is expected because
bilinear and bicubic employ very similar interpolation approaches, and smooth
hue uses bicubic for the ‘green’ component as discussed in Appendix I of Chapter
3. The confidence values obtained for the heuristic pattern, in all scenarios, are
significantly higher than those obtained for natural images which are in the range
of 50− 60% even under 100% JPEG quality. This demonstrates the superiority of
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Table 6.1: Variation of the classification confidence score as a function of JPEG
quality factor for the heuristic pattern in Figure 6.3. ∗ indicates mis-classification.
Algorithm No Compr. 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%
Bilinear 74% 68% 35% * * * * *
Bicubic 77% 39% 55% 65% 60% 44% 25% 3%
Smooth Hue 94% 25% 16% * * * * *
Median Based 64% 72% 68% 73% 77% 78% 67% 29%
Gradient Based 99% 92% 89% 83% 76% 71% 66% 69%
ACP 87% 50% 35% 22% 27% 25% 14% *
the designed pattern for semi non-intrusive analysis.
A Closer Look at Estimation and Classification Results
We take a closer look at the estimation and the classification results to understand
the reasons for superior performance. More specifically, we divide the heuristic
pattern, shown in Figure 6.3 into various 512 × 512 regions depending on the
location of wedge, chirp, horizontal, and vertical gradient patterns. The image
blocks are then interpolated with each of the 6 different interpolation methods,
and the interpolation coefficients are estimated from these blocks for classification.
In Figure 6.5 (a)–(f), we show the images obtained from the six interpolation
algorithms and highlight in green the regions that have been correctly classified by
the SVM classifier. For instance, when interpolated with the bilinear method, all
the regions except the wedge regions and the horizontal/vertical gradient regions
are correctly classified to be bilinearly interpolated and the remaining regions were
mis-classified.
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Comparing the highlighted regions in all the six images, we note that different
types of regions are correctly classified when interpolated with different techniques.
For example, the chirp patterns in the center can help identify the bilinear, bicubic,
smooth hue, gradient based, and adaptive color plane methods. However, they
may not be very good for identifying median based methods. On the other hand,
converging wedge patterns are very good in identifying the median interpolation
and gradient based methods. The horizontal and vertical gradient patterns can
help distinguish adaptive versus non-adaptive methods, but cannot help separate
two different types of adaptive methods or two different kinds of non-adaptive
methods. Thus, our results indicate that while the individual patterns may not
be separately good for identifying the exact interpolation algorithm, the proposed
heuristic pattern is very good. When the entire image is given as an input, the
coefficients obtained from each of the regions contribute to improve the overall
classification accuracy; thus, improving the confidence in forensic analysis.
6.3.3 Forensics Analysis of White Balancing Parameters
In this subsection, we focus on white balance parameter estimation. We begin
by describing the estimation algorithm and then present simulation results and
analysis.
Proposed Algorithm to Estimate White Balance Parameters
A brief survey of white balancing methods are included in Appendix of this chapter.
White balancing operations are typically multiplicative [39,150] as shown in (6.2)
and each color in the photograph is multiplied by an appropriately chosen constant
in the camera color space. Using U to represent the transformation matrix that
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(a) Bilinear Interpolation (b) Bicubic Interpolation (c) Smooth Hue
(d) Median based (e) Gradient based (f) ACP
Figure 6.5: A closer look at the heuristic pattern highlighting the regions that are
correctly classified under different types of color interpolation algorithms.
is used to convert the RGB color coefficients to camera color space, the white

































where y1(., ., .) represents the raw pixels, y2(., ., .) represents the white-balanced
pixels, and the 3 × 3 diagonal matrix Λ denotes the white-balancing coefficients
that are chosen based on the lighting conditions of the scene.3 In most commercial
3Diagonal transformation matrix is preferred for Λ as it follows the Von-Kries hypothesis [39],
and has only 3 parameters to be estimated from the scene.
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cameras, white balancing is done in the XYZ color space [150], and U in this case
would correspond to the color transformation from RGB to XYZ space. Some
modern digital cameras may perform sensor sharpening, and appropriate modifi-
cations are done to the matrix U to include these effects. Some sample values of
the transformation matrix, U , for FujiFilm FinePix S5000 and Canon EOS Digital
Rebel are shown in Figure 6.6(a) and (b), respectively. Note that U is tied to a
camera, while the value of Λ varies for each picture taken by the device.
As shown in Section 6.2, it would be difficult to non-intrusively estimate the
white balancing parameters U and Λ accurately from the output images without
the knowledge of the actual raw values captured by the sensor. However, they can
be semi non-intrusively estimated. If the digital camera can produce raw images,
the pixel values as captured by the CCD sensors can be read out from the captured
image. These values can be used alongwith the actual white balanced output to
estimate U and Λ by solving (6.16). For digital cameras that do not produce the
raw format, the values of U can be estimated by a two-step process [129,133]. The
first step obtains two images with approximately the same raw data but different
white balanced processed versions. This can be done by manually choosing different
built-in white balancing options while taking the pictures, for example, one image
with white balancing setting fixed to “tube light” and another with “tungsten
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wb represent the corresponding
values in the second image. Denoting the corresponding white balancing constants
employed in generating the two images by Λ(1) and Λ(2), respectively, we can show
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1.503428 -0.424598 -0.078830 1.591484 -0.645577 0.054094
-0.056807 1.369831 -0.313025 -0.083807 1.479398 -0.395591
0.032900 -0.403764 1.370864 0.069723 -0.473899 1.404176
(a) FujiFilm FinePix S5000 (b) Canon EOS Digital Rebel















































Here, the notation Λ(2)/Λ(1) represents a diagonal matrix with each diagonal ele-
ment obtained as an element-wise division of the corresponding terms in Λ(2) and
Λ(1).
In the following, we test our proposed estimation techniques for simulated data
and study its robustness to JPEG compression with both synthetic data and actual
images taken from the camera.
Testing with Synthetic Data
To reproduce the experimental setup in digital cameras, we generate two images
by applying two different white balancing parameters both with the same U corre-
sponding to the ones employed in Canon EOS Digital Rebel (shown in the Figure
6.6(b)). The diagonal values of the matrix Λ for the first image are chosen to
be equal to {1.436, 1, 1.763} and as {2.442, 1, 1.073} for the second image. These
values correspond to the ones used for daylight and tungsten light settings respec-
tively. The coefficients of A1→2 = U
−1(Λ(2)/Λ(1))U and the transformation matrix
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Figure 6.7: Results for white balancing showing the error in estimation of (a) A1→2
and (b) normalized transformation matrix Unorm.
U are then estimated from these two white balanced images.
We study the robustness of the estimation techniques as the final images are
JPEG compressed. More specifically, we JPEG compress the white balanced im-
ages with different quality factors and use these images for estimation. The es-
timation error in A1→2 is computed as the squared Forbenius norm between the
actual and the estimated values, and is shown in Figure 6.7(a) as a function of
the JPEG quality factor. The figure shows the error for the synthetic pattern
alongside the average error recorded from 20 natural images. We notice that the
error reduces as the quality factor increases for both natural images and the de-
signed pattern as expected. We also observe that the overall value of error for the
designed pattern is an order of magnitude lower than that obtained for natural
images. This result demonstrates the superiority of the proposed heuristic pattern
for semi non-intrusive estimation of white balancing parameters.
Eigen value decomposition is applied to the estimated matrix A1→2, and the
eigenvector matrix Ûnorm is computed with each of the eigenvectors normalized to
unit energy. The Frobenius norm between the actual normalized matrix Unorm and
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the estimated matrix is shown in Figure 6.7(b) as a function of the JPEG quality
factor. We notice that error values are lower than 0.1, suggesting the effectiveness
of the proposed heuristic pattern for estimating the white balance parameter Unorm.
Similar results were also obtained when tested with camera data.
Comparing Figure 6.4(a) and Figure 6.7(a), we also find that while the estima-
tion results obtained in the semi non-intrusive scenario with the proposed heuristic
pattern are better than the ones obtained using natural images in both cases, the
performance improvement is more significant in the case of white balancing than
for the case of color interpolation. This result can be attributed to the multi-
plicative nature of the white balance operation (see (6.16)), that requires more
information to produce more accurate estimates, and such additional information
may be available in controlled test conditions in a semi non-intrusive scenario.
These results also suggest that the performance improvements obtained with semi
non-intrusive forensics depends on the nature of processing that is to be identified.
Testing with Camera Images
We use the proposed estimation techniques for obtaining the white balancing pa-
rameters from camera data. In our experiments, we display the pattern in the
Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) monitor and capture it with several digital cam-
eras. All images are captured under the same constant uniform illumination under
incandescent lights. The Gamma of monitor is set to 1 and the ISO setting and
focal length are maintained to be similar for all images. A tripod is used to re-
move the effects of other kinds of such random distortions as the ones introduced
by hand shaking, and distinct horizontal (and vertical) lines as shown in Figure 6.3


































Figure 6.8: Results for estimating white balancing parameters for Canon EOS Dig-
ital Rebel: the estimated and the actual values of the normalized transformation
matrix (Unorm) are shown alongside for comparison.
image. Several snapshots of the input image were taken by changing the white
balance setting on the camera manually.
As a preliminary pre-processing step, registration is performed on the two
JPEG images. The corners in checker-board registration pattern is employed to
give good set of corresponding points, and the homographies [57] are computed by
matching these corners. One of the two images is then projected using the esti-
mated homography and the projected image is used for subsequent analysis. We
formulate a set of linear equations using the projected image and solve it using the
least squares technique to obtain A1→2. We then compute its eigenvalues and nor-
malized eigenvector matrix Ûnorm. The estimated values are shown in Figure 6.8.
The actual value of the transformation matrix U is also obtained by reading the
header of the corresponding raw files captured solely for testing purposes. The
closeness in the estimated and the normalized actual coefficients demonstrate that
our proposed simulation setting, pattern, and the estimation technique is good.
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6.4 Optimal Pattern Design for Semi Non-Intrusive
Forensics
In this section, we employ metrics from the estimation and pattern classification
frameworks presented in Chapter 5 to optimize the heuristic pattern for semi non-
intrusive analysis.
6.4.1 Optimizing the Heuristic Pattern via Estimation Frame-
work
We optimize the input pattern for semi non-intrusive forensics by solving a min-
imization problem that minimizes the parameter estimation accuracies, ∆s(x,y),
where x and y are the input and the output to the component, respectively. As de-
scribed in the imaging model in Section 6.1, color interpolation in digital cameras
can be expressed mathematically as (6.1) and can be represented in the matrix
form as
y = Xα + n1. (6.18)
where y denotes the component output, X represents a matrix with component
input values, α = [α(−Nα,−Nα, 1), . . . , α(Nα, Nα, 3)]T is a vector containing all
the component parameters to be estimated, and n1 is the additive white noise that
models any post-interpolation processing operations. Under the assumption that
the noise follows an independent and identically distributed Gaussian distribution,
it can be shown that the estimation error for semi non-intrusive forensics under






Figure 6.9: Digitally magnified versions of a 32 × 32 part in the original and
optimized input patterns.
where σ2n1 is the variance of the additive noise.
An iterative technique based on gradient-descent algorithm is employed to min-
imize the cost function ∆s(x,y) and to optimize the pixel values of the input pat-
tern [126]. In Figure 6.9, we show the results of the optimization algorithm for a
32×32 part the original input along with the optimized version for comparison. To
test the goodness of the designed pattern and the optimized pattern for estimating
the cameras’ color interpolation parameters, we first interpolate both the original
and the optimized images shown in Figure 6.9 using different kinds of adaptive
interpolation algorithms such as gradient based [92] and adaptive color plane [56].
We then post-process the interpolated images by JPEG compressing them under
different quality factors [126]; and finally re-estimate the interpolation coefficients
from the compressed versions. Figure 6.10 shows the estimation error as a func-
tion of the JPEG quality factor for both the heuristically designed input and the
optimized input image. The figure shows the average error is significantly lower for
the case of the optimized pattern compared with the original pattern. This result
suggests that the theoretical framework can be employed to design optimal input
patterns for estimating the color interpolation parameters with improved efficiency
and robustness to post-interpolation operations such as JPEG compression.
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Performance Comparison for Adaptive Interpolation
Heuristically Designed Original Pattern
Optimized Pattern
Figure 6.10: Average estimation error for semi non-intrusive forensics as a function
of JPEG quality factor.
6.4.2 Optimizing the Heuristic Pattern via Pattern Clas-
sification Framework
In the previous subsection, we employed estimation error as a metric for optimiz-
ing the heuristic pattern for semi non-intrusive analysis. The optimized images
obtained therein can be employed to estimate the coefficients with a higher accu-
racy as shown in the experimental results; and can be widely deployed for forensic
analysis when the knowledge of possible set of color interpolation algorithms is not
known apriori.
In this subsection, we show that with the knowledge of the possible set of color
interpolation algorithms, ideas from pattern classification theory can be employed
for optimizing the heuristic pattern and find the one that maximizes the overall
confidence in decision making. As shown earlier in Section 6.3.1, the optimal input
for camera component forensics is the one that maximizes the distance, ||(Aαβ(i)−
Aαβ(j))x||. Here, Aαβ(i) and Aαβ(j) correspond to two different possible values
for the Aαβ from the algorithm space. It can be shown that the solution for this
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Designed Pattern −− Adaptive Interpolation
Designed Pattern −− Non−adaptive Interpolation
Natural Images −− Adaptive Interpolation
Natural Images −− Non−adaptive Interpolation
Figure 6.11: Confidence score as a function of JPEG quality factor for (a) natural
images (b) designed pattern.
maximization problem, x̂, is along the direction of the eigenvector corresponding
to the largest eigenvalue of the matrix (Aαβ(i) − Aαβ(j)). Based on the above
observations, we optimize the heuristic pattern in Figure 6.3 and modify in such a
way that the optimal input approximately follows the direction of the maximum
eigenvector [130, 133]. The optimized input is employed for testing.
To simulate the camera capture process, the optimized input image is interpo-
lated using two different interpolation techniques: bicubic that does not adapt to
image content, and the adaptive color plane interpolation method (see Appendix
I of Chapter 3 for detailed description of interpolation algorithms) that adapts to
image gradient values. The interpolation coefficients are estimated and used as
an input to a two-class support vector machine (SVM) classifier [148] for identi-
fication. This SVM has been trained with the coefficients obtained from natural
images correspondingly interpolated with each of the same two different techniques.
We study the robustness in parameter estimation under JPEG compression. In
Figure 6.11, we plot the confidence values obtained on classification under different
171
quality levels of JPEG compression both for the designed pattern and for natu-
ral images. We notice from the figure that as the JPEG quality factor reduces
and compression noise becomes stronger, the confidence of correctly identifying
the interpolation coefficients reduces. Additionally, we observe that the confidence
score obtained with the designed pattern is higher than the average scores obtained
with natural images; demonstrating the superiority of designed pattern for semi
non-intrusive analysis.
6.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we present several applications of the theoretical framework and
show its applicability for semi non-intrusive component forensics of digital cam-
eras. We present case studies to examine digital camera components and theo-
retically derive the requirements for intrusive, semi non-intrusive, and completely
non-intrusive forensics of digital camera components. Motivated by the conclusions
from the theoretical analysis, we identify the basic requirements of a good input
pattern for semi non-intrusive forensics, and construct an input pattern satisfying
these conditions. We present a systematic methodology to estimate the parame-
ters of the cameras’ color interpolation and white balancing algorithms, and show
through simulations that the proposed heuristic input pattern in controlled testing
conditions provides an overall higher accuracy in parameter estimation. Compar-
isons with natural images obtained under non-intrusive forensic conditions suggest
the need for robust semi non-intrusive forensics, and the superiority of the heuristic
input pattern for parameter estimation. We then apply the theoretical framework
to optimize the input pattern using estimation error and confidence score as met-
rics; and show that the accuracy in parameter identification can be improved via
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such an approach. The features obtained from semi non-intrusive analysis provide
useful evidence to analyze infringement/licensing, to construct good training sets
for camera identification, and to provide ground-truth information for tampering
detection.
Appendix: Brief Survey of Some Popular White
Balancing Algorithms
There are many algorithms for white balancing [32]. In manual white balancing
techniques, the scale factors are chosen based on the chosen illuminance options
such as tube light, sunlight, incandescent lamps, cloudy lights, night vision, etc.
On the other hand, auto white balancing algorithms compute these values from
the picture based on estimate of the illuminance of the scene [12,140]. Auto white
balancing can be very broadly classified into three main categories based on their
inherent assumptions - gray world, white patch, and retinex methods. The Gray
world techniques work by assuming that average of all the pixel values in the world
is gray. These techniques find the the scale factors by normalizing with respect
to the mean of the image, mean of all images in the database, weighted mean of
the image, or by using the image mean after truncation [49]. The white patch
algorithms on the other hand assume that the maximum value of the scene is
white, and normalize the pixel values to achieve it. Retinex methods are one of
the oldest known techniques [18]. In this case, a path is first chosen, and the ratio
between the pixel values to the maximum in the path is computed. Such process





Robust and Secure Image
Hashing
In the previous chapters, we discussed forensic approaches to image authenti-
cation. In addition to these methods, when the original image is available at
hand, traditional techniques based on cryptography and watermarking can also
be employed to authenticate multimedia, verify content integrity, and prevent
forgery [24, 28, 29, 146]. In this chapter, we focus on addressing the problem of
multimedia forensics via extrinsic fingerprinting. Extrinsic fingerprints are exter-
nal signals that are added to the image by the device after the image has been
captured. These external signals can then be used to establish the authenticity
of digital data and determine possible tampering. Compared with non-intrusive
forensic analysis via intrinsic fingerprints, the use of extrinsic fingerprints necessi-
tates the presence of the device at hand as the fingerprint needs to be added at
the time of image acquisition. While this requirement imposes some additional
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Figure 7.1: Hash functions for image authentication.
constraints on their applicability, extrinsic fingerprinting techniques help build an
content-based image authentication scheme that is collision-resistant, robust to
common signal processing operations, and secure against estimation and forgery
attacks as will be shown in the chapter.
There are two popular approaches to multimedia authentication via extrinsic
fingerprinting. These include semi-fragile watermarking [40, 52, 146] and robust
image hashing [122]. In this work, we mainly focus on robust image hash functions
as a means for extrinsic fingerprinting. A multimedia hash is a content-based
digital signature of the media data. To generate a multimedia hash, a secret
key is used to extract certain features from the data. These features are further
processed to form the hash. The hash is transmitted along with the media either
by appending or embedding it to the primary media data. At the receiver side, the
authenticator uses the same key to generate the hash values, which are compared
to the ones transmitted along with the data for verifying its authenticity. This
process is illustrated in Figure 7.1.
In addition to content authentication, multimedia hashes are used in content
based retrieval from databases [82]. To search for multimedia content, näıve meth-
ods such as sample-by-sample comparisons are computationally inefficient. More-
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over, these methods compare the lowest level of content representation and do not
offer robustness in such situations as geometric distortions. Robust image hash
functions can be used to address this problem [138]. A hash is computed for ev-
ery data entry in the database and stored with the original data in the form of a
look-up table. To search for a given query in the database, its hash is computed
and compared with the hashes in the look-up table. The data entry corresponding
to the closest match, in terms of certain hash-domain distance that often accounts
for content similarity, is then fetched. Since the hash has much smaller size with
respect to the original media, matching the hash values is computationally more
efficient.
Image hash functions have also been used in applications involving image and
video watermarking. In non-oblivious image watermarking, the need for the orig-
inal image in watermark extraction can be substituted by using hash as side in-
formation [20,28,30]. The hash functions have also been used as image-dependent
keys for watermarking [41, 62]. In video watermarking, it has been shown that
adversaries can employ “collusion attacks” to devise simple statistical measures
to estimate the watermark if they have the access to multiple copies of similar
frames [119]. A solution to this problem is to use secure, content-dependent hash
values as a key to generate the watermark [42].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.1, we introduce the
general framework for image hashing and present prior art. We then present the
proposed image hashing scheme and compare its performance with several existing
schemes in Section 7.2. We evaluate the security for a number image hashing
schemes in Section 7.3. Finally, discussions are provided in Section 7.4 and the
chapter is summarized in Section 7.5.
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7.1 General Framework and Prior Art
There are two important design criteria for image hash functions, namely, robust-
ness and security [42, 120–122, 138, 147]. By robustness, we mean that when the
same key is used, perceptually similar images should produce similar hashes. Here,
the similarity of hashes is measured in terms of some distance metric, such as the
Euclidean or Hamming distance. In this work, we consider two images to be similar
if one image can be obtained from the other through a set of content-preserving ma-
nipulations. This set of manipulations includes moderate levels of additive noise,
JPEG compression, geometric distortions (such as the common rotation, scaling,
and translation operations, or more generally affine transformations), cropping, fil-
tering operations (such as spatial averaging and median filtering), and watermark
embedding.
The security of image hash functions is introduced by incorporating a secret key
in generating the hash. Without the knowledge of the key, the hash values should
not be easily forged or estimated. Additionally, some design criteria for generic
data hash also applies to image hash functions, namely, the one-way and collision-
free properties. A hash is one-way if given a hash h and a hash function g(·), it
is computationally expensive to find an image I such that h = g(I). Collision-free
property refers to the fact that given an image I and a hash function g(·), it is
computationally hard to find a second image Î such that g(I) = g(Î). Although
some generic data hash functions such as MD5 satisfy these criteria [96], they
are highly dependent on every bit (or pixel) of the input data rather than on the
content. Hence, most of the them are not suitable for the emerging multimedia
applications and the need for building robust and secure image hash is paramount.
To achieve robustness and security in image hashing, most of the existing
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Figure 7.2: The three-step framework for generating a hash.
schemes follow a three-step framework to generate a hash. As shown in Figure 7.2,
these three steps include
1. Generating a key-dependent feature vector from the image,
2. Quantizing the feature vector, and
3. Compressing the quantized vector.
The most challenging part of this framework has been the feature extraction
stage [79, 98, 138]. A robust image feature extraction scheme should withstand
minor distortions to the image that do not alter the semantic content [41, 41,
42, 78, 79, 98, 100, 120, 122, 138, 147, 151]. A typical approach is to extract image
features that is invariant to allowed content-preserving image processing opera-
tions [41,42,78,100,151]. These features are then used to generate the hash values.
Some of the features that have been proposed in the literature include block-
based histograms [38, 64, 117], image edge information [115], relative magnitudes
of the DCT coefficients [80], and the scale interaction model with the Mexican-
Hat wavelets [16]. However, these features are both sensitive and publicly known.
The sensitivity against minor distortion can be mitigated by preprocessing signals
via low-pass filtering [138], applying quantization or extracting most-significant
bits [151], and clustering [99]. As these resilient features are publicly known, us-
ing them alone makes the scheme susceptible to forgery attacks [42], even when
the final hash is obtained by encrypting these features [16, 80]. This is because
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the attacker may create a new image with different visual content, while still pre-
serving the feature values. As the resulting hash will be the same, such hashing
approaches may lead to mis-classifications in database applications, and would also
be vulnerable to counterfeiting attacks in authentication applications. Therefore,
the security mechanism should be combined into the feature extraction stage.
By jointly considering security and robustness, Fridrich et al. propose to gen-
erate image hash by projecting an input image onto zero-mean random smooth
patterns, generated using a secret key [42]. While the resulting hash is resilient to
filtering operations, it does not perform very well for geometric distortions and is
not collision-free as shown in [116]. In [138], Venkatesan et al. use the principal
values calculated from the wavelet transform of the image blocks to generate a fea-
ture vector invariant to general gray scale operations. The resulting features are
then randomly quantized and compressed to produce the final hash [97]. Recently,
it has been shown that this scheme does not perform well for some manipulations
such as contrast changes, gamma correction [95]. An iterative key-dependent image
hash based on repeated thresholding and spatial filtering was proposed in [98]. All
these algorithms [42,98,138] described above perform well under additive noise and
common filtering operations, but not under desynchronization and geometric dis-
tortions. Considering these disadvantages, the Radon soft hash algorithm (RASH)
based on the properties of the Radon transform was proposed in [78,79]. Recently,
other transform domain features have been employed for perceptual hashing. Fea-
tures obtained from the singular value decomposition (SVD) of pseudo-randomly
chosen regions of the image [71] and Randlet transform coefficients [90] have been
shown to have good robustness properties especially for rotation and cropping
attacks.
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To enable fast comparison and searches, it is usually preferred that the final
hash be a short sequence of bits rather than a set of real numbers. Therefore, the
output of the feature extraction stage is usually quantized, converted to binary
representation, and further compressed. Uniform, Lloyd-Max, or key-dependent
randomized quantizers have been used for hash quantization [97,138]; and the de-
coding stages of error correcting codes have been used for compressing the quan-
tized hash [17, 97, 138]. These methods reduce the length of the hash vector; yet
preserving the Hamming distance. Some work also secure the compression stage
by performing a key-dependent random selection from the quantized hash val-
ues [97,151]. A detailed survey of image hashing algorithms can be found in [147].
In this work, we introduce a new method to construct robust and secure image
hash functions. Since the feature extraction stage is the most important stage in
the general image hashing framework, we will investigate the feature extraction
stage in greater detail in this chapter. We design a randomized hashing scheme
based on the rotation invariance of the Fourier-Mellin transform. We show that the
proposed scheme is robust to geometric distortions, filtering operations, and various
content-preserving manipulations. We then present a framework to systematically
study the security aspects of existing image hashing schemes. We propose to
evaluate the security from an information theoretic perspective by measuring the
amount of randomness in the hash vector using the differential entropy as a metric.
We show that the suggested security evaluation framework is generic and can
be used to analyze and compare the security of several classes of image hashing
algorithms. We derive analytical expressions of security using an entropy-based
metric for several representative image hashing schemes and demonstrate that the
proposed hashing algorithm is more secure in terms of this metric. Finally, we
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use the proposed security metric to discuss the trade-offs between robustness and
security that is exhibited in most existing image hashing algorithms.
7.2 Image Hashing Algorithms Based on Polar
Fourier Transform
In this section, we present the proposed image hashing algorithm [122]. Our pro-
posed scheme is based on the Fourier-Mellin transform, which has been shown to
be invariant to 2D affine transformations [41, 63, 81, 105]. We incorporate key-
dependent randomization into the Fourier transform outputs to form secure and
robust image hash.
7.2.1 Underlying Robustness Principle of the Proposed Al-
gorithm
Consider an image i(x, y) and its 2D Fourier transform I(fx, fy), where fx and fy
are the normalized spatial frequencies in the range [0, 1]. We denote a rotated,
scaled and translated version of the i(x, y) as i′(x, y). We can relate them as
i′(x, y) = i(σ(xcosα + ysinα) − x0, σ(−xsinα + ycosα) − y0), (7.1)
where the rotation, scaling, and translation (RST) parameters are α, σ, and (x0, y0)
respectively. The magnitude of the 2D Fourier transform of i′(x, y) can be written
as
|I ′(fx, fy)| = |σ|−2|I(σ−1(fxcosα + fysinα), σ−1(−fxsinα + fycosα))|. (7.2)
Consider now a polar coordinate representation in the Fourier transform domain,
i.e. fx = ρcosθ and fy = ρsinθ, where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the normalized radius and
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θ ∈ [0, 2π) is the angle parameter. The (7.2) can be written using polar co-
ordinates as
|I ′(ρ, θ)| = |σ|−2|I(ρσ−1, θ − α)|. (7.3)
In (7.3), we observe that the magnitude of the Fourier transform is independent of
the translational parameters (x0, y0). Observing that a rotation in image domain
leads to a rotation by the same amount in the Fourier transform domain, we inte-
grate the transform magnitude |I ′(ρ, θ)| along a circle centered at zero frequency




|I ′(ρ, θ)|dθ ≈
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These properties of the Fourier transform enable us to construct robust features.
In the next subsection, we present the detail steps of the proposed algorithms.
7.2.2 Basic Steps of the Proposed Algorithms
The basic steps of the proposed algorithm include preprocessing, feature genera-
tion, and post processing.
1. Preprocessing: We first apply a low-pass filter on the input image and down-
sample it. We then perform histogram equalization on the down-sampled
image to get i(x, y). We take a Fourier transform on the preprocessed image
to obtain I(fx, fy). The Fourier transform output is converted into polar
co-ordinates to arrive at I ′(ρ, θ) as in (7.3).
2. Feature generation: We sum up I ′(ρ, θ) along the θ-axis at K equidistant




, . . . , (2K−1)π
K
}, to obtain an
image feature vector hρ. K = 360 is used in our implementation. Since the
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Figure 7.3: 2-D Fourier transform of the Lena image. The jth hash value−hj , is
obtained by a random weighted summation along the circumference of chosen radii
ρ ∈ Γj in scheme−2. Some of the constant radii circles used in the summation are
displayed in the figure. The magnitude of the Fourier transform is shown in the
log-scale and has been appropriately scaled for display purposes.
feature hρ is only dependent on the image content, we propose two random-
ization methods to obtain key-dependent features using hρ:
• Scheme 1:
We obtain |I ′(ρ, θ)| as in (7.3) and compute a weighted sum along the




















where {βρj ,i} are key-dependent pseudo-random numbers that are nor-
mally distributed with mean m and variance σ2.
• Scheme 2:
We first use a secret key to generate random sets of radii {Γj}. We then
take |I ′(ρ, θ)| obtained in (7.3) and do a summation along the θ-axis
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for each radii in this set. A random linear combination of the resulting






















where βρ are key-dependent pseudo-random numbers that are normally
distributed with mean m and variance σ2. This method is illustrated in
Figure 7.3.
3. Post processing: We quantize the resulting statistics vector and apply
Gray coding to obtain the binary hash sequence [51]. This bit sequence
is then passed through the decoding stage of a order-3 Reed-Muller decoder
for compression [97]. This step may also be replaced with the Wyner-Ziv
encoder [65, 149]. Furthermore, we can enhance the security of the hash
by making the quantization and compression stages key-dependent. For ex-
ample, randomized quantization algorithms may be used to quantize the
hash [97]; for the compression stage, we can randomly select the hash values
from the quantized hash vector [98] or randomly choose the order of the Reed-
Muller decoder used for different sub-sections of the hash. These techniques
would further enhance the security of the resultant hash vector. Finally, the
compressed hash is randomly permuted according to a permutation table
generated using the key.
7.2.3 Performance Study and Comparison
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Performance Metrics and Experiment Setup
To measure the performance of image hashing, we choose the Hamming distance
between the binary hashes, normalized with respect to the length (L) of the hash







|h1(k) − h2(k)|, (7.7)
which is expected to be close to 0 for similar images and close to 0.5 for dissimilar
ones. As more parts of a picture is changed, the manipulated image and the orig-
inal image become more dissimilar. For an ideal hashing scheme, the normalized
Hamming distance between the corresponding hashes should increase accordingly.
We test the proposed schemes on a database of around 157,200 images. In
this database, there are 1200 original grey scale images each of size 512 × 512.
This includes around 50 classic benchmark images (such as Lena, Baboon, Pepper,
etc.), and a variety of scenery and human activity photos taken by digital cameras.
These camera photos were cropped, converted to grey scale, and downsampled to
512× 512. For each original image in this set, we generate 130 similar versions by
manipulating the original image according to a set of content-preserving operations
listed in Table 7.1. We measure the normalized Hamming distance between the
hashes of the original image and the manipulated images. The results obtained for
the proposed schemes are compared with three representative existing schemes by
Fridrich et al. [42], by Venkatesan et al. [138], and by Mihçak et al. [98]. These three
schemes are chosen because they adopt different ways to extract the robust image
feature as well as different methods to randomize these features. We also consider
the normalized Hamming distance between the hashes of dissimilar images, which
indicates the discriminative capability of the hashing algorithm. We note that the
computed hashes of all these schemes are short in length. For a 512 × 512 image,
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Figure 7.4: Performance of various hashing schemes under desynchronization at-
tacks. To generate a point on the curve, the input image was first rotated (or
sheared) to give a larger image padded appropriately with zeros. This image was
then cropped to exclude the zeros and resized to a pre-determined canonical size.
The hash of the resulting image was computed and the normalized Hamming dis-
tance from the hash of original image is shown in the Y -axis.
the hash lengths are on the order of a few hundred bits, as shown in Table 7.2.
Experimental Results on Robustness of the Hash
To examine the robustness properties, we consider the performance of various
hashing schemes to different content-preserving manipulations such as moderate
RST, filtering, and image compression.1 We show the comparison results in terms
of normalized Hamming distance in Figure 7.4−Figure 7.8. Our results indicate
1In all the experiments, we use our implementation of the hashing methods [42, 98, 138] for
the comparison study. Whenever possible, we verified the performance results with the ones
reported in the paper. In all cases, the parameters of the hashing algorithms were chosen so as
to maintain similar values for the security metric in order to facilitate a fair comparison. Refer
Section 7.3 for details on the security metric.
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Table 7.1: Set of content-preserving manipulations.
Manipulation Operation Parameters of the Operation Number of Images
Additive Noise
Gaussian distributed Variance 0-0.2 10
Uniform distributed Variance 0-0.5 10
Filtering Operations
Spatial Averaging Filter order 2-6 5
Median Filter Filter order 2-11 10
Wiener Filter Filter order 2-11 10
Sharpening Filter order 3-11 5
Geometric Distortions
Rotation Degrees 1-20 20
Scaling Percentage 0.5-1.5 10
Cropping Percentage 1-30 10
Shearing Percentage 1-10 10
Random deletion of lines Percentage 1-20 10
Luminance Non-Linearities
Gamma correction Iγ, γ ∈ [0.75-1.25] 10
JPEG compression Compression Ratio 10-99 10
Total 130
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Table 7.2: Hash lengths for various hashing schemes.
Hashing method used Hash Length
Mihçak’s algorithm B [98] 1000
Venkatesan’s scheme [138] 805
Fridrich’s scheme [42] 420
Proposed scheme 1 420
Proposed scheme 2 420
that the proposed schemes perform well under desynchronization distortions. The
performance for rotation and shearing distortions, averaged over the 1200 images,
are shown in Figure 7.4. In the case of rotation distortions, we observe that the
Hamming distance between the quantized feature vectors of the proposed schemes
is smaller than those of the existing schemes, especially for large rotation angle.
This is expected since the summation along the θ-axis reduces the effects of ro-
tation. We can also observe that scheme−2 gives better results than scheme−1,
in terms of the normalized Hamming distance. This is attributed to the fact that
performing a weighted sum along the θ-axis as in the proposed scheme−1 no longer
preserves rotation invariance. The proposed algorithms also achieve comparable
performance with most existing algorithms under shearing distortions. The perfor-
mance results for random bending [107] and cropping are shown in Figure 7.5(a)
and (b) respectively. We observe that the proposed schemes perform very well
for both these distortions. This is because the magnitude of the low frequency
coefficients of the Fourier transform that contribute to the hash does not change
much under moderate bending and cropping.
We show the performance of the hash algorithms under additive noise in Fig-
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Table 7.3: Performance of the algorithm for dissimilar images under the type of
manipulation shown in Figure 7.9. Here, dAB denotes the distance between images
(a) and (b).
Hashing method used dAB dAC dBC
Mihçak’s algorithm B [98] 0.50 0.20 0.28
Venkatesan’s scheme [138] 0.37 0.15 0.31
Fridrich’s scheme [42] 0.41 0.26 0.34
Proposed scheme 1 0.49 0.28 0.37
Proposed scheme 2 0.48 0.32 0.39
ure 7.6. We observe from the figure that the proposed scheme−2 does well com-
pared to the proposed scheme−1 and other existing schemes. We further note
that the normalized Hamming distance between the hashes of the noisy image and
the original image is very small and on the order of 0.02. This performance is
attributed to the low pass filtering in the preprocessing step of the hash genera-
tion. The results for filtering and JPEG compression are shown in Figure 7.7 and
Figure 7.8. We observe that the performance of the proposed schemes under these
distortions is comparable to the existing schemes.
The Discriminative Capability of Hash
Since image hash should be able to distinguish malicious manipulations from
content-preserving ones, its performance in differentiating images with different
contents is an important performance aspect. For images with different contents,
an ideal hash algorithm should produce two statistically independent binary hash
vectors, where half of the hash bits are expected to be the distinct and the other
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half the same. This would result in a normalized Hamming distance of around 0.5.
Our experiments with a set of 1200 different images indicate that the mean of nor-
malized Hamming distance of the resulting 719,400 combinations was around 0.48.
To further demonstrate the performance of the proposed scheme to inauthentic
modifications, we consider the following cut-and-paste image editing as shown in
Figure 7.9, where a new image (c) is created by combining approximately equal
parts from image (a) and (b). An ideal image hashing scheme should classify
(c) as inauthentic. We perform this test on 500 images and list the normalized
Hamming distance between the obtained hash vectors for different algorithms in
Table 7.3. We can see from the table that the proposed schemes find the image (c)
to have large distances from (a) and (b), and thus correctly declare it inauthentic;
on the other hand, the existing algorithms suggest a smaller distance and have
lower reliability to distinguish (c) from (a) and (b).
Image Authentication as a Hypothesis Testing Problem
Generally speaking, the problem of image authentication can be considered as a
hypothesis testing problem with the following two hypotheses
• H0: Image is not authentic; and
• H1: Image is authentic.
Now, we examine the robustness and discriminative capabilities of various hashing
schemes in terms of the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) [109,145]. The
ROC curve characterizes the receiver’s performance by classifying the received
signal into one of the hypothesis states. For each original image, we compute and
store the hash values, which we denote as h1. Given the received image, we find its
hash value h2 and declare it to be authentic if the normalized Hamming distance
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Figure 7.5: Performance of various hashing schemes under (a) bending and (b)
cropping. Cropped images were obtained by retaining the central portion of the
image and removing the boundaries. The cropped image is resized to a pre-
determined canonical size before computing the hash.
between the hashes satisfies d(h1, h2) < η where η is a decision threshold. Based
on ground truth, we record the number that are correctly classified as authentic
to give us an estimate of the probability of correct detection (PD). For a given η,
we also record the number of processed versions of other images that are falsely
classified as original image and obtain an estimate of the probability of false alarm
(PF ). We repeat this process for different decision thresholds η, and arrive at
the ROC. The ROC obtained from the experiments using 1200 different images is
shown in Figure 7.10. We can observe from the ROC curves that the proposed
schemes attain a PD = 0.95 when the PF is 0.05, while the other schemes attain
the same PD when PF is close to 0.15. Hence, the proposed scheme has a higher
probability of correct detection for a given probability of false alarm and hence
achieves a better performance. This further demonstrates the advantages of the
proposed hashing schemes over the existing schemes.
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Figure 7.6: Performance of various hashing schemes under additive noise. The
noisy images were artificially generated by adding uniform/Gaussian distributed
noise of different variances to the original image.


































































Figure 7.7: Performance of various hashing schemes under filtering.
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Figure 7.8: Performance of various hashing schemes under JPEG compression.
7.3 Security Analysis
In addition to robustness, another important performance aspect of image hashing
is security, i.e. the hash values should not be easily forged or estimated without
the knowledge of the secret key. In this section, we introduce a framework to
evaluate and compare the security of image hashing schemes. We propose to use
differential entropy as a metric to study the security of randomized image features
and derive analytical expressions of the proposed metric for some representative
classes of image hashing algorithms. Further extensions of the proposed framework
and other possible approaches to study security are described later in Section 7.4.3.
7.3.1 The Proposed Security Evaluation Framework
We propose to evaluate the security of image hashing schemes from an adversary
view point. The adversary knows the hashing algorithm g(·) and the image I, and
tries to estimate the hash values without the knowledge of the secret key. The
degree of success that can be attained by the adversary depends on the amount of
193
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.9: An example of inauthentic manipulations obtained by combining parts
of multiple images. (a) and (b) are two original 512 × 512 images. Image (c) is
obtained by combining parts of image (a) and (b).
randomness in the hash values. The higher the amount of randomness in the hash
values, the tougher it would be to estimate or duplicate the hash without knowing
the key. In the subsequent discussions, we shall focus on the security of the output
of the feature extraction stage. Since the quantization and the compression stages
are chained with feature extraction stage, once the entropy of this stage is obtained,
the entropy measure for the following stages can be obtained subsequently.
We start the discussion by reviewing the definition of differential entropy [27].











where f(x) is the probability density function of X and Ω is the range of support
of f(x). In most image hashing schemes, the output of the feature extraction
stage consists of two components – a deterministic part and a random part. The
deterministic part is contributed by the image content, which we will consider to
be known or can be well approximated from the test version of the image that
the attacker can acquire. The random part is contributed by the pseudo-random
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Figure 7.10: Receiver Operating Characteristics of the hypothesis testing problem.
The plots display the probability of correct decision (PD) with respect to the
probability of false alarm (PF ). A greater the value of PD for the same PF indicates
more robustness. The original curve is shown on the left and the magnified version
is shown on the right.
numbers generated using the secret key. In our analysis, we model the output of
the feature extraction stage as random variables and find the degree of uncertainty
in terms of the differential entropy to arrive at the security metric [121]. In the
following sections, we present the security analysis for our proposed scheme, and
compare it with the results obtained for a number of representative prior work on
image hashing [42, 98, 138].
7.3.2 Analytic Expressions of the Security Metric for the
Proposed Schemes
In this part, we derive analytic expressions of the security metric for the proposed
schemes. In the proposed scheme−1, the randomness in the hash is introduced by
the variables {βρk,i}, which are key-dependent pseudo-random numbers, normally
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distributed with mean m and variance σ2. The final hash can be considered as a
weighted summation of these Gaussian distributed random variables as shown in
(7.5), where the weights of the summation are determined by the image content and
known to the users. Since the sum of Gaussian random variables is also Gaussian,







































Therefore, the differential entropy of the feature extraction stage for the proposed


























We observe that the differential entropy increases as the variance σ2 becomes large
and the scheme becomes more secure as expected. Additionally, we note that the
differential entropy rises as the number of sample points K is increased. This is also
expected since a higher value of K implies that we involve more random numbers
for generating each hash value as shown in (7.5); and hence the hash would be
more difficult to forge.
Next, we derive the security metric for the proposed scheme−2. In this scheme,
we use the secret key to generate random sets of radii {Γk}, and the weights (βρ)
for the summation in (7.6). To facilitate discussions, we define qρ as the summation



















The ρ values chosen for generating the hash are from Γρ = {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN}. Let
λik be Bernoulli distributed random variables such that P (λik = 0) = P (λik =
196






We observe that each hash value obtained is a weighted summation of N terms and
each of these terms is a product of a Bernoulli and a Gaussian distributed random
variable. Therefore, the hash value hk is not Gaussian. To find the differential
entropy of hk, we first find the probability density function (pdf) of hk using the
(7.13) and then use the pdf to find the entropy. To derive the pdf, we compute the
characteristic function of hk and apply its inverse Fourier transform [106]. It can










































































where δ(·) denotes the dirac delta function. We observe that the pdf of hk is a sum
of many Gaussian pdf’s and finding the exact expression for the differential entropy
by integrating (7.8) would not be feasible. We instead find the lower and upper
bounds of the differential entropy. Using the concavity property of the entropy, we
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This lower bound can be simplified using the following energy compaction property
of the Fourier transform. Without any loss of generality, we assume that the radii
are ordered as ρ1 < ρ2 < ρ3 < . . . < ρN . Now, since qρi is the summation of the
absolute values of the Fourier transform coefficients along the circumference of the
circle of radius ρi, we have
qρ1 ≥ qρ2 ≥ . . . ≥ qρN (7.16)

















Next, to derive the upper bound, we use the fact that the Gaussian distribution
has the maximum differential entropy among all distributions with the same vari-
ance. Moreover, the differential entropy of a Gaussian distributed random variable
depends only on its variance. Therefore, we obtain an upper bound on ℵ(hk) by



















In Figure 7.11, we show the derived lower and upper bounds along with the
actual value, for different number of sampling points (N). The true values were
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Figure 7.11: The entropy of the hash values for the proposed scheme−2 plotted
with respect to the number of sampling points N. The plots show the lower bound,
the upper bound and the actual value. The actual plot is shown on the left and
the magnified version is shown on the right.
obtained by numerically computing the differential entropy from the pdf. of the
hash values. We observe that the upper bound plotted using (7.18) is very tight
and is almost equal to the actual value. This is because the true pdf. of the hash
values is close to Gaussian with the same mean and variance as those used in the
upper bound calculation.
7.3.3 Extending the Security Evaluation to Other Image
Hashing Schemes
In this subsection, we show that the proposed security metric can be extended to
study the security of various classes of image hashing schemes and is thus generally
applicable. For our study, we consider two representative methods, namely, the
scheme by Fridrich et al. [42] and the hashing algorithm by Venkatesan et al. [138].
These schemes were chosen as they have very different approaches to introduce
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randomness in the feature extraction stage. For instance, the Fridrich’s scheme [42]
secures the hash by projecting the image onto random low-pass images; and the
Venkatesan’s scheme [138] introduces security by extracting image features from
randomly chosen regions of the image.
Security of Fridrich’s scheme [42]
This scheme is based on the observation that any significant change made in the
transform domain would be reflected as visible changes in the image domain. Key-
dependent pseudo-random patterns {X(r)}, of the same size of the image, are
initially generated. These patterns are then spatially averaged with a m × n low-
pass filter {αij} to generate zero-mean smoothened random patterns [Y (r)]kl. The
rth hash value hr is obtained by projecting the input image on to Y











To analyze the security of this scheme, we consider the hash values {hr} as random





















Here, I(αα) is the image obtained by filtering I twice with the filter {αij}. The
details of the analysis is presented in Appendix I of this chapter.
Figure 7.12 shows the plot of the differential entropy of the Fridrich’s scheme for
different orders of averaging filter. We observe from the plot that the differential
entropy decreases as the order of the filter is increased. This result is expected
because on increasing the order of the averaging filter, the degree of uncertainty in
the smoothened patterns {Y (r)} decreases, as the original random images {X(r)}
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Figure 7.12: Differential entropy of the hash for different orders of averaging filters
in Fridrich’s scheme [42].
are low-pass filtered to a greater extent. Thus, the amount of randomness of the
final hash values reduce as a consequence.
Security of Venkatesan’s Scheme [138]
In this scheme, the authors first perform a 3-level DWT of the image and then a
random tiling of each DWT sub-band of the image is generated. The mean (or
variance) of the pixel values in the random rectangle is used to form the feature
vectors [138]. These features are then randomly quantized and compressed to
generate the hash.
There are two aspects of security in this scheme. To estimate the hash values,
the adversary has to first find the locations and sizes of the random partitions and
compute the image statistics in these partitions. Then, the adversary needs to
arrange the estimated hash values in the correct order to obtain the hash vector.
In our analysis, we consider these two aspects separately and obtain the differential
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entropy in each case.
We first show that the exact size and location of the random partitions is not
required to estimate the hash. The attacker can instead make an intelligent guess
of the image statistics by replacing the random partitions with uniformly spaced,
equal sized partitions. In [138], the width of the random partition is uniform
in [wmin, wmax], where wmin and wmax are the minimum and maximum widths
of the random block. Therefore, a good estimate of the partition width would





. Similarly, the height is uniform in the





. The attacker can
calculate the image statistics using uniform size partitions of the size Ew × Eh
to obtain an estimate for the hash values. In Figure 7.13(a), we plot the actual
hash values, our estimates and the corresponding difference (i.e. the estimation
error). Here, the estimates are obtained by computing the statistics from the
closest uniform spaced partition. We note that the error has a much lower dynamic
range than the actual value even though the location and size of the estimated
partitions are not exactly the same as those used in hash generation. The amount
of randomness in the hash values can be characterized by the degree of uncertainty
in our estimation. Therefore, the differential entropy of the first aspect of security,
h(1), can be numerically obtained by first finding the pdf of the estimation error
and then computing the entropy from the pdf For the Lena image, h(1) can be
numerically computed to be around 5.74. We also note that h(1) only characterizes
one aspect of randomness in the hash values. Therefore, the actual differential
entropy of the hash values ℵ(hk) would be greater than h(1).
The second aspect of the hash security that we consider here is the randomness
associated with the order in which the individual hash values are concatenated
202























(a) The plot of the actual and the estimated image
statistics vector in the first stage of the hashing
scheme along with their differences; for the Lena
image with wmin = 10, wmax = 40, and W = 512.































(b) The entropy obtained by modeling the syn-
chronization errors plotted for different parameter
values of wmax and wmin with W = H = 512,
wmin = hmin, and wmax = hmax.
Figure 7.13: Security analysis results for Venkatesan’s scheme.
together while creating the hash vector. Here, we compare the true hash vec-
tors generated using the randomized block partitions and the ones estimated using
uniform partitions and assume that both these hash vectors are obtained using a
raster-scan order of the partitioning blocks. It is to be noted that any further per-
mutation of the hash can be factored into the post-processing stage which we shall
not consider here as indicated before. A good uniform partition that emulates the
randomized partition can be obtained as follows. We model the two-dimensional
randomized partitioning as a combination of first partitioning the input image
along the vertical direction into rows and then further partitioning each row into
blocks. Let M denote the number of rows and Ni denote the number of partitions




, E(Ni) = E(N) =
2W
wmin + wmax
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ M (7.21)
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The derivation is presented in Appendix II of this chapter.
Since, we use a uniform partition to approximate the randomized partition,
there will be synchronization errors in each row of the estimated partition. Let
us now denote the amount of synchronization errors in the nth row by Yn. The





(Ni − mN). (7.22)
In order to facilitate combining the security analysis of the synchronization error
with the differential entropy h(1) derived for first security aspect, we provide a
continuous approximation of Yn and bound its maximum amount of uncertainty.
We note that among all continuous random variables with the same variance,
the Gaussian distribution has the maximum differential entropy; and that the
differential entropy is completely specified by the determinant of its correlation
matrix. So we construct a M × M correlation matrix RY for the set of random
variables {Y1, Y2, . . . , YM},
RY (i, j) = E(YiYj) = min(i, j)σ
2
N . (7.23)
Here, σ2N denotes the variance of Ni and can be computed from its probability mass
function (pmf) given in (7.38) of Appendix II of this chapter. It can be shown that
|RY | = σ2MN . Therefore, using the Gaussian upper bound, the differential entropy















In Figure 7.13(b), we show the plot of the upper bound as given by the RHS of
(7.24) for different values of wmin and wmax. We observe that the upper bound
heavily depends on the value of the variance σ2N . For very small wmax, we have
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Table 7.4: Comparison of differential entropy of various hashing schemes shown
for three different images.
Hashing algorithm Differential entropy
Lena Baboon Peppers
Proposed scheme−1 8.2 − 15.6 13.58 − 16.18 8.76 − 15.46
Proposed scheme−2 16.28 16.39 16.18
Fridrich’s scheme [42] 8.31 8.32 8.14
Venkatesan’s scheme [138] 5.74 − 11.48 5.96 − 11.70 5.65 − 11.39
Mihçak’s algorithm B [98] 8 8 8
σ2N → 0 and therefore h(2) → −∞, suggesting that the hashing algorithm becomes
insecure for low σ2N . This result is expected because when wmax ≈ wmin, the
window widths and locations become approximately deterministic and the errors
caused by synchronization are small.
Overall, when an attacker replaces the random partitions by uniformly spaced
partitions to estimate the hash values, the two aspects of security will both con-
tribute to the uncertainty of the hash algorithm. Thus, the final differential entropy
can be approximated by (h(1) + h(2)).
The above analysis method can be generalized and extended to other hashing
schemes alike. For example, analysis can be applied to the hashing scheme by




In this subsection, we compare the security of image hashing schemes in terms
of the differential entropy as a metric. We compute the differential entropy of
the hash values on the Lena image for various schemes and present the results in
Table 7.4.
The differential entropy of the proposed scheme−1 lies in the range 8.2− 15.6.
This is due to the fact that each hash value in the scheme−1 has different amount
of randomness based on the radius on which the summation in (7.5) is performed.
If the corresponding Fourier transform coefficients have a higher magnitude, then
the variance of the hash values would be larger. Thus some of the hash values
can be estimated easily, while it might be difficult to estimate some others. This
can be considered as one of the disadvantages of the proposed scheme−1. The
disadvantage is overcome in the proposed scheme−2 because the summation is
done over randomly chosen subsets and thus all the hash values would have a
similar amount of randomness. We note that the differential entropy of the feature
extraction stage of the proposed scheme−2 is higher than that of the scheme−1.
This is expected because in the proposed scheme−2, the random weights are scaled
by larger factors and thus the overall variance of the hash values would be higher
Next, we observe that the differential entropy of the proposed scheme−2 is
greater than that of Fridrich’s scheme. This can be attributed to the low-pass
filtering operations in Fridrich’s scheme that reduces the variance of the random
variables and hence its entropy. The differential entropy of Venkatesan’s scheme is
lower than those of proposed schemes. This is because, even without the knowledge
of the exact block partitions, the image statistics in Venkatesan’s scheme can be
estimated to reasonable accuracy. On the other hand, in the proposed schemes,
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the attackers need to guess the random variables in computing features (such as
βik).
Notice that we only consider the security of the feature extraction stage in this
work. It should be noted that while random permutation or other techniques alike
can be applied to any scheme to bring further randomness, such post-processing
does not change the relative security results obtained in this work. If the type of
quantization and/or quantization step size employed by various schemes are not
identical, the gap between the security metric for these schemes may change and
can be further analyzed.
7.4 Discussions
7.4.1 Trade-off Between Robustness and Security
In this section, we jointly consider the two main performance criteria for image
hashing, namely, robustness and security. We observe a trade-off between the
two criteria for each hashing scheme and illustrate this phenomenon with some
examples.
In Figure 7.14(a), we show the trade-off between robustness and security for the
Fridrich’s scheme [42]. The scheme was simulated for different orders of averaging
filter; and the ROC and the differential entropy was obtained in each case. The
ROC was sampled to obtain the probabilities of correct decisions PD for three
different probabilities of false alarm PF , and plotted with respect to the differential
entropy. We observe that as the robustness increases, the scheme becomes less
secure and vice-versa. This trend is expected because on increasing the order of the
averaging filters, the patterns Y (r) become more smooth making the scheme more
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robust to content-preserving manipulations like the ones in Table 7.1. However,
the scheme becomes less secure because the smooth patterns Y (r) would be less
random.
Similar behavior can also be observed for the proposed scheme−2. The perfor-
mance of the scheme was studied for different parameter values; and the ROC and
the differential entropy were obtained in each case. As shown in the Figure 7.14(b),
we observe that for a fixed PF , as we increase the variance of the random weights
βik, the differential entropy increases and the robustness decreases. However, it is
to be noted that proposed scheme exhibits a better trade-off compared to Fridrich’s
scheme. This is evident by comparing the X-axis of Figure 7.14(a) and (b). We
observe that proposed scheme−2 is more secure than the Fridrich’s scheme for the
same amount of robustness. This demonstrates the advantages of the proposed
scheme.
The robustness results in Figure 7.10 and the differential entropy values in Ta-
ble 7.4 show that the proposed scheme−2 provides better tradeoff between robust-
ness and security against guessing than the proposed scheme−1. This is attributed
to the fact that the circular summation along the θ-axis in proposed scheme−2 can
generate more robust features. In the mean time, we also remark that the circular
summation is a double-edged sword and may reduce the resilience against collision
and forgery attacks. It is possible for malicious attackers to perform meaningful
changes by altering individual values of the Fourier transform coefficients while
preserving the overall sum. In contrast, the proposed scheme−1 is more resilient
to such collision attacks, as the weights of the summation are random and depend
on a secret key unknown to adversaries. A possible improvement is to employ a
weighted circular summation with gradually changing weights, where the varying
208
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Figure 7.14: Robustness and security trade-off for (a) Fridrich’s scheme (b) Pro-
posed scheme−2.
trend of the weights is specified by a secret key. This hybrid scheme can combine
the advantages of the two proposed schemes, improving the collision resistance
compared to scheme−2 and also the robustness compared to scheme−1.
7.4.2 Extending the Security Analysis to Quantization Al-
gorithms
We have shown that the differential entropy can be used as a metric to study the
security of the feature extraction stage in image hashing. In this section, we extend
the security analysis beyond the feature extraction stage and show that entropy
can be used as a metric to study the degree of security of the quantization stage
that follows feature extraction.
As an example, we consider the randomized quantization algorithm proposed
in [97], which is an adaptive quantization algorithm that takes into account the
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, where Q is the number of quantization levels and pX(·)
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i − 1 w.p. 1 if Ci ≤ x ≤ Ai,

















if Ai ≤ x ≤ Bi,
i w.p. 1 if Bi ≤ x ≤ Ci+1.
(7.25)
We again use the conditional entropy ℵ(hk|I) as a security metric. Based on
the detailed derivation in Appendix III of this chapter, we can show that
H(q(X)|X) = r log2(e), (7.26)
which quantifies the amount of randomness introduced by the randomized quan-
tization. We note that the conditional entropy is directly proportional on the
randomization parameter r, and is independent of the source distribution. Other
quantization algorithms can be analyzed similarly using conditional entropy as a
metric.
7.4.3 Further Discussions on Hash Security
In this work, we have considered the conditional entropy of the hash values as a
metric to study security. Our analysis is based on the premise that the adversary
knows the image and the hashing algorithm being used and does not know the key
210
used in generating the hash. Therefore, in our analysis, the adversary does not have
access to the actual hash values and tries to estimate them based on his knowledge.
Alternatively, we can evaluate the security of a hashing scheme by measuring the
conditional entropy of the hashing key when the image, the hashing algorithm
and output hash values are known. This conditional entropy can be written as
ℵ(K|(I, h)), where K denotes the key, I the image, and h the corresponding hash
value. In reality, if more information is available to the adversary, he/she may be
able to come up with more sophisticated attacks to break the hashing algorithm.
In such a case, the conditional entropy of the key will reduce with the increase in
the number of observed image/hash pairs. Thus, ℵ(K|(I1, h1), (I2, h2), ...(In, hn))
is a monotonically decreasing function with n. When n is large enough, it would
be possible to uniquely identify the key K with very high probability. This is
analogous to Shannon’s discussion on secrecy system and his definition of unicity
distance [118]. Along these lines, we may define another notion of hashing security
by requiring that the conditional entropy ℵ(K|(I1, h1), (I2, h2), ...(In, hn)) is not
negligible as long as the number of observed image/hash pairs, n, is upper bounded
by a polynomial in key length. We note that for image hashing and other types of
multimedia hashing, an adversary may not need to exactly recover the key in order
to estimate a hash. The estimation type of attack introduced in [116] is clearly an
example.
7.5 Chapter Summary
Robustness and security are two important requirements for image hashing algo-
rithms in applications involving authentication, watermarking, and image databases.
In this chapter, we have developed a new image hashing schemes that has improved
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robustness and security features. We show that the proposed schemes is resilient
to moderate filtering, and compression operations, and common geometric oper-
ations up to 10 degrees of rotation and 20 percent of cropping. The proposed
hashing scheme also has good discriminative capabilities and can identify mali-
cious manipulations, such as cut-and-paste type of editing, that do not preserve
the content of the image. In addition to the study on robustness, we have intro-
duced a general framework for analyzing the security in image hashing. We derive
analytical expressions using differential entropy as a metric to study the security
of the feature extraction stage for both the proposed schemes and several existing
representative schemes. Our studies have shown that the proposed image hashing
algorithm is highly secure in terms of this metric. The analysis can also be ex-
tended to incorporate other stages of the hashing operation, such as randomized
quantization.
Overall, we developed a new image hashing algorithm. It is more robust com-
pared to existing image hashing schemes, and at the same time, it is also secure
against estimation and forgery attacks. Thus, it can provide a robust and secure
representation of images for numerous applications.
Appendix: Details on Modeling and Derivations
Appendix I: Deriving the Security Metric for the
Fridrich’s scheme [42]
In Fridrich’s scheme, key-dependent pseudo-random patterns X(r)(r = 1, 2, . . . N)
of the same size of the input image are first generated. These pseudo-random
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patterns have uniform distributed pixel values. These patterns are then spatially






















The input image I is projected on the N smooth patterns {Y (r)} to obtain the











These intermediate hash values are then quantized to generate the final hash. In
our analysis, we model the intermediate hash values hr as random variables and
find its differential entropy to generate the security metric. The hash values hr in



















where the random variables V
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We observe that V
(r)
ij is a weighted sum of W × H uniformly distributed ran-
dom variables {X(r)ij } with the weights determined by the image pixel values (Ikl).
According to the Central Limit Theorem, we approximate V
(r)
ij to be Gaussian
distributed, with mean m
(r)
ij and variance σ
2(r)


































We also note that all {V (r)ij } are identically distributed, but are not independent
since the same random variables {X(r)ij } are used to generate various V (r)ij . The de-




























Now, from (7.29), we see that hr is a weighted sum of m× n Gaussian distributed
random variables. So hr is also Gaussian and its differential entropy is completely



































































Note that I(αα) is the image obtained by filtering I the image twice with the filter




















Appendix II: Model for Block partitioning in Venkate-
san’s scheme [138]
As indicated in Section 7.3.3, we approximate the 2-D block partitioning as a com-
bination of two 1-D problems, namely, partitioning along the horizontal direction
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and then along the vertical direction. To model the partition along the width of
the image, we divide the space (0, W ) into several regions by successively gen-
erating random numbers {Uk} as shown in Figure 7.15, uniformly distributed in
[wmin, wmax], and wmin and wmax are the minimum and the maximum widths of the
random blocks. The location of the nth partition is then given by a set of random
variables Tn, where Tn =
∑n
k=1 Uk. Since Tn is the sum of n uniformly distributed
random variables, we approximate Tn with a Gaussian distribution. Its mean mTn









(wmax − wmin)2. (7.36)
Let Ni denote the number of partitions in the i
th row. Using the distribution of
Tn and noting that Ni is also the index for the last partition in the row, we can
write the pmf of Ni as








P (wmin < Un+1 < wmax)fTn(t) dt, (7.37)
where fTn(·) is the pdf of Tn. Using the Gaussian assumption on Tn, the above
expression can be simplified as


















wmax + mTn − W
wmax − wmin
(FTn(W − wmin) − FTn(W − wmax))
+ (FTn(W ) − FTn(W − wmin)), (7.38)
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Figure 7.15: Simplified model of the block partitioning algorithm in Venkatesan’s
scheme [138]
















Figure 7.16: The plot of the pmf of Ni−the number of blocks in ith row, where
the parameters are wmin = 10, wmax = 40, and W = 512. Note that the random
variable Ni has a very small variance and hence the mean would be a good estimate.

















The plot of the pmf of Ni is shown in Figure 7.16. From this pmf, we can derive





Appendix III: Deriving the Security Metric for
Randomized Quantization [97]
In this appendix, we provide the detailed derivations of the conditional entropy for
the randomized quantization algorithm [97]. The conditional entropy H(q(X)|X)


















H(q(X)|X = x)pX(x)dx, (7.40)
where pX(·) denotes the pdf of the input data X. The last step follows from (7.25)
since the quantizer q(X) is random only in the interval Ai ≤ x ≤ Bi. Now, we note
that in this interval, q(X) takes a value i with probability pi = (PX(x)−PX(Ai)) Q2r ,








(pi log2(pi) + (1 − pi) log2(1 − pi))pX(x)dx





In this dissertation, we have introduced two new frameworks for forensic analysis
of digital camera images based on intrinsic and extrinsic fingerprints.
We consider the problem of component forensics and propose a set of forensic
signal processing techniques based on intrinsic fingerprinting to identify the algo-
rithms and parameters employed in the individual processing modules of digital
devices. We particularly focus on digital cameras for this dissertation and propose
a non-intrusive methodology to estimate the parameters of camera’s color filter
array and color interpolation modules; these parameters form the intrinsic finger-
print traces of the digital camera. We show through detailed simulations with 19
camera models of nine different brands that the proposed algorithms can authen-
ticate the source camera and identify the exact brand with 90% accuracy. Our
analysis also suggests that there is a considerable degree of similarity within the
cameras of the same brand and some level of resemblance among cameras from
different manufacturers.
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Building upon component forensics, we introduce a new formulation to study
the problem of image authenticity. The proposed formulation is based on the
observation that each in-camera and post-camera processing operation leave some
distinct intrinsic fingerprint traces on the final image. Using appropriate models,
we present techniques to estimate the in-camera component parameters and the
linear shift-invariant approximation of the post-camera manipulations. We show
that evidence obtained from such forensic analysis is used to build a forensic testbed
to identify the image acquisition source (whether the image was captured using
a camera, cell phone camera, scanner, or generated via computer graphics?), the
brand and model of the imaging device, and to determine if there has been any
post-device processing such as tampering or steganographic embedding. Overall,
our proposed techniques provides a common framework for a broad range of forensic
analysis on digital images.
We then present a generalized theoretical analysis to gain a concrete under-
standing about component forensics and to answer a number of fundamental ques-
tions related to what processing operations can and cannot be identified and un-
der what conditions. We define formal notions of classifiability of components and
present bounds on parameter estimation accuracies. Developing upon notions from
the theoretical analysis, we present techniques for robustly estimating the compo-
nent parameters via semi non-intrusive forensics. We believe that such component
forensic analysis would provide a great source of information for patent infringe-
ment cases, intellectual property rights management, and technology evolution
studies for digital media and push the frontiers of multimedia forensics to gain a
deeper understanding of information processing chain.
While the presented component forensics and intrinsic fingerprinting techniques
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can be employed to determine the source and the authenticity of images just based
on the output data, their accuracies are limited by theoretical performance bounds.
Extrinsic fingerprinting helps bridge the performance gap by employing external
signals, added to the image after capture, to establish the authenticity of the image.
In this dissertation, we design a new content-based image authentication scheme
based on image hashing and show that the proposed scheme is collision-resistant,
robust to common signal processing operations, and secure against estimation and
forgery attacks. Combined with intrinsic fingerprint techniques, extrinsic finger-
printing provides a universal framework for digital image forensics for a wide range
of applications.
The main contributions of the thesis are as follows:
• Introduced component forensics as a new methodology for multimedia foren-
sics, aiming at identifying algorithms and parameters in each component of
an information processing chain.
• Proposed algorithms to non-intrusively estimate the parameters of in-camera
components such as the color filter array and the color interpolation based
solely on the output data.
• Applied the estimated in-camera parameters for several forensic tasks, in-
cluding camera identification and technology infringement/licensing foren-
sics, and to design a universal framework for image acquisition forensics.
• Introduced methods to detect post-camera processing operations by modeling
them as a linear shift invariant system and casting the problem into a blind
deconvolution framework; and showed that the estimated manipulation filter
coefficients can efficiently differentiate between processed images and direct
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camera outputs.
• Developed a new theoretical framework for multimedia forensics based on
estimation and pattern classification theories. This is the first work in liter-
ature to look into theoretical analysis of multimedia forensics.
• Introduced the concept of semi non-intrusive forensics and devised methods
to design optimal inputs for semi non-intrusive forensics.
• Presented a new robust and secure hash as an extrinsic fingerprint and
showed that the proposed hash is resilient to geometric and filtering op-
erations in images.
• Introduced a systematic evaluation of the security of image hash functions
and demonstrated the trade-offs between robustness and security in several
hashing schemes.
Based on the study of this dissertation, there are several aspects of multimedia
forensics that can be further explored. In our work, we have mainly focussed on
digital cameras. However, the fundamental principles of intrinsic fingerprinting and
component forensics can be widely applicable to a range of other imaging devices
such as scanners, cell phone cameras, and video recorders; and display devices
including projectors and Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) screens. In our recent work,
we have extended the forensic methodology beyond cameras and employed it for cell
phone cameras [94] and with image scanners [54,55] with very encouraging results.
A promising next step is to go beyond still images and apply the analysis to digital
video data. Video brings in several additional challenges due to its time domain
features. Therefore, a more sophisticated imaging model incorporating the effects
of time domain would be necessary to perform forensic analysis of video. The time
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domain also allows for better attacks and more possibilities for the attackers, and
it would be interesting to design and introduce methods for component forensics
of digital video that would be robust to improved and more targeted attacks.
The research on component forensics and intrinsic fingerprinting presented in
this thesis can also be applicable to a number of interesting problems from com-
munications and networking to biology and web design. For instance, transmitting
data from the sender to the receiver involves a series of processing operations that
include source coding, channel coding, message modulation onto a carrier signal,
physical transmission over a channel (wireline or wireless), demodulation, and de-
coding. Forensic analysis on the various components of the information processing
chain, to estimate the parameters such components as source coding, channel cod-
ing, the message modulation scheme, and the channel parameters, just based on
the received signal can help identify the nature of the source and further help es-
tablish the integrity of the message. The proposed theoretical framework can also
be extended to other applications such as to analyze biological processes.
In this thesis, we have examined both intrinsic and extrinsic fingerprint ap-
proaches for multimedia forensics and demonstrated the applicability, advantages,
and drawbacks of these frameworks. A natural extension of this work is to exam-
ine a joint intrinsic-extrinsic framework for forensic analysis that can combine the
advantages of the two frameworks. One step in this direction is to design foren-
sic hashes. Just as the image hash is a content-based compact representation of
an image with applications in image authentication, the forensic hash is a short
representation of the data focussed on gaining a better understanding of the infor-
mation processing chain to answer forensic questions regarding how an image was
generated; from where an image was from; what has been done on the image since
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its creation, by whom, when and how. The forensic hash can be designed to be an
intrinsic device-specific fingerprint or an extrinsic fingerprint that is added to the
image at the time of capture. This new hash can then be employed to identify the
tell-tale clues about the various processing operations that the image/video has
gone through. It would be interesting to examine the design and performance of
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